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Chapter 1 – Introduction
1
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
In the late 19th century the electric utility industry began its emergence on both sides of the 
Atlantic. During its embryonic phase the industry, consisting of generation, integrated 
distribution / retail, and in some cases even consumption, was under the umbrella of one 
vertically integrated local monopoly firm. The initial model had similar characteristics all over 
the world. This is due to the lack of an infrastructure with an established legacy to support the 
new industry, combined with the substantial risks involved with investments in the build-up and 
early expansion of electricity generation, transmission and distribution. There was probably 
never a formal decision to use a monopoly as the organizational form – this emerged naturally 
from the technical foundations of the new industry. Besides the entrepreneurs in the industry, 
during this era nobody really could have predicted what the overall role of this new energy 
infrastructure would be. Nobody could have known for certain that electricity would grow to 
have the significant role we recognize today in terms of serving the infrastructure development 
of society (Demurger, 2002; Röller and Waverman, 2001; Calderon and Serven, 2004). 
As the electric utility industry grew and gained a more established position in society, the 
increasing number of firms engaged in energy business inevitably led to interaction between the 
firms in the industry, and subsequently to competition. This in turn resulted in the restructuring 
of the industry through a wave of mergers between the firms (Behling, 1938). A natural 
consequence of the growth of the firms was an increase of the power of the firms vis-à-vis the 
customer, and more generally in society. In the United States (US) the government began efforts 
to restrict the growing power of the monopolies by introducing antitrust legislation in the 1910s 
and 1920s (Chandler, 1990). This action was, among others directed towards the electricity 
utility industry as the overall significance of this new energy delivery infrastructure industry in 
the US began to unfold.
It is especially in the Nordic area that the government’s role has been significant as an owner of 
enterprises in general, the governments have often also had direct authority over energy firms. 
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Obviously the situation in all European countries has not been identical. In some countries 
private enterprises have had a leading role in the energy industry, while in others government-
owned and private enterprises have coexisted. In Europe the question of the market power of 
energy firms permanently emerged on the public agenda in conjunction with the privatization of 
the energy industry in the 1990s, which was sometimes followed by unbundling the firms into 
wires and sales businesses. In the UK, the administration of Prime Minister Thatcher began 
introducing competition and privatization in the energy market, which later spread to other 
countries in Europe.
The relatively static state both in the US and Europe was perhaps permanently changed by the 
introduction of competition towards the end of the 1990s. The process was started on a major
scale in Europe through the introduction of common market principles by the European union 
(EU). This has taken place in three phases1, the third of which at this time is still pending. In the 
US the idea of opening up the markets for competition was a wave that extended through the 
country in the late 1990s.
The rationale for this dissertation is in the need to understand the behavior of energy firms in the 
US and Europe as a reaction to the changes in their regulatory environments when the markets in 
which they were operating were opened for competition. The variances in the ways the firms 
appeared to react further emphasized the complexity of the issue. Although there seemed to be a 
multiplicity of paths the different jurisdictions took, sometimes they appeared to come to a 
standstill, but somehow later regained momentum. In the huge machinery consisting of the 
legislative – regulatory environment, and the firms with their customers, every component 
seemed to somehow be dependent on multi level interactions in an interconnected network of 
influences. The features of interaction between the industry, the regulatory environment and the 
legislative framework under various jurisdictions appeared to be different, but yet somehow 
emitted signals as if it would be following a similar grand scheme. In some markets the firms 
and their regulatory environments had been evolving in close interaction, while in other markets 
the relationship could even have been regarded as hostile. The characteristics of competition 
changed when the markets were opened for competition. This often resulted in a wave of 
mergers between the companies – some companies flourished while some others vanished. All 
this seemed to depend on a complex combination of circumstantial characteristics.
1 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council dated 19 December 1996 (1stPackage) set out 
the framework for common rules for the internal market in electricity. This first package has subsequently been 
complemented by the second package (2003/54/EC) (2ndPackage). The third package (Directive 2009/72/EC) was 
approved by the European parliament in September 2009 and it will thus enter into force in March 2010 and has to 
be subsequently included in the national legislation of the member states. 
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In this research I concentrate on the electricity retail firms. I have restricted the scope of this 
research, being especially fully aware of the many similarities between the electricity and gas 
markets, the fact that often these two products are found in the sales portfolio of an energy 
company, and that the two products sometimes influence each other. I will further narrow the 
scope of this research to the evolutionary paths of electricity retail firms at the time of opening 
their respective markets for competition; analyzing the signals they obtained from the operative 
environment and the firms’ reactions to these signals. This narrow scope, however, led to the 
carrying out of research in a relatively broad field, and to combining research streams from
classical economics, political economy, strategy research and research of organizational 
behavior, and ultimately to creating a new interdisciplinary research stream. 
1.2 THE STATE OF RESEARCH IN REGULATION AND POLITICAL 
ECONOMY
In classical economic theory the smallest indivisible building block of society is the “economic 
man” who always seeks his own interest. Olson (1965), however, lists other motivational causes 
for economic behavior that could likewise be regarded rational. This list includes, gaining 
prestige, friendship, social and psychological benefits, or simply, philanthropic or religious 
causes.  Simon (1986) regards the motivation of gaining economic benefit as being not the 
essential part. In a society composed of free and rational utility-maximizing individuals, these 
individuals interact with each other and sometimes choose to undertake action collectively, 
rather than privately (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965). The obvious emerging question is when will 
an individual member of the group find it advantageous to enter into a "political" relationship 
with his fellows, and what triggers this?
Both the theory of democracy and theory of market economy are products of the Era of 
Enlightenment2 (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965). The eighteenth-century philosophers do not 
specifically make a distinction between these two orders of human activity. The democratic state 
was conceived as that set of constraints appropriate to a society which managed its economic 
affairs largely through a competitive economic order, in which the economic interests of 
individuals were acknowledged to be paramount in driving men to action. Buchanan and Tullock 
(1965) describe the conceptualization of collective action in the eighteenth century in terms of 
the laying down of general rules, applicable to all individuals and groups in the social order. In 
2 The authors refer to England as discussion in other countries could have taken a different path.
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the discussion of these general rules, serious and important differences in the economic interests 
of separate individuals and groups were not expected to occur. Differences were foreseen and the 
necessity for compromises was recognized. However, these were not usually interpreted in terms 
of differences in economic interest.
Lyon (1937) formulates the essence of private enterprises functioning under the operative 
framework set by the government as follows: “The term “Private Enterprise” would mean 
nothing if it were not for governmental regulations establishing the right of private property and 
for governmental interpretation and enforcement of contracts” (Lyon, 1937). In practice no 
enterprise, private, publicly held or state owned, small or big, could exist or function without an 
overall framework for the business. Most often, in an organized society this is achieved through 
government action, which in turn should represent the interests of individual members of society. 
The most fundamental form of regulating business transactions is to pass laws that define the 
overall framework and structure of the society under which firms conduct their businesses. The 
mere existence of laws would not suffice if there would be no body to ensure that such laws were 
meaningful, and that the intention of the laws would be followed. Subsequent to passing the laws 
the establishment of a law enforcement system is a prerequisite to achieving the expected results
of the system, and to the overall proper functioning of that system. The existence of a state, 
governed by a government can be seen as one indication of the common intent of free and 
rational, utility-maximizing individual members of society (von Mises, 1928; Downs, 1957; 
Buchanan and Tullock, 1965). Choosing common action, rather than each member acting 
individually, can be seen as an indication of members understanding the potential of obtaining 
something more through this form of action.
In addition to classical economics and the work of Austrian economists defining the market 
process (von Mises, 1928, 1979, 2009; Hayek 1973; Kirzner, 1992; Foss and Christensen, 2001) 
there is a rich literature describing the various interactions between firm and customer (Mitzruchi 
and Yoo, 2002; Rao, 2002), regulator and firm (Smith, 1776; Chydenius, 1765; Kahn, 1988; 
Aldrich, 1979; Schumpeter, 1964; Williamson, 1975; Coase, 1988; Kirzner, 1992; Hayek, 1979; 
Stigler, 1988; North, 1990, 1992), and between government and voter (Downs, 1957; Buchanan 
and Tullock, 1965; Kessler, 2003; Downing, 2005; Degan, 2006; North, 1990). There is, 
however, no comprehensive combination of these illustrations that paints a picture of the 
interaction between all these actors during the period of deregulation of the electric utility 
industry. The interaction of the electricity retail firms with the respective environment and the 
subsequent co-evolution of both is the focus of this research.
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Natural monopolies, where one service provider produces the service for an entire society, are 
economically effective due to the continuously downward sloping unit cost curve, or 
subadditivity (Demsetz, 1968; Kahn, 1988; Viscusi et al., 2000, Brätland, 2004). Examples of 
such natural monopolies (Demsetz, 1968; Viscusi et al., 2000) are many infrastructure industries, 
such as the power and gas transmission and distribution networks. Under a natural monopoly a 
certain degree of regulatory restriction is often kept in place in order to prevent the abuse of 
dominant market position, although the ideal of the market regulating itself would follow the 
principles of Austrian Economics (von Mises, 1928, 2009; Hayek, 1973; Kirzner, 1992; Foss and 
Christensen, 2001) where the individual’s action has a pivotal role. The Austrian School makes 
use of the ideas of rest and equilibrium, without which economic thought cannot progress. 
However, it is always aware of the purely instrumental nature of these ideas and aims to account 
for prices actually paid in the market, and not just prices that might be paid under certain 
conditions that are never-realizable (von Mises, 2009). 
Rothbard (1962) regards a monopoly, and the prices a monopoly obtain, to be part of the regular 
market process. In his thinking the market has free entry, which is seldom the case in real-world 
economic situations. Even under natural monopolies the market self-regulation is sometimes 
promoted as an alternative to regulation (Brätland, 2004; Rothbard, 1962). Brätland (2004) goes 
so far as to propose that contestability3 theory as an explanatory framework could be used to 
replace the theory of natural monopolies. A remaining question is then, to what extent, how and 
by what means should the regulation of a natural monopoly be carried out, or should it.
When energy markets are opened for competition we could assume that the government acts in a 
Russeauian fashion as a device for carrying out the will of the people (Downs, 1957). This could 
be presented as a one directional process where the legislator initiates the process with the 
customer being the ultimate beneficiary. However, there are multiple additional parties involved 
in the process that cannot escape the impact of this process. A regulator is required to be an 
instrument to implement the regulations while the target of the regulations is the firm. The 
changes in the firm’s action portfolio, caused by the initiation of the process will subsequently 
impact the choices available to the customer. The customer, being a member of society and thus 
eligible to vote, will by voting, signal whether the publicly declared benefits were ever realized. 
The traditional conceptualization compresses the process into a set of momentary fragmented 
projections with no associated dynamism. In this research I try to show that the process of 
3 The idea in contestability is that a monopoly market is vulnerable and can be challenged from within or from 
without provoking that the entry and exit barriers are not substantial.
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opening the markets for competition should be seen as a dynamic interaction between the 
legislator, regulator, firm and the customer, where the customer has a dual role of a customer to 
the firm in parallel with being a voter in government elections. In this proposed cyclical 
interaction all the actors’ actions influence freedom of the others to take action. An action by a 
subject causes a reaction by the object, which in turn provokes further action by the involved 
parties. This, and the dual role of the customers, ties the process into a cycle where the influence 
appears as a sequence of actions, and reactions leading to interaction. By doing this, I follow 
Downs’ (1957) idea of analyzing political theories and economics, and especially more 
thoroughly, the link between these two. In this research my intention has been to complement the 
existing body of research by merging theories that have previously been separately presented 
into a new dynamic theory of interaction between the firm and its regulatory and business 
environment. I will try to bring a new perspective into the interaction between the various 
subjects and see how they interact. Specifically my intention is to analyze the co-evolutionary 
interaction between the parties.
In order to be able to illustrate the interaction between the firm and the regulatory and business 
environments my intention is to bring a co-evolutionary view into the discussion of corporate 
political activity.
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The first key objective of this study is to analyze and explain the changes in regulatory dynamics 
at the time of opening the energy markets for competition. This translates into mapping both the 
company actions vis-à-vis the events in the business environment of the firm, and the actions 
taking place in the environment of the firm that impact the firm. This is vital for understanding 
the logic of action the firms took at the time of opening the markets and during the following 
period. The second objective of this research is to analyze and identify patterns in the interaction 
between the selected case firms with their respective environments. This approach is encouraged 
by Winter (2005), who states that evolutionary theory invites detailed attention to individual
firms and the problems they face in dealing with competitive environments.
In making energy markets competitive there are at least three distinct parties: the energy firms, 
government (collectively the regulator and the legislator) and customers. My intention with this 
work is to be able to provide understanding to the energy firms struggling with regulatory 
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changes, but also to the regulators who feel the pressure from end consumers trying to navigate 
the unknown waters of competitive markets. 
For this research the principal questions are the following:
1) How do regulatory and industry dynamics change as a result of the opening of energy 
markets for competition?
2) How do the energy firms, customers, and legislator / regulator interact in a post market 
opening environment?
3) How have the action portfolios of energy firms changed at market opening?
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, APPROACH, METHODS AND 
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION
In this research I seek to capture information on the interaction between electric utility firms and 
their business, and regulatory environments and customers during and immediately following the 
opening of the retail markets for competition. To this end, I chose as the research setting retail 
firms and their political and regulatory environments in markets that were opened for 
competition representing both the US and Europe. By selecting firms from both these groups of 
individual markets I tried to cover sufficiently the combinations of market - firm - performance. 
For the firms the change in the business environment was so fundamental that it could be 
characterized as a strategic surprise (Eisenhardt and Bhatia, 2002). Indeed, the interaction 
process after the initial steps was substantial and traceable. In most cases this process is still 
ongoing.
When analyzing electricity utility firms in this context the use of case methodology unfolded as a 
natural means of investigation. For the cases I reconstructed a sequence of events to illustrate the 
events and their temporal relationship. For this analysis I chose to use Event Structure Analysis 
(ESA) and the Ethno4 software, which is a widely used and proven tool, proved to be a good way 
to provide structure to the process of analyzing the events. The use of company press releases as 
a source of event data turned out to have its novelty as a source of firm initiated information. The 
press releases, however, concentrate primarily on positive news. Thus these press releases were 
subsequently complemented by event information that originated from the company
environment. These were complemented by confirmatory interviews with industry experts. 
4 Ethno model developed by Indiana University. http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ESA/ethno.html.
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When selecting a set of case firms representing a multiplicity of markets and political 
environments the challenge was to find markets that would be open and functioning in reality, 
and not only on paper. To assess the functioning of the various component markets I used 
external assessments: in the US the RED index5 for comparing the markets in different states, 
and in Europe, the assessment prepared for the EU concerning the functioning of the markets 
within different member states. The number of real markets where competitiveness would even 
approach the Schumpeterian ideal6 was low, and it was hard to find a large number of firms that 
would be active in these markets. Thus I had to be satisfied with a small N7, however to capture a 
sufficient quantity of data that enabled theory construction.
Many of the firms active in retail were also active in other parts of the electricity value chain, 
such as generation or trading of electricity, natural gas, coal or oil. These other businesses could 
have been made competitive earlier, or at a pace that was different from that of the electricity 
markets. For the purposes of this research I narrowed the scope of the research by omitting the 
other products of the participating firms and concentrated on electricity sales to final consumers; 
i.e. electricity retail. The key focus was placed on electricity retail primarily in order to 
demonstrate causality and comparability, to maintain clarity, and to enable a clear “audit trail” 
throughout the research process. Although many of the selected case firms have an active 
presence in other parts of the value chain, the participation in the retail element was deemed to 
be the key issue.
The mechanisms for introducing competition in the electricity retail markets have been 
dissimilar in different markets and this has led to asymmetrical company reactions and 
subsequent performance differences, and thus provided a fruitful setting for this research. This 
research focuses on Europe (EU 15)8 and the United States (US) as the number of different 
permutations obtainable from these case markets covers sufficient combinations of deregulatory 
arrangements and company reactions and strategy. 
This research aims to contribute to the research in political economy by building a link between 
various research streams.  I have combined the work of key researchers and thus created an 
integrated cyclical model of interaction between the firms, the regulators, the legislators and the 
5 The RED Index was prepared by CAEM, Center for Advancement of Energy Markets, a US think tank.
6 Schumpeter (1964) defines fully competitive Market as one where no actor has the ability to impact the price of 
the product or any factor market. 
7 Small N stands for using a small number of cases as a basis for theory preparation.
8 The justification to select only the 15 EU members as a source of utility data is covered later. The principle for this 
choice is, however, that the historical perspective of the most recent 12 (new) members of the EU is relatively 
short, and the markets only recently opened for competition. 
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customers. A key finding during the process is that energy firm customers also have a role as 
voters in government elections, thus setting the evolutionary cycle in motion. As a function of 
time the cycle keeps spinning towards an elevated level, and towards a common, but unknown 
future.
This dissertation is divided into 8 chapters. In the following, I provide a brief introduction to the 
main issues presented in each chapter.
Chapter 1 includes the introduction to the issue, the research field and how this dissertation ties 
to the existing body of research. The main concepts are defined in this chapter.
Chapter 2 includes an introduction to the research framework. It presents the key results of 
previous research associated with this dissertation. In the chapter I intend to provide an overview 
of the research in political economy. 
Chapter 3 provides an introduction to the research site, i.e. the industry that is central to this 
research. The chapter includes a review of the key characteristics of the value chain, and the 
impact and mechanisms of opening the energy market for competition. 
Chapter 4 presents the methodological foundation of the dissertation including the motivation 
and justification of why the case methodology was selected. In this chapter I present in detail the 
methodology used in the dissertation including the use of Ethno software.
Chapter 5 presents the cases selected for this research and provides a historical narrative and the 
event structure analysis for each case. 
Chapter 6 presents the assessment of the dynamics in the environment after market opening.
Chapter 7 incorporates a development of a theory of competitive dynamics in market opening. 
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation by providing a discussion of the theoretical and practical 
contribution, the weaknesses and limitations of this research. I present some key ideas for future 
research and discuss the managerial implications this research could bring to energy firms, 
regulatory authorities and legislators active in introducing energy-related legislation.
1.5 KEY CONCEPTS
The terminology used in conjunction with bringing competition to the electricity markets can 
have multiple meanings in different market areas, thus sometimes making discussion of these 
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issues a stressful experience. For the purposes of this research, and to bring clarity, I saw the 
necessity to explain some of the key concepts as follows.
Competition: The effort of two or more parties acting independently to secure the business of a 
third party by offering the most favorable terms.9
Competitive dynamics: The dynamism caused by evolving competition.
Deregulation: Removing all or part of regulation (Viscusi et al., 2000). Government, or a 
governmental authorized body, lifting restrictive rules for competition in a particular industry or 
geographical area. The objectives of deregulation can be multiple and include providing an even 
playing field for existing and new players with the aim of protecting consumers and promoting 
general economic development. Deregulation can include demands for the unbundling of 
different functions previously belonging in one firm. It is noteworthy that this expression very 
seldom is used in the US.
Distribution: An activity with the purpose of arranging and maintaining the technical capability 
that is required to deliver electricity over a low voltage cable, wire and metering system to the 
end consumer. In practice this definition of distribution means that the retail customer is 
connected to the electricity infrastructure through a low voltage network that is used to deliver 
electricity to end consumers, who may be residential, commercial and small industrial 
consumers. The distributor invoices the end consumer for the technical capacity of delivering 
electricity to the customer and using this capacity to measure the amount of electricity delivered. 
Dominant market position: Often the desired outcome of regulation is to prevent the abuse of a 
dominant position, and thus fundamentally to protect consumers (Stigler and Cohen, 1971). 
Especially in the case of natural monopolies, there is not, and often cannot be, a market for a 
certain product or service. The possible tools or rules available for the regulator can include 
barriers of entry, service obligation, tariff ceiling, and restrictions on the return on employed 
capital. 
Environment: Firms emerge from the environment to organize what would otherwise be market 
transactions whenever their costs are less than the cost of carrying out transactions through the 
market (Coase, 1988). A firm as a governance structure is separated from its environment by the 
boundaries that are set by the capacity of the firm to provide useful organizational functions vis-
à-vis the market (Williamson, 1996). In this research the term environment does not refer to the 
bio-ecological environment.
9 Webster's Third New International Dictionary.
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Open access: Generators’ open non-discriminatory access to the network to sell their product to 
a buyer (Hunt, 2002).
Market liberalization: Literally means liberating the market, but also refers to making the
market competitive. It is sometimes used in conjunction with lifting import restrictions or 
permitting foreign firms to acquire firms at a market. It is often used as a synonym to 
deregulation. Due to the loose use of this expression this should not be used in scientific 
research, and thus has been avoided in this thesis.
Monopoly:  Under a monopoly there is a single seller of a products or services (Begg, Fischer & 
Dornbusch, 1994).
Opening market for competition:  Arrangement that makes room in the end consumer markets 
for competitive suppliers to act. This does not necessarily mean that the market would, in 
practice, even remotely perfectly resemble competitive markets.  Market Opening is
synonymous and generally used in media with the same content as deregulation.
Regulation: Government or a governmental body sets restrictive rules for a firm active in a 
particular industry, or geographical area, or both (Kahn, 1988; Stigler, 1988; Viscusi et al., 
2000). Regulation can appear in conjunction with a dominant company (Viscusi et al., 2000), a 
natural monopoly (Demsetz, 1968; Kahn, 1988; Viscusi et al., 2000), or otherwise in the case of 
important industry (Kahn 1988), and the intent is to set rules (Kahn, 1988; Viscusi et al., 2000; 
Stigler, 1988) for pricing, return on capital employed, or minimum requirements for service level 
and possibly to eliminate the firm from abusing market dominance. This, in fact, is carried out in 
order to replace markets (Viscusi et al., 2000), as an environment for price discovery, and setting 
the rules. 
Regulatory changes: Any substantial change in the firms’ operating environment, i.e. 
introduction of regulation, changes in regulation, or introduction of competition through 
deregulation, in a specific market or industry.
Restructuring: A term used in the US to refer to the reorganization of the activities of regional 
vertically integrated monopoly firms in order that the network and other businesses are 
unbundled from each other (Hunt, 2002). In the US this term is often used as synonym for 
deregulation, although in conjunction with restructuring, a price cap for retail prices has often 
been set with the unintended result that no competition takes place in the residential retail 
market. 
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Retail / supply: Contractual obligation and activity with the purpose of supplying electricity to 
the final customer by utilizing the technical capacity of the existing distribution network. In 
practice retail / supply means that a company concludes a contract with the end consumer of 
electricity, arranges or has arranged the delivery of electricity over the distribution network 
belonging to a distribution company, generates itself the required electricity or purchases it from 
the wholesale market, and concludes the transaction by invoicing the end customer for the 
electricity consumed.
Trading: Selling and buying wholesale quantities of electricity under the rules of an organized 
exchange. The membership of the exchange often asks the applicant to meet certain financial and 
other requirements. 
Transmission: Activity with the purpose of arranging and maintaining the technical capability 
that is required to deliver electricity over an interconnected high voltage cable network from 
generating plants, to either high voltage wholesale customers or to distributors’ networks.
Unbundling: Dismantling the bundle of services a utility offers to its customers. Legally this can 
be done by accounting, or by legally de-merging the firms. For small firms a derogation of this 
requirement is often granted. A term often used in Europe in the context of separating network 
business from other activities. 
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2 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
In this chapter I provide a review of the literature associated with the framework relevant to this 
research. First I discuss the evolutionary literature and how this constitutes the general 
framework for my research. I continue by discussing the traditional presentation of the cause 
and effect framework in a regulatory environment, and propose a new interaction cycle to be 
used in place of the once-through model. 
2.1 REVIEW OF THE CO-EVOLUTIONARY LITERATURE
The concept of co-evolution has been the research framework for a rich body of research in 
biology. As an example Ehrlich’s and Raven’s (1964) research on certain moth species’ 
interaction with the flowers they pollinate that in turn provide them with nutrition. Many other 
similar plant-animal mutually dependent and mutually beneficial interactions can be found in 
research and follow the same principal pattern. Darwin in his “Origin of Species” originally 
proposed that a co-evolutionary 'race' had driven the directional increase in length of a plant's 
spur and its pollinator's tongue, thus predicting the existence of an exceptionally long-tongued 
moth. In this biological co-evolutionary process the species specialize in interaction with one 
another and these specialized interactions result in reciprocal evolutionary change. 
In co-evolutionary interaction with another, the species develop characteristics that enable them 
to interact with the other in certain fashions. This co-evolution thus pairs these species into a 
mutually beneficial relationship. Besides the butterfly and its caterpillar that obtain nourishment 
from the plant it is pollinating (Ehrlich and Raven, 1964) multiple other examples of this mutual 
dependence between two species in the biological nature exist. Janzen (1980) suggested that 
there is a parallel to the biological definition of co-evolution by the organizational co-evolution. 
Hannan and Freeman (1989), too, have drawn a parallel between biological Darwinist 
evolutionary process and the organizational counterpart. Hannan and Freeman (1989) encourage 
Chapter 2 – Research Framework
14
organizational ecologists to consciously borrow the biological model of natural selection in 
developing organizational evolutionary theories. Just like the biological species that are 
dependent on another, the firms are dependent on the operative environment they are active in. 
The flip side of this dependency is that the environment of the firm in turn is influenced by the 
actions of the firm. However, as in biological nature where the species is primarily influenced by 
one other species, the firm is influenced by a multitude of actors influencing the firm from the 
space surrounding the firm. 
Under environmental turbulence caused by a combination of firms being active in the process, 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) found that new firms initiated competence-destroying 
discontinuities, which resulted in increased environmental turbulence. The firms with a history 
within the industry, however, initiated competence-enhancing discontinuities resulting in 
decrease in environmental turbulence. The cooperation between the players tends to become 
more difficult with increased number of actors (Axelrod, 1984 and 1988). According to the 
“history friendly industry evolution model” (Malerba, Nelson, Orsiegno and Winter, 1999), firms 
may find it difficult to adopt to the changes in the environment as the competencies accumulated 
into the firm may not be easily transferred to serve new applications. The organizational routines 
as an organizational memory (Nelson and Winter, 1982) may thus hinder the firm from adapting 
to the new environment. The firms may also find it hard to adapt to new technical challenges or 
diversify to new markets. Such firms may stick to their history without recognizing the impact of 
the changes in the environment to their business base. This could be especially true for 
businesses that have enjoyed static environments for a long time - like the utility industry. 
Stinchcombe (1965) introduced the notion of the liability of newness, meaning that newer 
organizations are more likely to vanish. Similarly, depending on the pace and rate of changes, in 
some businesses long history could as well be a liability (Aldrich 1979, Kelly and Amburgey 
1991).
The sequence of reactions of the individual firm in a cluster of firms to the changes in the 
environment will almost certainly not be identical to other firms in the cluster, but will reflect the 
history and resources of the firm (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), the characteristics of management 
(Chandler (1962), Alchian and Demsetz (1972)) and the competitive and regulatory situation the 
firm is facing. In the changed environment the institutional bandwagon pressures of non-adopters 
fearing appearing different from many adopters (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993) could 
constitute a pressure for the firms to copy the behavior of others. Schumpeter (1947) identified 
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two possible reactions for a firm to environmental variation and called these creative innovation 
and adaptive change. In the Schumpeterian definition the innovative response goes beyond 
existing procedures and practices while the changes induced by the latter are much less 
fundamental. March (1991), however, proposed the concepts of exploration and exploitation as 
possible reaction and emphasized the exploration of new possibilities vis-à-vis the exploitation 
of old certainties in organizational learning. According to Williamson (1996) adaptation is in the 
central role of an economic organization. The firm may react to the environmental changes either 
autonomously or by cooperating with the environment. Hull (1989), likewise puts environmental 
co-operative interaction in the central role, and found that firm may copy the patterns from the 
environment intact, or interact with its environment as a cohesive whole and develop own 
internal reproduction of the situation internally. Thus due to the bandwagon pressures 
(Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993), the firm interacts with its environment as a cohesive whole 
(Hull, 1989) trying to adapt to the changed situation (Williamson, 1996) through either adaptive 
change (Schumpeter, 1947) i.e. exploiting the old certainties (March, 1991) or through creative 
innovation (Schumpeter, 1947), i.e. exploring new possibilities March (1991). 
Hannan and Freeman (1984), see the high levels of structural inertia reflected in the behavioral 
patterns of the organization as a consequence of a selection process rather than as a precondition 
for selection. This structural inertia, i.e. the strength of inertial forces within the firm may vary 
with age, size, and complexity of the firm. By changing the key features of the organization to 
promote survival exposes the organization to a short-run increased risk of organizational failure 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Hannan and Freeman (1984), thus, claim that the organizational 
memory (Nelson and Winter, 1982) could constitute a disadvantage for the firm if the firm has 
developed  too strong an organizational memory. This combined with the concept of liability of 
newness by Stinchcombe, (1965), could push the conclusion that the age on any level could 
constitute an obstacle for the firm. Kelly and Amburgey (1991) claim that organizational size is 
associated negatively with the probability of change that involves business-level generalism. 
Thus, larger corporations, like many of the energy companies, are not tempted to change their 
general strategy based on individual changes in the business environment (Kelly and Amburgey, 
1991), but they tend not to let environment easily change the course of the business. 
Under market deregulation (Larsen and Bunn, 1999) even the regulatory institutions have little 
understanding of how they operate in the short run and evolve in the future as there are no 
historical evolutionary models to follow. The firm's absorptive capacity can be regarded as 
largely a function of the firm's level of prior related knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). For 
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strategy formation the only available option is to use only the available information while 
maintaining the option for corrective action in the future. Stuart (1996) emphasizes the role of 
the firm’s R&D orientation as depending on the R&D of its competitors. Technology evolves 
through periods of incremental change punctuated by technological breakthroughs that either 
enhance or destroy the competence of firms in an industry (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). It is 
important for the firms to maintain active R&D activity and follow carefully the activities taking 
place in the industry. Whether it be the technology or any other aspect of change in the 
environment of the firm that keeps changing, the firm needs to take action. Dosi (1992) relates
continuous changes to progress along a technological trajectory defined by a technological 
paradigm, while discontinuities may be associated with the emergence of a new paradigm. As 
the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply 
it to commercial ends is critical to its innovative capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, 
Mahoney, 2000), successful firms often rely on a variety of low-cost probes into the future, 
including experimental products, futurists, and strategic alliances (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). 
Teece (1986) demonstrates that markets do not work well when imitation is easy, and the profits 
from innovation accrue to the owners’ complementary assets, rather than to the developers of the 
intellectual property. Thus the innovating firm would need to have established a position in these 
complementary assets as an insurance policy prior to setting sail towards the sea of innovation. 
Innovators with new products and processes providing value to consumers may sometimes be so 
ill positioned in the market that they necessarily will fail (Teece, 1986). Under such 
circumstances the competence-destroying discontinuities (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) 
causing environmental turbulence may thus cause dramatic impact. Innovating firms without the 
required manufacturing and related capacities may perish even though they are the best at 
innovation. 
Institutional isolating mechanisms may provide a firm with either industry leadership or 
obsolescence, depending on whether firm practices generate and sustain strategic isolating 
mechanisms in their competitive context (Jones, 2001). To enhance their development, rival 
firms not only search for new capabilities within their organization, but also for those that rest in
their competitive environment (Huygens, Van Den Bosch, Volberda and Baden-Fuller, 2001). 
These search processes at both firm and industry levels in interaction makes industries and firms 
co-evolve over time (Murmann, 2003). 
The capability differences between the firms are a necessary condition for vertical specialization; 
and the transaction cost reductions only lead to specialization when capabilities along the value 
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chain are heterogeneous (Jacobides and Winter, 2005). Jacobides and Winter (2005) suggest that 
there are four evolutionary mechanisms that shape vertical scope over time: the selection process 
itself, driven by capability differences dynamically shaping the vertical scope; the transaction 
costs that are endogenously changed by firms that try to re-shape the transactional environment 
to increase their profit and market share; the changes in vertical scope affecting the nature of the 
capability development process, i.e., the way in which firms improve their operations over time; 
and the changes in the capability development process re-shape the capability pool in the 
industry, changing the roster of qualified participants.
Although the essence of organizational capability is the integration of individuals' specialized 
knowledge (Grant, 1996), the flexibility of the firm can be seen to derive from the repertoire of 
managerial capabilities (management challenge) and the responsiveness of the organization that 
Volberda (1996) calls organization design challenge. On the basis of theories of control, 
Volberda (1996) argues that organizational flexibility is inherently paradoxical and requires a 
constructive friction between change and preservation. The paradox of flexibility is portrayed in 
a conceptual model that relates competitive environments, certain types of flexibility, and 
organizational conditions.
Järvinen and Sillanpää (forthcoming) have mapped the structure and evolution of evolutionary 
research related to the fields of management, economics and sociology. Their bibliometric 
analysis shows that the articles by Cyert and March (1963), Nelson and Winter (1982), Hannan 
and Freeman (1984), Tushman and Anderson (1986), and Hannan and Freeman (1989), are the 
most cited articles in the field of evolutionary research. Of those articles that made it on the list, 
that by Nelson and Winter (1982) is clearly the most cited and could thus be regarded as a 
cornerstone for research in evolutionary research and has impacted practically all evolutionary 
research that has been published subsequently. 
Each organization interprets the signals from its environment by using modes determined both 
by management's beliefs about the environment and organizational intrusiveness (Daft and 
Weick, 1984). Regarding geographical diversification, Fuentelsaz, Gomez and Polo (2002) show 
that organizational size, organizational competence, and organizational experience are the key 
factors explaining the reactive patterns. The paths or trajectories leading to organizational 
flexibility vary significantly across countries, reflecting historical legacies and institutional 
constraints. Djelic and Ainamo (1999) argue that the process of change has been one of co-
evolution, where environmental transformation and organizational change have fed upon each 
other through time. In a path-dependent manner, different models of organization and national 
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competitiveness have thus emerged (Djelic and Ainamo, 1999). Pioneer firms originally devised 
organizational solutions within the bounds set by nationally defined constraints and 
opportunities. The strategies, organization forms and the relationship between the headquarters 
and the affiliate company, however, could be influenced by the national heritage of the firm 
(Calori et al. 1997). Becoming institutionalized, the early organizational solutions in turn shaped 
the environment for individual organizations and organizational populations, creating new sets of 
opportunities and constraints. In a path-dependent manner (Kole and Lehn, 1997), different 
models of organization and national competitiveness thus emerged. 
At the time of change, one may ask what causes the change to happen and who controls the pace 
and direction of change. Chandler (1962) emphasizes the general role of top and middle 
management as subjects in the process (Grant, 1996), although the skills and accumulated 
experience of the management could as well be highlighted (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). The 
personal role of top management in changing the path of the firm and establishing a co-
evolutionary lock-in has been described by Burgelman (2002), while Cyert and March (1963) 
emphasize the well-defined sequence of the decisions of the firm. Volberda and Lewin (2003), 
however, express their doubts regarding the active steering role of firm management in the midst 
of the change. One could obviously stress the element of chance in the change, i.e. the fact that 
the management of the firm never can fully control the chain of sequences in the environment of 
the firm. The firm may try to absorb information of the events in the environment of that firm, 
but how these events are interpreted and which decisions follow subsequently will be a function 
of a multitude of factors. 
The research stream of dynamic capabilities focuses on the capacity of the firm to constantly and 
dynamically change itself based on the signals from the environment of the firm (Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000), Helfat and Petaraf (2003), Petaraf (1993) and Teece at al (1997)) by introducing 
dynamic processes to adapt to the changes in the firm environment. The firm would need to
define and acquire the most beneficial configuration of dynamic capabilities during the 
environmental variation and posses and then subsequently nurture these after the variation. Two 
specific organizational determinants of absorptive capacity, organization forms and combinative 
capabilities influence the level of absorptive capacity (Van den Bosch, Volberda and de Boer, 
1999). Van den Bosch, Volberda and de Boer (1999) claim that this framework explains how 
knowledge environments co-evolve with the emergence of organization forms and combinative 
capabilities that are suitable for absorbing knowledge. According to Levinthal and Myatt (2006) 
the interaction mechanisms between the firm and the environment could take the form of simple 
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positive feedback from the market, subsequently leading the firm to focus on a particular 
capability trajectory.
In the biological examples presented above, the co-evolutionary interaction results in formation 
of a perfect match, where two species benefit from each other in a mutually interdependent 
relationship. This co-evolution in the firm world, however, does not reach an end where the 
development would stop. The individual firms but as well populations of firms are constantly 
evolving and incorporating multiple aspects in an ever increasing pace. Through the 
globalization and the introduction of new technologies the competition in the industry is 
continuously finding new forms and shapes that in turn ask for reaction by the other actors.
The firm needs to specify the most important selection process among host of processes that 
transform a population (Murmann, 2003). The firm will sometimes find it hard to adapt to the 
changes in the environment as the competencies accumulated into the firm may not be easily 
transferred to serve new applications (Hannan and Freeman, 1984, Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Here we revert to the “creative destruction” outlined by Schumpeter, as the means of the firm to 
reinvent itself. Murmann (2003) captured these aspects in his co-evolutionary theory by stating 
that the firms, technologies and institutions co-evolve in interaction thus impacting each others’ 
evolution. Murmann (2003) sees two distinct ways to study the evolution of firms; a model that 
only emphasizes the births and deaths of firms, analyzed primarily by the organizational 
ecologists, and the pattern utilized primarily by the strategic management research, emphasizing 
the capacity of the management to actively change the destiny of the firm (Chandler, 1962,
Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).
Under a static environment, organizations will be positively selected by age, meaning that static 
environments favor older organizations in form of learning and the experience gained and 
accumulated by old organizations (Aldrich, 1979). Subsequently, the probability of change in 
strategic orientation will decrease with organizational age (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991). Old 
organizations in the energy industry, following Aldrich (1979) and Kelly and Amburgey (1991) 
could find it more difficult to react to changes taking place in the environment. Strong internal 
retention mechanisms make it more difficult to response to environmental changes, especially if 
there are few established procedures, i.e. dynamic capabilities for responding to change. 
However, the organizations can be expected to survive to the extent they are effective, where this 
effectiveness derives from the management of demands, particularly the demands of interest 
groups upon which the organizations depend for resources and support (Pfeffer and Salancik,
2003).
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Aldrich and Zimmer (1986) identify entrepreneurship as embedded in networks of continuing 
social relations, facilitated or constrained by linkages between aspiring entrepreneurs, resources, 
and opportunities; and influenced by the interaction of chance, necessity, and purpose in all 
social action. A common response for organizations faced with increasing environmental 
turbulence has been to move towards greater flexibility or modularity and to experiment with 
network forms (Djelic and Ainamo, 1999). Rosenkopf and Tushman (1998) have found that the 
forms of co-evolution depend on the degree of uncertainty and subsequently impact the choice of 
modes of network evolution. Even in a strategic alliance the role of co-evolution can be seen in 
how the alliance co-evolves with the firm's strategy, the institutional, organizational and 
competitive environment, and with the management intent on the alliance (Koza and Lewin, 
1998).
Nelson, 1994; Lewin, Long and Carroll, 1999 suggest that the firm level strategic and 
organization adaptations co-evolve with changes in the environment (competitive dynamics, 
technological, and institutional) and organization population and forms, and that new 
organizational forms can mutate and emerge from the existing population of organizations. 
Murmann (2003) sees two evolving populations as coevolving when both have a significant 
causal impact on each other’s ability to persist.
In the environmental interaction the line of causation runs from the institutional environment to 
the firm, but likewise the firms have the capacity to shape and build the environment through 
purposeful actions (Murman, 2003). This interplay may take the form of using collective 
organizations to mobilize support, to work directly with the parliament and creating private/ 
public (academic) partnerships (Murman, 2003). Murman (2003) has identified a cyclical 
relationship at the turn of the 20th century between the UK dye industry in decline, and the 
universities that were not producing enough graduates for the industry. This vicious circle was 
leading to a stall in the R&D field, leading subsequently to the industry further falling behind the 
competition. This argument of cyclical relationship is further confirmed by a reverse case in US, 
where academia fed the ever growing hunger of the industry for talented R&D personnel. Thus 
the development in the firm institutional environment highly contributed to the development of 
the firm. The firms do not develop the capabilities they use for the business themselves, but they 
use the national environment to draw on the raw capabilities. Murman (2003) describes the 
interaction between industries and the universities in co-evolutionary terms, like in the biological 
sciences. He sees the interaction between the two so that both influence each other and form a 
relationship of cross-fertilization between the two. They likewise interact with the other 
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institutions, government included, to shape the operative environment more favorable. The 
government could have a role in distributing information, i.e. providing access to the losers in 
the society of their perceived sources of misfortune (North, 1990). Hannan and Freeman (1989), 
however, see the danger in elevated firm political activity in promoting political protection, i.e.
creating protectionist entry barriers as this could jeopardize the mere existence of the national 
industry. 
Lewin and Volberda (1999) ask for a richer arsenal of methods and techniques to be used in the 
research when describing the challenge of co-evolutionary research in the use of longitudinal 
data. They propose specifically that sequence analysis be used to complement co-evolutionary 
research. Research in dynamic phenomena involving firm microevolution, industry 
macroevolution, environmental and technological evolution and co-evolution processes within a 
system, would be needed. Co-evolutionary research would have the capability to bridge and 
reintegrate strategy and organization theory within a holistic framework
I would like to conclude this chapter by quoting John Donne’s (1572-1631) famous Meditation 
XVII, where he stated that “No man is an island, entire of itself, every man is a piece of the 
continent, a part of the main”. Although the poem emphasizes the interconnectedness of mankind 
while reminding mankind of its mortality, the pattern likewise applies to the interconnectedness 
of the firms and their environments. 
2.2 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ACTORS IN THE REGULATORY 
PROCESS
According to social contract theory, a just society is characterized by as the product of a “fair” 
agreement among rational individuals on the “rule of the market game” (Cordes and Schubert, 
2007). Often, however, in the political discourse, the long-term benefits for society as a whole 
are not clearly defined. However, there is a rich array of literature in the field of political 
economy, addressing the issue of, what is public good, and whether such a concept exists in the 
first place (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965; Downs, 1957; Olson, 1965). The key objective of a 
political process appears to be the process itself and the opportunities to make the process and 
outcomes thereof look favorable before the next elections (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965; Downs, 
1957). One dimension of public good that the government often provides is the protection of the 
members of society against non-members.  Holcombe (2008) argues that the rationale for this 
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materializes in the act of protecting members of society and thus the government protecting its 
tax base. By paying taxes members of society enable the protection of their assets. 
Changing the characteristics of the regulatory environment is clearly part of that category of 
governmental actions which is intended to create public good; otherwise the process would never 
obtain sufficient support among the politicians aspiring to get elected in forthcoming elections. 
The regulatory process faced by the energy utility industry is often seen as a one-sided process 
which could be characterized as a “one-way-street”. The industry often presents itself as an 
object, while the regulatory and legislative authorities are presented as subjects in the process. 
There are variations between Europe and the US regarding the way the process is described in 
the public discourse, but the fundamental undercurrent remains the same. In this public image 
the regulatory process is initiated by undefined political ambitions, which are subsequently 
converted into objectives and methods through the political machinery and ultimately translated 
into arbitrary regulatory objectives and handed over to the regulator for practical 
implementation. According to this public image, the firms as objects in the regulatory process, 
have no influence in the heading or speed of the process and are merely targets or instruments for 
arbitrary political scoring. The view of the process, though not explicitly described as unilateral 
and irreversible is reflected in the work by many scholars in economics and sociology (Aldrich, 
1979; Rumelt, 1984; Kahn, 1988; Viscusi et al., 2000; Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). Although 
the customers are expected to be the ultimate beneficiaries of the process, and their interests 
appear at the end of the line, the authors do not specifically emphasize the customer benefits.  
Neither do they necessarily point out the interaction during the process.
The process of introducing competition, or any other major regulatory change, into a former 
monopoly market place is often very slow, and thus for the legislator the prospects of gaining 
political points sometime in the distant future do not yield benefits today (Downs, 1957). This 
one directional, unilateral, irreversible process, as reflected in the public discourse and by many 
scholars, is shown below in Figure 2-1. In this representation the process has one clear event-
sequence; it begins at the legislator, flows through the regulator towards the firm and ends at the 
customer.
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Figure 2-1 The traditional view of the regulatory process.
In this research, encouraged by the pattern proposed by Murman (2003) I suggest an alternative, 
cyclical view of the regulatory process (see Figure 2-2). In this model there is no beginning or an 
end in the cycle and the initiator cannot always be clearly identified. Once this cycle is set in 
motion it is spinning continuously and the speed and intensity of interaction differs over time and 
between different markets. The initial momentum that sets the cycle in motion could come at any 
phase of the cycle. It could be the legislator or the regulator being influenced by development 
within other industries, or other geographical markets. It could also be the firm, setting in motion 
a process that it will initially deem as destructive, but similarly trying to leapfrog the competition 
and obtain competitive benefits within the industry facing a certain change. Even customers, 
customer groupings or associations (Olson, 1965), customer’s pressure groups or other consumer 
advocates could set the cycle in motion with the intention of being able to share the proceeds of 
increased competition among their constituents. This interaction is called the primary impact.
By adding one further dimension to the process, i.e. time, could convert the cycle into a time 
spatial spiral where time, on vertical axis, would be the force functioning like the rotor of a 
helicopter, lifting the cycle from the two dimensional surface thereby creating an entirely new 
motion to the spinning of the cycle. Figure 2-2 presents the basic conceptual framework for this 
research.
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Figure 2-2 Cyclical sequential model of regulatory impact.
In the cyclical form, four distinctive components of interaction can be identified that, in concert, 
constitute the model. 
1) Interaction between the Legislator and the Regulator,
2) Interaction between the Regulator and the Firm,
3) Interaction between the Firm and the Customer,
4) Interaction between the Customer and the Legislator.
Each of these four interaction mechanisms is discussed in detail below.
2.3 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE LEGISLATOR AND THE 
REGULATOR
The legislator and the regulator represent the juridical part in the interaction cycle. Sometimes 
they are bundled together (Downs, 1957; Buchanan and Tullock, 1965) and addressed
collectively as the government. A clear distinction between the roles of the legislator and the 
regulator, however, can be identified, because the powers of the regulator are based on 
legislation passed by the legislator. The regulator is thus set up in order to implement the 
legislation that the legislator passes by issuing orders and rulings and determining the 
practicalities of implementation. However, depending on the administrative practice, the 
legislator could set budgetary restrictions for the regulator, which in practice could impair the 
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independence of the regulator. The third package of European energy market unification 
addresses this issue and promotes the full autonomy of the regulator.
The legislator, a democratically elected body representing the interests of the people, intends to 
sponsor the perceived common good and thus passes legislation to promote this objective. If the 
"public interest" or "common good" can be defined in the sense of Buchanan and Tullock (1965), 
and if individuals choose to act so as to promote this "common good" rather than their own 
interests, the delegation of all effective power to a single decision-maker, and an accompanying 
hierarchy, may appear perfectly rational. This may seem to be assured by constitutional 
requirements for periodic elections of rulers or ruling groups.  Obviously in any society not all 
members’ interests are aligned or perfectly symmetrical. Thus obtaining “common good” does 
not necessarily yield a symmetrical benefit stream to all members of society. Collective action in 
the sense of Buchanan and Tullock (1965) is the action of individuals when they choose to 
accomplish purposes collectively rather than individually. Thus the government is seen as 
nothing more than a set of processes, the machine, which allows such collective action to take 
place. Buchanan and Tullock (1965) reject the idea that the state would exist as an 
“überindividuell entity” that would have interests superior to the sum of its members’ interests. 
Benn (1953) regards the strengthening of the state machine as a weakening of the individual, but 
every improvement in the individual means a strengthening of the nation. The motivation in 
government decision-making is to maximize its chances of winning the next elections (Downs, 
1957). Distributing benefits to a group of voters in order to ensure winning forthcoming elections 
could reflect this type of action. Rothbard (1962) sees voting for a politician or a public policy as 
completely different matters. The electors are often tempted to vote for those politicians that 
manage to sell their ideas and not necessarily those that would have proven successful.
Depending on the voting rights included in the constitutional order of the state the majority vote 
is often the means to make decisions that subsequently bind every member of a society. 
Sometimes this is achieved through direct vote or referendum, but most often the members elect 
a legislator through elections. The individual members of the state elect their representatives to 
use the power that naturally resides among individuals. However, the power of the voter while in 
the voting booth is miniscule when compared to the power of the elected official making 
decisions affecting the voter during the term of office (Rothbard, 1962). Downs (1957) sees the 
government as a particular and unique social agent having a specialized function in the division 
of labor. Downs (1957) further states that the government provides the framework of order upon 
which the rest of the society is built. In an organized society certain rules allow certain members 
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of the group to use the structure of society to obtain differential advantage. It is the state that may 
be used for such purposes, thus prompting rational individuals to place constitutional restrictions 
on the use of the political process (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965).
If one aspect of the common good could be understood to be enhanced efficiency in society, this 
could partially be promoted by introducing competition to the energy markets. The legislation to 
introduce competition would then be passed by the legislator. At the same time the legislator 
would often establish a regulator to monitor the functioning of the energy markets, to give the 
regulator executive powers to regulate the market action of the actors on a day-to-day basis, and 
to expect reporting to the legislator of the advancement of the energy markets. Thus the regulator 
would be the body to ensure that the objectives of the competitive energy markets are met. 
Though the roles of the legislator and the regulator can be characterized as representing two 
different branches of government, i.e. the legislative and the executive, the bundling of these two 
branches together could likewise be justified. 
The parallel between biological Darwinist and organizational evolutionary process (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989) is clearly visible here as the changes initiated by the government could be 
allegorically compared to such changes in the biological environment of species that favor new 
characteristics and even new species. The regulator as a newly established function has to 
discover its new place in the ecological framework between the firm and the legislator. 
Based on the above literature review, I formulate the following Assumption.
Assumption 1a 
As a result of the introduction of competition to former monopoly markets, and the regulator 
assuming part of the direct regulatory role of the legislator, the government could be distanced 
from the direct control of firms’ activities and the opportunities to redirect the benefit streams to 
the constituents could thus be reduced.
Assumption 1b 
As a result of the introduction of competition to former monopoly markets, and by the 
establishment of the specialized regulator, the level of expertise and detail in the regulatory 
framework could be expected to increase.
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2.4 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE REGULATOR AND THE FIRM
In a perfectly competitive market (Schumpeter, 1964), the market itself can be regarded as the 
device that assures good performance. In the classical economic view, the market is competitive 
and the products symmetrical, no single actor is able to charge more for products or services, and 
their price equals the marginal cost of making that product or service available. In case 
competition could truly work, the value of any transaction or product could be set on a level that 
is defendable in the long term. This would subsequently lead into optimal resource allocation in 
a society, as predicted by Smith (1776) and Chydenius (1765). Under regulation the government 
would have an enormous task in reaching this objective by legislating for good performance. 
Often, in real markets the regulator is more concerned with regulating the individual actions of 
firms rather than concentrating on nurturing the foundation of true competition. The Austrian 
economists view of the market process as a systematic process of mutual discovery by market 
participants (Kirzner, 1992), emphasizes the role of both the suppliers in introducing new 
products to the market place, and the customers in signaling preferences.
Under regulation the “invisible hand” is replaced by governmental10 orders as the principal 
institutional device for assuring good performance. Performance in this connection means 
performance in favor of the customer (Kahn 1988, Viscusi et al., 2000). The “invisible hand” 
(Smith, 1776) is thus somehow tied by the regulation, the purpose of which could be arguable. 
Kahn (1988) discusses both legal and economic rationale for regulation and identifies three 
primary economic reasons for such regulation: 1) importance of the industry in question, 2) the 
fact that many of the firms enjoy a natural monopoly or 3) that for some reason the competition 
does not work well. Under regulation certain constraints regarding the performance of the firm 
towards the customer are thus set. These constraints often restrict the firm’s freedom to set 
tariffs, choose their customers, or charge some of its costs to the customers. In addition in a 
regulated environment there are often obligations for the utility; such as “obligation to serve”, 
“service level” or “provider of last resort”. These oblige the firm to provide the service even 
though it might not be economically justifiable. However, these obligations are often coupled 
with surcharges that cover the firm’s expenses. Often the regulations that a monopoly firm faces 
guarantee a certain return on the invested capital as a tradeoff for giving up a certain degree of 
10 Government in this context refers to the competent body forming such regulatory framework. It could be the 
national government, the state government or a supranational government, depending on the legal environment of 
the case.
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decision-making power related to business decisions the company could otherwise make under 
competition. Sometimes, the regulations may exceed the level that could be regarded as 
justifiable to reach the defined objectives. If the democratic process does not provide 
“regulations for the regulations” and the legislative system encourages making the regulatory 
system even more demanding, the firm has the option to start a juridical process as a means to try 
to defend its room to maneuver. In regulated industries the interaction between the regulator and 
the firm is often one-dimensional, where the influence originates at the regulator and the firm has 
no option but to follow (Aldrich, 1979). The regulator is expected to be prudent in its 
relationship with the regulated (Beecher, 2008). According to the “whistle-blower policy”, 
common in the US an individual employee of a regulated company who tips-off any breaches in 
the regulatory conduct of the regulated firm would be rewarded for doing so (Heys and Kapur, 
2008).
Sometimes a monopoly in a society is the result of action not only by the firm but the 
government representing the perceived interests of that society. The privatization of the gas 
business in the UK11 changed a state monopoly to what was in essence a private monopoly, 
while the competition was introduced later. Zhang, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2007) showed that 
privatization and regulation do not alone bring the expected benefits in economic performance. 
This would require introduction of competition. 
Most private monopolies reflect governmental assistance and support in the form of exclusive 
franchises, a governmentally administered cartel, special immunities, licensure requirements law, 
barbering, tariffs and quotas (Friedman, 1975). Thus the problem of monopoly is not largely a 
problem of getting government to enact legislation against monopoly, but of keeping government 
from enacting and enforcing legislation strengthening and preserving the monopoly. Brätland 
(2004) discusses natural monopoly and the contestability theory and argues that the natural 
monopolist includes entry barriers into the pricing formula. As a result, prices would only reflect 
such a profit level that deter the competition from entering the market, but would not yield 
excess profits for the monopolist. 
Sappington and Stiglitz (1987), when identifying three forms of governmental12 control; indirect 
control, regulation and nationalization, found that regulation is directed at correcting market 
11 The government owned gas monopoly was formed as an instrument to facilitate the investments required to 
spread quickly newly discovered natural gas to the entire country.
12 Governmental control obviously in a democracy has to reside upon the legislation passed by the parliament. The 
discussion by Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) does not make a distinction between the different individual roles of 
the parliament, government and the regulator.
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failures of imperfect competition, imperfect information or externalities. According to Stigler 
(1988) the prime role of regulation is to redistribute income, although the position of von Mises 
(1928, 1979) and Rothbard (1962) and many libertarian scholars, is that this should not be 
carried out in the first place. Beyond this very general objective of redistributing income, the 
means that are at the regulator’s disposal according to Stigler (1988) are to restrict market entry, 
set a protective tariff, to affect the substitutes and complements, or to fix the prices.. 
According to Stigler (1988) this regulation, sometimes bureaucratic and rigid by nature, can be 
intended to serve two goals. Firstly it can be intended to benefit an entire society or public at 
large or some subclass of it (Stigler, 1988) by maintaining the institutions (North, 1990, 1992) 
within whose framework the free market can continue to function (Kahn, 1988). This could be 
achieved by regulating volume (Viscusi et al., 2000), quality of service (Kahn, 1988; Viscusi et 
al., 2000) – such as access to energy to everybody – while maintaining reasonable return to the 
investors (Kahn, 1988; Viscusi et al., 2000) in order to ensure funding of the investments 
required to conduct the business. According toe Stigler (1988) the other would have no direct 
cause; as the political process defies rational explanation. 
Stigler (1988) proposes that, in general, regulation is acquired by the industry and designed and 
operated primarily for its benefit. This behavior can be regarded as rational in light of the firm 
pursuing to obtain the monopoly position in the market. Majandar and Marcus, (2001) suggest 
that well-designed regulations have a positive effect on utilities, whereas those that are less-well
designed have a negative impact. By well-designed they mean more flexible rules that give the 
firms “latitude” on how to meet the goal, and time to deploy new means and to set more 
ambitious goals that stretch beyond present practices.  
The only aspect the government cannot command the business to do is to perform (Kahn, 1988; 
Lindblom, 1977). In this connection performance refers to the operational and financial 
performance of the company. The government can, however, induce the enterprise to perform by 
providing a set of market and political benefits (Kahn 1988). 
In many countries13 there is a regulatory mechanism in place for the approval of telecom, 
electricity or gas sales or distribution rates14. This has been designed to eliminate the opportunity 
to abuse market power (Stigler, 1988; Kahn, 1988; Viscusi et al., 2000). According to Lindblom 
13 In this context Country could refer to Nation State, Federal State or a State in the US.
14 In many States in the US the rates need to be approved “ex ante”, i.e. before they can be applied, whereas under 
many jurisdictions in Europe the rates can be regulated “ex post”, i.e. the utility company can apply and introduce 
new rates while the regulator maintains the powers to alter the rates retroactively in case they are found 
unjustifiable.   
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(1977), however, the greatest distinction between one and another government is in the degree to 
which market replaces government or government replaces market. 
Pelzman (1976) sees the potential of regulatory behavior to convert the supply-demand apparatus 
into constraint. Russo (1992) has shown that because monitoring costs (regulatory costs) are low 
firms easily adapts to the regulatory framework, and the increase in these costs leads to 
inducements for a utility to remove itself from this relationship and fundamentally diversify. 
Russo (1992) further indicated that a regulated utility and the regulator, though locked in a 
bilateral relationship, are more often adversaries than collaborators.
Comparing different governments’ regulatory practices 
To illustrate the variances in the degree of detail in regulatory practices under various 
jurisdictions, let us assume a society that is in complete state of anarchy; it has no structure, no 
state and thus no legislation or a law enforcement system. North (1990) calls such a state a tribal 
economy. North (1990) illustrates this by referring to Ellickson’s study among the rural 
residents’ in Shasta County California where they resolved disputes based on elaborate structure 
of informal constraints. In the absence of the formal state structure, the tribal society developed 
an informal set of rules with substantial stability (Ellickson, cited in North, 1990); deviant 
behavior was not tolerated because it was a fundamental threat to the stability and assurance 
features of the tribal group. In such a tribal economy exchange was possible and necessary 
because every member of the society cannot or will not perform all functions in the society.
The most extreme form of the tribal economy would be a “Crusoe economy” (Rothbard, 1962) 
where there would be no interaction between individuals, but everyone would act alone. If we 
exclude the scheme of violent exchange of ownership, any form of exchange between 
individuals is based on valuing the products in reverse order by the two parties, and that each of 
the parties knows of the existence of the other individual and the products that he or she 
possesses. Without knowledge of the other person’s assets, no exchange of these assets could 
take place (Rothbard (1962). This direct exchange can take place providing that the value or the 
expected benefit after the exchange would be mutually comparable.  
By using a variable that illustrates the degree of detail to which a society has standardized the 
interaction patterns between individuals, we can plot the tribal society North (1990) and 
Rothbard (1962), the model characterized by Lyon (1937) as organized crime, and all the known 
examples of present day organized societies, as different observation points along the same axis 
in an increasing order. The value of each observation point would thus reflect the degree of order 
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a society has standardized the interaction patterns between individuals, whereby the tribal 
economy would have the lowest score and the most detailed society structure would have the 
highest score. Thus we would create an illustration of “a regulatory continuum” where the 
regulatory framework stretches from non-existent to maximum and from more general to more 
specific. As every government exercises some degree of control over individuals, and restricts 
the activities of the business community, all known governments would find a point along this 
one axis. Sometimes, however, firms oppose the introduction of the rules. Although some rules 
of doing business are regarded as irritating and onerous, the business community would be the 
first to oppose the lifting of governmental regulation on competition (Lyon, 1937).
This regulatory continuum, illustrated in Figure 2-3 starts with the tribal economy (North, 1990) 
without any regulatory or legal framework of organized society at the left end of the continuum. 
As we begin moving right members of the society begin acting collectively giving up part of 
their liberty to a representative body and to an organized society in exchange for certain benefits 
that are obtainable this way. We pass through the phase of setting the overall framework of 
functioning society (Kahn, 1988) by passing the laws, creating of a juridical system including the 
law enforcement function (Stigler, 1982; Lyon, 1937; Viscusi et al., 2000), restricting or 
enabling certain individual transactions, defining terms for conducting business, or restricting the 
abuse of market dominance provided by competition restrictions. 
Towards the right end of the continuum we would reach the other extreme that could be regarded 
as a state where the framework regulating the firms’ action gets so detailed, and the number of 
regulations so high, that any deliberate activity would be impossible. How far right on this 
continuum a society then actually goes depends on the political intentions of the government and 
other bodies with jurisdiction over the business institutions. The right end could be seen to 
stretch to detailed rules impacting any single individual action of the firm. This could be 
allegorically illustrated as an “economic zero Kelvin temperature of society” where all 
“molecular motion” ceases.15 This cessation of activities would be, however, self-imposed by 
restricting the freedom of individuals so that no activity would be possible. Obviously this 
extreme is as theoretical as the pure tribal economy. 
15 Absolute zero is the zero point on the Kelvin temperature scale at which all thermal particle motion and vibration 
would cease.
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Figure 2-3 The regulatory continuum.
In the Figure 2-3, the freedom of firms to take action increases towards the left, as the number 
and detail of rules decrease. However, under complete freedom the firms would need to carry 
part of the functions of organized society themselves thus increasing the functions required by 
the firm. In the tribal economy as illustrated by North (1990) members of the society set the rules 
for acceptable behavior and thus resume the role of society structure. When moving right along 
the continuum the number of rules and regulations increases, thus gradually limiting the freedom
of action by any individual firm. The firm’s activities can concentrate on the most obvious, while 
the society carries an increasing share of the responsibility of non-core activities. However, by 
the increase in rules and regulations the standardization of different actions becomes more 
evident. 
According to North (1990), the legal system is created to handle more complex disputes and 
entail formal structures to specify principal-agent relationships. The role of these institutions in 
society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure to human interaction (North, 
1990). Olson (1965) points out that in a free market economy the self interest of the individual 
reigns supreme, and the almost sole factor governing relations is the profit motive. In a 
theoretical free market economy the market would be competitive and government would not set 
any restrictions related to market entry. Under such an environment a monopoly would not 
require attention from the government (Rothbard, 1962).
North (1990) describes life and the economy as being ordered by formal laws and property 
rights, which are “seldom the obvious and immediate source of choice in daily interactions”. In
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the development of the detail and number of regulations in a society, property rights could be 
seen as social institutions that define or delimit the range of privileges granted to individuals, or 
as specific resources, such as parcels of land and water (Libecap, 1989). Barzel (1989) and Foss 
and Foss (2003) make the connection between property rights and transaction costs. Foss and 
Foss (2003) emphasize the role of property rights as determinants of net value and value 
creation. Foss and Foss (2003) list property rights as right to consume, obtain income from, and 
alienate a resource (Foss and Foss, 2003). Eggertson (1990) identifies three categories of 
property rights as: 1) Rights to use a resource, including right to physically transform it; 2) right 
to earn income based on the resource, including right to contract with third parties, and 3) right 
to permanently transfer the resource to another party. Barzel (1989) points out that exchange that 
otherwise would be attractive may be forsaken due to such costs. High transaction costs of 
political market have often resulted in property rights that do not induce economic growth 
(North, 1990) , and the consequent organizations may have no incentive to create more 
productive rules. At the introduction of competition, the property rights as determinants of net 
value (Foss and Foss, 2003) and value creation that characterized the firm environment prior to 
the change may no longer be valid, i.e. in the new operative environment the of the firm being 
changed. 
When the functional environment of the firm is changed, the firm reacts to the changes in the 
environment and the reactions will reflect the history and resources of the firm (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972), and the characteristics of management (Chandler, 1962; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).
Duncan (1972) characterized the uncertainties associated with this new operative environment by 
plotting the uncertainty along two diagonal axes, simple-complex and static-dynamic, in which 
he finds the dynamic-complex corner to be the most challenging, followed by simple-dynamic 
and complex-static corners of the quadrant. Employing the Duncan framework, environmental 
evolution in the context of this research is illustrated in Figure 2-4 as a reflection of this
approach for the energy industry. These reactions will then subsequently influence the immediate 
environment of the firm and in an interaction taking the form of co-evolution (Murman, 2003).
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Figure 2-4 Electric utility industry deregulation illustrated by Duncan’s (1972) framework 
for environmental change.
Eisenhardt and Bhatia (2002) discuss the impact of complexity theory and environmental 
complexity on the organization. They regard the state of the firm at the edge of chaos as the 
natural state between order and chaos, or a grand compromise between structure and surprise. 
Sorenson (2002) discusses the impacts of complexity at an inter-organizational level and the 
subsequent interaction and interdependence of the organizations. 
The business environment of a utility prior to and after opening the market for competition is 
illustrated in Figure 2-4. Prior market opening the environment could be characterized as static 
and without competition from within the industry due to regulatory barriers. The appropriate 
level of return is determined by the regulator. After opening the market for competition, a certain 
degree of uncertainty becomes evident providing that the mechanism for opening the market is 
successful. The competition emerges partially from within the industry and partially from outside 
of that industry, and the stability that characterized the industry in the past is replaced by 
dynamism. Likewise, at the introduction of competition the key problems the firm faces transfer 
from simple to complex.
Under market deregulation there are no historical evolutionary models to follow and even 
regulatory institutions have little understanding of how deregulation will operate in the short 
term, and evolve in the future (Larsen and Bunn, 1999). It is especially the planning methods the 
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electric utilities used under monopoly times that become less useful and require replacement 
after deregulation (Dyner and Larsen, 2001).
Research on the impact of regulative changes on firms in different markets has been carried out 
in the context of natural gas price regulation (Jorgensen and Slesnick, 1987), the airline industry 
in the US (Caves et al., 1987), demerged Bell operating firms in the US after market deregulation 
(Smith and Zeithaml, 1996), the Spanish insurance industry (Cummins and Rubio-Misas, 2006), 
and the impact of regulative changes has been analyzed at a general level (Ahmad and Chiasakul, 
2005).
The past is more than a prologue – the reputation capital accumulated prior to the deregulation is 
available for use by the deregulated firm (Daughety and Forsythe, 1987). Firms may need a 
lengthy time to adapt to the new prevailing market situation after years of regulation, but the 
accumulated learning is and remains within the firm. Reger et al. (1992) state that deregulation 
has a direct effect on firms’ strategic choices and both direct and indirect effects on risk and 
return. A gradual shift towards deregulation will allow a firm time to adapt less risky strategies. 
Firms that do react in time to environmental variation tend to outperform those that do not; the 
strategies of the latter are likely to get “out-of-alignment”. Reger et al. (1992) further show that 
at the time of transfer from regulation to deregulation, the most profitable kind of strategic move 
is from an unfocussed follower to an innovation strategy. To implement this can be really 
challenging as such a change asks for total change in the way the firm operates. Additionally
Reger et al. (1992) emphasize the importance of the correct timing of decisions.
Deregulation clearly underlines the importance of the role of alert management in the firm. 
Stiroh and Strahan (2003) have shown that relative performance prior to deregulation becomes a 
predictor of future market share after deregulation. As regulatory barriers are lifted, several new 
opportunities arise for a firm. Attracting new customers from new markets becomes an 
opportunity to grow, while retaining old customers becomes a must, because regulatory 
restrictions no longer hinder competition from capturing market share. Pettus (2000) shows that 
the firms that followed a specific hypothesized resource development pattern generated higher 
growth than those following other development paths after deregulation. This, however, is not 
directly a function of deregulation, but a function of a firms’ success in its strategies and 
resource allocation decisions.
Reger et al. (1992) propose that the direct effect of deregulations on firms’ strategic choices is 
least destructive for the involved firms, when changes are enacted gradually as part of an overall 
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plan, and when affected firms have sufficient advance notice and thus enough time to adapt 
themselves to the changes. Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006) studied the Spanish insurance 
industry at deregulation and found that the number of firms declined while the average size 
increased. Likewise inefficient firms disappeared through insolvency or liquidation.
At the time of opening the markets for competition, one expected outcome would be changes in 
the utility governance structure. Changes in the governance structures of the utility industry were 
not, however comparable to those in industrial firms (Rennie, 2006). Further deregulation would 
be expected to stimulate competition and lead to governance structures that provide greater 
control of the owner-manager agency conflict; especially if after deregulation several governance 
structures coexisted efficiently coping with regulatory uncertainty (Dalmas and Tokat, 2005). 
Dalmas and Tokat (2005) further pointed out that deregulation has a negative impact on the 
productive efficiency of firms, and that vertically integrated firms are more efficient than those 
that rely both on generation and contracting. Explaining (market) price of electric utilities, 
Blacconiere, Johnson and Johnson (2000) demonstrated that deregulation decreases the position 
of book value and increased the position of earnings.
At opening the markets for competition the structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) 
accumulated in the firm may hinder the firm form seeing the changes of the key features of the 
for the organization partly due to the organizational memory (Hannan and Freeman, 1984:  
Nelson and Winter, 1982). The new firms entering the market could initiate competence-
destroying discontinuities (Tushman and Anderson, 1986)  within the industry.  If we regard the 
structural inertia reflected in the behavioral patterns of the organization as a consequence of a 
selection process rather than as a precondition for selection (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) then 
obviously the firms may find it difficult to prepare for changes in the business focus. However, 
the firms that survive through the change process evidently have to choose right at least 
sometimes.
Based on the above discussion I can formulate the following Assumptions:
Assumption 2a
As a result of the introduction of competition and the subsequent changes in firm environment 
the overall locus of firm activity can be expected to shift.
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Assumption 2b 
As a result of the introduction of competition and the subsequent changes in firm environment 
the repertoire of action of a firm can be expected to change.
Assumption 2c 
As a result of the introduction of competition in previous monopoly markets the role of political 
action in the action portfolio of a firm can be expected to increase.
2.5 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE FIRM AND THE CUSTOMER
“Every individual, guided by himself, aims for a position and profession in the society where he 
best is positioned to increase the national profit, unless the laws prevent him from doing so”
(Chydenius, 1765). Chydenius further describes the laws that restrict individual’s choices or 
force the economic activities to take a certain shape in form of professions as “harmful for the 
nation and its’ national profit”.
Chydenius discusses the competitive market and its’ consequences for the entrepreneur in the 
following terms: “[the] entrepreneur, who can freely exercise his trade, stretches his activities 
far; every moment he thinks how to move his products in the most effective way. If somebody 
wishes to gain too much, he will have to face competition that will come to share the profits with 
him thus protecting the citizens from selfish greed. Then everyone would have to satisfy with less 
profit from each product, but in order to manage everyone would have to move the products 
more efficiently”.
Chydenius’ ideas build on the concept of competitive markets. In his view, as long as the 
entrepreneur follows the laws success is in his own hands. Chydenius did not explicitly discuss 
or describe the characteristics of a competitive market. In his statement the legislation sets the 
ultimate limits regarding the way the entrepreneur may proceed in pursuing his own interest 
while promoting “national profit”. 
Schumpeter (1964) defined the perfectly competitive market as a state in which no single 
individual actor has the capability to impact the prices directly or through factor markets. The 
concept of perfectly competitive markets is an ideal that the real markets seldom approach. There 
are only rare examples of this, such as worldwide markets of crude oil or other major 
commodities. In most other markets reality barriers hinder those markets from reaching the state 
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of perfect competition. The barriers that so hinder the competition from really working can be 
multiple; they can be of a technical nature derived from standardization, derived from legal 
decisions by the competent legal authority, logistical or related to the business situation, or the 
result of any of the characteristics of the market. 
Williamson (1975) sees market transactions as involving exchanges between autonomous 
economic parties, whereas for Coase (1988) markets are institutions that facilitate exchange. 
According to Kirzner (1992) the Austrian economists perceive the market process as a 
systematic process of mutual discovery by market participants. Kirzner (1992:43) defines this as 
“changes in the distinct set of forces unleashed at every moment in the absence of equilibrium …. 
These separate market processes run into one other colliding with or reinforcing each other so 
that the actual sequences of [a dependent variable] values are seen as highly complex outcomes 
of numerous interacting sets of forces.” Hayek (1973) emphasizes the role of prices in 
integrating dispersed knowledge and promoting a tendency to dovetail plans. In a competitive 
market the price of a product or service is determined at the market place as a striking price that 
enables the transaction between the buyer and the seller. The price is developed as a balance 
function between supply and demand and depending on the preferences of the observer; the 
resulting striking price can be characterized as high or low. However, if the transaction takes 
place, the price is correct for that time, place and occasion. In a perfectly competitive market 
each provider has so small a relative market power16 (Schumpeter, 1964) that no individual actor 
is able to impact the price of the product or any factor market thereof.  According to Coase 
(1988), in perfect competition an intricate system of rules and regulations would be needed. 
In classical economic theory market is often seen as homogenous, where products are 
symmetrical; each provider obtains the same price and the cost of making the product available 
is the same. One of the contributions of the Austrian economists is the theory of the markets (von 
Mises, 1928, 1979; Hayek, 1973; Kirzner, 1992; Foss and Christensen, 2001). According to the 
principles of Austrian economics, entrepreneurs try to use the information dispersed in the 
markets and create new information that can subsequently lead to new products and an improved 
competitive position. Kirzner (1992: 44) formulates this by noting “the entrepreneurial exercise 
16 A commonly accepted measure of market concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The purpose of 
the HHI index is to measure the concentration in a market. It is calculated by summing the squared market shares 
of each firm competing in a market. The HHI number can range from zero to 10,000. In perfect competition, i.e. 
perfectly competitive markets the HHI would have the value of 0, while at monopoly the HHI would have the 
value of 10.000. In real markets the HHI value of 10.000 is much more common than a value that would be close 
to zero.
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of alertness closes pockets of ignorance in the market and thereby moves the economic system 
towards a coordinated state”.
In pursuit of own success, guided by the “invisible hand” working to promote the “national 
profit”, the success of the entrepreneur will then be determined by the ability of that entrepreneur 
to collect dispersed information in order to differentiate itself from the others, obtain a preferable 
position among symmetrical products, move the products more efficiently, and as a result of his 
actions to obtain increased profitability. 
The actions of the firm inevitably have an impact on the customer base it serves. Automatically, 
all the actions the firm takes impact directly or indirectly on customers. Such actions could be 
changes in price or other commercial terms, changes in customer interface management, or the 
way the firm organizes its activities. If the firm chooses to exit, i.e. divest its utility functions, it 
will as well have an impact on its customers. Russo (1992) states that firms and regulators are 
locked in a bilateral relationship. Being locked with the regulator; the firm is likewise locked in 
its relationship with its customers. Customers are the fundamental necessity for the firm, and 
customers, as a group, need a firm to supply them with e.g. electricity. In a competitive market 
firms may change, but the existence of a firm to supply the electricity is a requirement.
Customers purchase products and services from the firm, so any changes in the way the firm 
makes the products and services available to the customer base will ultimately impact the 
customer and the behavioral options available to customers. If the customer does not like the 
new commercial terms proposed by the firm, the customer could reduce consumption or 
ultimately switch to another supplier or alternative product, provided that this is an option. This 
follows the core process of the Austrian economic school.
If we assume that the firm acts like “economic man”, primarily to maximize its own benefit, the 
firm could be expected to act so that it plans its configuration of actions to maximize its benefit 
stream (Siggelkow, 2001). When the environment changes, the most optimal configuration of 
actions obviously changes likewise, and thus the configuration of actions yielding the optimal 
outcome changes and evolves over time. Thus if we take snapshots of the process and compare 
two snapshots, the portfolio of most optimal actions obviously will have changed over time.
Mitzruchi and Yoo (2002) have shown that organizations that interact with their environment can 
obtain power over their business partners if customers are dependant on the interaction. The flip 
side of this is naturally, that in a competitive market such dependence cannot emerge. At 
introduction of competition the dependence between the customer and the firm obviously is cut. 
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Subsequently the customer may surprise the firm by switching to another supplier. Rao (2002) 
discusses competitiveness between two organizational communities. He identifies a competitive 
factor α that defines the directional competitive position between organizational communities A 
and B. In such a mutual interaction the two values for the vector α depend on the 
directionionality of the vector α.
In competitive markets the competition functions as the principal institutional device for assuring 
good performance (Viscusi et al., 2000). Customers should be the first beneficiaries of the 
introduction of competition and should expect to see the impact of competition on products, 
prices and company performance. In many electricity markets all over the world, major industrial 
and commercial customers are the ones that first use the opportunities that competition provides 
for customers in terms of increased choice, while the small residential customers tend to stay 
with their traditional suppliers and often do not use the opportunity to switch suppliers. The 
proportional importance of energy expense in the overall cost structure seems to be directly 
correlated with the readiness to change supplier. Similarly, the evidence from almost all markets 
where competition has been introduced is that customers with the smallest proportional shares of 
energy cost in their overall cost structure are the least interested to switch supplier. This could to 
be connected to the savings potential for the customer; the larger the bill the more you might be 
expected to reduce the costs by using the option to let competition work. 
In competitive markets the negative publicity a firm receives will subsequently have an impact 
on cash flow, stock volatilities, and ultimately stock price (Luo, 2009). Firms with a long 
monopoly history will especially need to include customers’ switching opportunity into their 
thinking. Although the customer would need to bear the switching costs, he or she is prepared to 
switch supplier if the service quality the firm provides does not lead into customer satisfaction 
(Meng and Elliot, 2009).  Furthermore Wieringa and Verhoef (2007) have shown that 
relationship quality, switching cost, and current demand for products and services from the 
energy supplier represent important determinants for all customers. Walsh et al. (2006) found a 
weak relationship between corporate reputation and switching intention. However, Walsh et al. 
(2005) discovered three switching clusters: unsatisfied customers, relatively satisfied customers 
seeking change, and dissatisfied customers.
What actual level of competition will be reached after deregulation depends on an array of 
variables (Porter, 1980). The overall attractiveness of the market, the characteristics of the 
process of market opening, the remaining market power of the incumbent, availability of firms to 
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offer alternatives to customers, overall size and structure of the market, and the like will all 
impact how competitive the market will become. 
Regarding products, firms need to assess if their customers’ preferences are changing or if their 
needs were not met. There could be latent demand that has never been discovered. In their study
on airline strategies after deregulation, Bailey and Williams (1988), show that deregulation 
caused a major change in carrier strategy regarding route networks. Obviously in the airline 
industry the product is the traveling service on a route the airline is offering to the customers. By 
changing the route offering the airlines intended to satisfy such customers’ needs that had not 
been served before. 
Greene and Smiley (1984) found that unregulated prices (the state prior to regulation, and 
therefore not the same as deregulated prices) for electricity were 20-50 per cent higher than 
regulated prices. The initiative behind introduction of regulation has probably been 
dissatisfaction with the prevailing price level, but without knowledge of the detail prevailing at 
the time it is not possible to assess market entry barriers and their significance on the lack of 
competition (Rothbard, 1962). Meyer and Leland (1980) found that regulated prices were 
significantly lower than unregulated, but that the customers would have preferred even lower 
prices. Viscusi et al. (2000) refer to a study prepared by Stigler and Friedland, in which the latter 
studied regulated and non-regulated electricity prices in the US in the 1920s and tried to 
eliminate the impact of other variable by using multiple regression analysis. Their finding was 
relatively surprising – statistically, regulation had no significant impact on prices. 
Well designed competitive market reforms have led to performance improvements in a number 
of dimensions, and benefited customers through lower retail prices (Joskow, 2006). However, 
the experiment of competitive markets in California resulted in catastrophic results and could be 
regarded as an example of how good intentions can produce unexpected results. Cho and Kim 
(2007) have shown that in California between 1998 and 2000 a welfare loss can be explained by 
the then finite transmission capacity and the market power exercised by the generators. In 
California, the wholesale market was opened for competition while the retail market had price 
caps. As the retail market had such price caps and wholesale prices were rising rapidly, the 
utilities were not able to let the price signals go through to the residential customers. The retail 
customers, in the absence of the price signal, continued to increase consumption, which in turn 
made the wholesale prices even higher. The utility firms were restricted from using hedging and 
thus the situation was unbearable for firms. The result was the bankruptcy of one utility and re-
Chapter 2 – Research Framework
42
regulation for the entire state, with the concept of the state authority purchasing electricity for all 
utilities within the state.
The finding of Ghobadian and Viney (2002) that utilities need to achieve critical mass and some 
form of integration can be seen in many examples of former monopoly firms in the energy 
industry that have been faced with the competition. As there are no historical evolutionary 
models to follow (Larsen and Bunn, (1999) and even the regulatory institutions have little 
understanding of how to operate in the short run and evolve in the future, the strategy formation 
can be based only on available information maintaining the option for corrective action in the 
future. The role of the firm’s R&D orientation (Stuart (1996) could be one way to navigate but it 
is always depending on signals of the R&D of its competitors. As technology evolves through 
periods of incremental change punctuated by technological break-troughs that either enhance or 
destroy the competence of firms in an industry (Tuschman and Anderson, 1986) the process the 
reconfiguration and transformation are essential forms to renew the organization (Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972). Though the continuous changes are often related to progress along a 
technological trajectory defined by a technological paradigm, the discontinuities are associated 
with the emergence of a new paradigm (Dosi, 1992). 
Institutional isolating mechanisms may provide a firm with either industry leadership or 
obsolescence, depending on whether firm practices generate and sustain strategic isolating 
mechanisms in their competitive context (Jones, 2001).  To enhance their development rival 
firms search for new capabilities both from within their organization and also for those that rest 
in their competitive environment (Huygens, Van Den Bosch, Volberda and Baden-Fuller, 2001). 
These search processes directed to find new solutions at both firm and industry levels in 
interaction makes industries and firms co-evolve over time (Murmann, 2003). 
Based on the discussion above, the following Assumptions are presented: 
Assumption 3a 
As a result of the introduction of competition to former monopoly markets, firm’s active in the 
market must define the strategic context they are in. They would need to determine if retail or 
distribution, or a combination thereof will be their business configuration.
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Assumption 3b 
As a result of the introduction of competition to former monopoly markets, firm’s active in the 
market could be expected to evolve together with the industry and shift attention towards 
maintaining competitiveness, thus acknowledging the option of losing customers.
Assumption 3c 
As a result of the introduction of competition to former monopoly markets, firm’s active in the 
market could be expected to shift attention towards their internal structure, competences and the 
cost of producing the service. 
2.6 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE CUSTOMER AND THE 
LEGISLATOR
The interaction loop is closed by introducing the customer’s dual role, both as a buyer of the 
products and services and as a political actor i.e. the customer being at the same time a citizen of 
the state and thus a voter in elections. This functions as the link that ties the entire interaction 
discussed above back to political decision-making through the interaction between voters and the 
legislators.
The fundamental question here asks why a state exists – why have free individuals joined 
together to form a state to act collectively on behalf of the individuals that could also be acting 
individually. The classic benefit that the individuals could gain by joining forces is related to 
defense and law enforcement, but this discussion is omitted in this context. Obviously economic 
man, acting according to the well-documented behavioral principles, tries to maximize his own 
benefit stream, which in this particular case would be achieved by joining forces with other 
individuals. 
Sometimes the state acting on behalf of the markets can be seen to produce “public good” in 
form of correcting a market failure (Buchanan, 1968). In the discussion, fuelled by the work of 
Keynes (1936), that has led to a vast number of publications discussing the interventionist 
policies of the state to correct market failures, the key such discussions is whether the state 
should intervene in the market or not. The counter-argument put forward by von Mises (1928, 
1979) against interventionism because the markets fix themselves, is strongly supported by 
Buchanan and Tullock (1965); although the latter do acknowledge the supply and demand of 
public goods. Krugman (2009) sees a parallel between the great depression of the 1930s and the 
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crisis of 2008; and the role of government and the private sector in the causes of the present 
(2008) crisis. However, once the state exists, individual members of the state are integral parts of 
a larger more meaningful organism (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965). Obviously individual 
members of the state are permanently integral parts of an organism. They do not have the 
privilege to change their position in the state over time; sometimes being a member and 
sometimes not. 
Although different individuals have different utility functions, Buchanan and Tullock (1965) 
regard the desire to maximize the personal utility of economic man as the basis of the theory of 
collective choice. Additionally, Olson (1965) lists as key motivational forces the gaining of 
prestige, friendship, social and psychological benefits, or for solely philanthropic or religious 
causes. On the other hand, Simon (1986) regards the motivation to gain economic benefit not to 
be the essential element for collective choice. Widerquist (2003) emphasizes the altruistic 
behavioral of man in society, thus objecting to the concept of economic man maximizing his 
own benefit.
Downs (1957) describes the utility function an individual may obtain from government as the 
difference between the expected obtainable utility incomes from government and from the 
alternative. Although the utility function is motivated solely by individual self interest in all 
aspects of the behavior, in the political mechanism individuals may co-operate to secure certain 
mutually desired ends (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965).  
The course of action the state takes should, in theory, be intended to serve the interests of the 
constituents i.e. the voters, who in turn are the members of the state. Sometimes this objective is 
not reached, but the state acts against the interests of a particular group of its members. Benn 
(1956) even goes so far as to call the state the enemy. Rotberg (2004) discusses strong and weak 
states and the impact of this on the individual. Whether the state appears to be strong or weak is 
clearly not always the result of a deliberate decision of the individual, but an outcome of a 
political process.
Kessler (2003) discusses the characteristics of representative and direct democracy. Direct 
democracy refers to the people voting directly rather than using their elected representatives to 
make the vote. In a representative democracy, the voters use their democratic power in elections 
that take place infrequently. Gersbach (2003) plays with the hypothesis of every voter having not 
exactly one vote, but rather voters would having an uneven number of votes and found that such 
a situation could lead to the majority taxing minorities.
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The voters’ primary powers are associated with casting the ballot. Thus, the themes that become 
the most important during the election process often reflect true or perceived voter concerns 
(Downs, 1957), and these voter concerns are subsequently reflected in how the voter casts the 
ballot. Benz and Stutzer (2005) claim that citizens are politically better informed if they have 
extended political participation rights. Cebula (2008) suggests that voter turnout in referenda is 
influenced by the emotionality of the subject on the ballot. 
Voters have several opportunities to form their opinions. Strömberg (2001) emphasizes the role 
of mass media in increasing the knowledge level among uninformed voters. Generally, it is 
assumed that voter participation increases when the expected obtainable benefit stream from the 
state increases. Greene and Nikolaev (1999) argue that this is not a general explanation, but that 
voter income level could better explain voter behavior. Daumann and Wassermann (2009) even 
propose that a market for votes could improve efficiency, though in democratic states this is 
often forbidden. Buchanan and Lee, (1986) present a model of assessing vote buying in a 
stylized setting. Krause and Mendez (2005) identify political business cycles. 
The prevailing or perceived legislative framework for energy can have a major role in the 
electoral behavior of customers i.e. voters. At the time when the customers of a company are 
unsatisfied, they could be tempted to vote for representatives that declare an intention to shape 
the future legislative framework more favorably towards the customers. The economic rationale 
of voting (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965) may not always be sufficient to explain voter behavior. 
Voters lack the direct test of success or failure of the elected politicians’ actions. A voter tends 
not to turn to those politicians whose policies have the best chance of success, but to those who 
can best “sell” their ideas. The average voter will never be able to discover the errors that his 
elected representative makes (Rothbard, 1962). 
Piketty (1999) argues that recent developments regarding the role of political institutions in 
aggregating dispersed political information, emphasize the role of majority rule voting as a 
bringer of efficient information aggregation. Voters may find it impossible to distinguish 
economic responsibility in society while in the voting booth, and thus would be tempted to 
permit other aspects such as belonging to a social, linguistic or religious group to impact their 
voting decisions (Bengtsson, 2004). Downing (2005) questions altogether the traditional 
explanation of rationality of voting, and introduces new rationale. This new rationale consists of 
justifying the inherent interest in politics, meeting the perceived obligation to vote or obtaining 
satisfaction in having the opportunity to express their opinion, and enjoying the overall feeling of 
importance associated with voting. Sometimes energy-related questions are presented to the 
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people in a referendum; like such as the nuclear referendum in Sweden 1980. In referenda the 
alternatives according to which the voters need to take a stand are often very simplified 
extremes. According to Kessler (2003) the results of such referenda follow more closely the 
preferences of the majority, but in representative democracies determined policies are better 
tailored to relevant contingencies. 
Downs (1957) claims that every government seeks to maximize political support, and the 
primary goal of government is re-election. Similarly, he states that a successful election is the 
objective of those parties now out of power. To reach this end the government has to know what 
the voters want because without having knowledge of their aspirations and wishes the 
government would inevitably run the risk of losing the forthcoming elections (Downs, 1957). 
Besides listening to pressure groups, there are primarily two options available for government to 
find out what the voters want. The government may conduct polls, which is expensive, or it can 
rely on guessing what the voters want. This latter option, however, is obviously quite inaccurate. 
Thus, many governments often rely on the voices of various representatives or pressure groups 
that come forth and state their views. Page and Shapiro (1983) found that public opinion 
influences policy more than policy affects public opinion. 
Individuals may establish pressure groups with the objective of influencing policies. Olson 
(1965) discusses the motivation of such pressure groups and suggests that in a society they 
counterbalance one another, thus ensuring that the outcome will not be biased. He even claims 
that such pressure groups should have larger constitutional role in society. He sees the role of 
pressure groups in a society as a form of democracy by claiming that eventually the interests of a 
larger number will win out over the special interests of the minority. The government listens to 
various pressure groups and lobbyists when considering which decision would yield most votes 
for the governing party or coalition in the next elections, and decides accordingly (Downs, 
1957).
Voters in a democracy do not have equal influence on policy formation (Downs, 1957). 
Variations in the possession of resources and affiliation in various influential organizations may
emphasize this disparity. Voters / customers can try to provide new momentum to the cycle and 
thus continue the process. The means available to voters / customers are to join together to 
amplify their voice, thus increasing the chances of their voice being heard at the legislative level, 
seek to purchase votes, providing that this is an option (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965; Downs, 
1957), and to try to influence other voters by means of spreading information of voters opinions 
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(Downs, 1957). The latter is most effectively achieved by aligning with a newspaper that has 
wide popularity among the potential voters and the government (Strömberg, 2001). By doing so, 
the voter that intends to influence other voters is able to get his / her voice amplified 
substantially. They can likewise establish their own party, if there is an opening in the political 
spectrum (Downs, 1957), or try to influence through existing associations or other organizations. 
Bonardi, Hillman and Klein (2005) saw a parallel between political and economic markets in that 
the political  is a collection of political markets where demanders of public policy interact with 
suppliers in the same way as economic markets. Another question is then how the effectiveness 
and efficiency of public policy could be measured, and which metrics would be appropriate to 
use (Johnsen, 2005) if people would be prepared to pay for public goods (Mitchell and Carson, 
1988). Ando and Palmer (1998) suggest that the dominance of one interest group in the struggle 
for the influence over the decision maker may speed up of the process towards retail competition 
with the expected efficiency gains. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) even suggest that the relative 
strength associated with the potential winners could influence the outcome of the deregulation 
process. 
Degan (2006) proposes that in the future the voter group is going to polarize into one group that 
gathers much information and one that abstains from voting. At election time, and during the 
time between elections, various groupings advance their interest by trying to influence elected 
officials. Horgos and Zimmermann (2009) have shown that interest group activity has a reverse 
impact on growth rates, and a positive impact on inflation rates. Coates, Heckelman and Wilson 
(2007) build on Olson’s (1982) “institutional sclerosis” theory and found that under a stable 
environment interest groups flourish, and institutional stability and economic development are 
both related to interest group formation. Coates and Wilson (2007) show that interest group 
activity is negatively related to aggregate stock market performance.  White (1996) indicates the 
need to demonstrate the short run consumer benefits could hinder the widespread adaptation of 
regulatory reforms. Kaserman, Mayo and Pacey (1993) find so many conflicting interest groups 
representing the deregulation formula, that they regard it as surprising that any deregulation in 
the long distance telephoning  industry ever has happened.
Voters could find it easier to distinguish the link between their voting decision and policy 
changes on a local level than on a state or federal level. In local elections the link to policy 
implementation could be perceived to be more direct. The election themes that impact voters’ 
choice should subsequently have an impact on the legislative process after the elections (such as 
electing the Governor in the State of Maryland in 2006).
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When elected, the representatives’ voting pattern could be expected to reflect the interests of 
their voters. North (1990) proposes that when observing the voting behavior of the legislator it 
becomes obvious that it is not possible to explain such voting behavior only by the 
principal/agent model, but the agent’s own utility function – his own sense of the way the world 
ought to be – appears to play a role in the outcomes. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) analyzed roll 
call voting in the US Congress spanning two centuries and found that despite a wide array of 
issues facing legislators, over 80 per cent of a legislator's voting decisions can be attributed to a 
consistent ideological position ranging from ultra-conservatism to ultra-liberalism. In the US the 
term liberal is often used to describe the opposite to conservatives, though the conservatives are 
seen as keen supporters of liberty. Grossman and Helpman (2001) claim that voters, interest 
groups, and politicians all act in their own self interest, and that political outcome can be 
identified with the concept of equilibrium from game-theory. Van Deth (1997) points out that the 
structure of voluntary associations and intermediary organizations is dynamic and has changed, 
and points to a changing, but not declining, democratic culture in Western Europe. 
The discussion above leads to formulating the following Assumption:
Assumption 4
As a result of the introduction of competition to previous monopoly electricity markets, 
electricity-related aspects could more easily become issues that activate voters in elections.  
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3 RESEARCH SITE
Before entering the research I will set the scene and discuss the characteristics of the electricity 
supply industry and the overall framework of making the electricity market competitive. The 
purpose of this chapter is thus to provide an overview of the special characteristics of the 
electric utility industry and its fundamental underlying business logic.
The electricity value chain (Porter, 1985) consists of the sourcing of primary energy, generation, 
high voltage transmission, the wholesale market including trading, low voltage distribution and 
retail (supply). As an example, Figure 3-1 illustrates the electricity industry value chain in the 
United States in 2003. In addition to the parts of the value chain, the Figure illustrates the 
amount of capital tied into various parts of the business value chain, and the revenue stream in 
that particular part of the chain. The capital tied in the value chain part is illustrated as the net 
book value. 
Often, fuel sourcing is not presented as a separate part or is excluded altogether as an externality. 
However, in Figure 3-1 it is included in order to demonstrate the overall value associated with 
fuel sourcing. Furthermore it should be pointed out that in this presentation the retail market is 
included in the distribution rather than presented as a separate component in the value chain.
The amount of capital tied into generation is highest, followed by distribution, while the capital 
tied in the other components of the value chain is substantially lower. Subsequently the revenue 
base in generation is highest, followed by distribution.
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Figure 3-1 US electric value chain in 2003.
Within the electricity value chain, there are at least two distinctive markets. These are the 
wholesale market and the retail market, and both are discussed below. These two markets can be 
opened for competition either at the same time, or the opening of the retail market could be 
phased in later. 
The wholesale market, which operates in a high voltage network environment, is characterized 
by large volumes. The trade can take place between generators, traders, large industrial 
consumers and utility firms. The products traded can be electricity, futures contracts, risk 
management services, transmission rights, capacity arrangements or any derivatives of these. 
They are often complemented with financial contracts traded on a defined market place. A 
wholesale market often takes place in an organized.
The retail market can be found in low voltage environment, where retail firms compete in 
contracting the supply of electricity to final consumers; residential, commercial and other. This 
competition takes place using a distribution network as a common carrier that can often be 
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regarded as a natural monopoly (Demsetz, 1968; Kahn, 1988; Viscusi et al., 2000). A market 
opening for competition is likely to change the competitive dynamics of the industry, although 
the visible impact may be delayed.
During the historical phases, the industry operating the electric business has seen several 
organizational options. Hunt (2002) has identified the following four possible phases in the 
evolutionary path of organization forms of electricity industry:
1) Vertically integrated monopoly,
2) Single buyer,
3) Wholesale competition,
4) Retail competition.
The first of these phases incorporates all activities under one company umbrella in the form of a 
vertically integrated monopoly. This model has been the traditional way to organize the 
electricity industry from its early beginning to recent times. The next phase opens generation to 
competition, permitting independent power producers to be connected into the network, 
however, leaving the dominant firm as the sole buyer of the generate power. In this model, the 
commercial terms of the transaction are often regulated by a regulator. As a variation of this 
model, in the Nordic Area17 a group of major producers connected to the network were not 
directly competing with each other, but exchanging power between themselves primarily to 
provide reserve capacity and to optimize the overall costs of operating the electricity system. In 
the third model the wholesale market is opened for competition. This is the model that represents 
many of the US component markets; PJM18 market as an example (Lambert, 2001). The final 
phase opens the entire market for competition. This is the model represented in the Nordic Area 
and in the UK.
In all models the wires businesses19 remain as regulated monopolies. The transaction costs to 
perform the transmission or distribution functions using parallel channels would exceed the cost 
of the natural monopoly model.  The natural monopoly model is accompanied by entry barriers 
in the form of licensing of the distribution business. The electricity market is not perfectly 
competitive, although, especially in the wholesale market, there are many characteristics of a 
17 The Nordic Area in this context refers to the geographically connected Nordic electricity market consisting of 
Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark.
18 PJM is an organization. The letters originally stood for Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland but the 
organization now covers large areas on the US east coast. It is a high voltage network operator and the largest 
electricity market place in the world.
19 Wires business refers to owning and operating the distribution and transmission networks while letting others take 
care of selling electricity to the customers.
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perfectly competitive market. Parisio and Bosco (2003) have shown that large generators have an 
incentive to restrict their supplies, thereby creating condition for higher prices. This is perfectly 
in accord with the behavioral pattern of a monopolist as presented by Rothbard (1962). In the 
foreseeable future, there will always be some actors whose influence in price discovery will be 
more significant than others’. Though Parisio and Bosco (2003) state that the efficiency of the 
wholesale power market is somewhat ambiguous, many power markets in the world are working 
well and provide benefits to the participants. However, even if they could work substantially 
better and the setting of prices could be more efficient, nobody has presented a working model 
that would bring the markets closer to the ideal of a perfectly competitive market in the 
Schumpeterian sense.
At an opening up of the electricity market the vertically integrated monopoly supply chain from 
generation to distribution and retail is cut and two markets are formed. By reference to Hunt 
(2002), the markets can be opened for competition only partly, or completely. This process can, 
and often is implemented in phases. The process is often phased in order that competition is 
introduced by first making the high voltage wholesale and generation market competitive, 
leaving the low voltage retail market opening to take place later. The existence of a well-
functioning wholesale market with subsequent risk management features is a prerequisite for the 
functioning of a competitive open market in both wholesale and retail levels.
When the retail market is opened for competition, final customers may change electricity 
suppliers when they see this as fitting. A prerequisite for retail market competition is a 
functioning wholesale market, where retailers may purchase and sell electricity volumes. The 
emergence of a wholesale market place of electricity is essential for the functioning of a retail 
market because when customers change supplier, suppliers need to have an option to dispose of 
the electricity they no longer supply. Similarly after gaining a customer, suppliers must have a 
flexible way to source electricity at a price that reflects the true product value at the market 
place. Besides physical supply, such a market provides the opportunities to develop other 
products, such as long-term forward supply contracts and derivatives to cover the inherent price 
or volume risks or any other auxiliary services they need to extract from the network. 
Joskow (2000) has considered the idea of why there should be a retailer anyway; could not the 
consumer get electricity cheaper through wholesale. His conclusion is that the role of the retailer 
/ supplier is not obtained automatically, but the retailer must earn his position, i.e. the value 
added that the retailer provides to the customer must be equal or higher than the markup the 
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retailer charges on the top of the wholesale price; otherwise the retailer does not earn his place in 
the value chain.
The wholesale market is used for price discovery, so price of wholesale power is decoupled from 
a direct link to cost, reflecting primarily the supply – demand balance in network and 
transmission congestion, and secondarily the short-term marginal cost structure of the additional 
generating capacity at any given time. The price indexation previously used is thus no longer 
valid, and market participants will need an arrangement that can be used for managing price 
risks. The wholesale market, with forward trading features and financial products, can be 
established for and between the generators, retailers and traders without the need to open the 
retail market for competition. 
Price discovery in the wholesale markets of electricity takes place through an auction process 
where, with increase in demand of electricity in a system, new plants are connected on line 
(dispatched) to maintain the consumption-generation balance. Depending on the actual 
operational procedures defined in the system, the plant last connected to the network is usually 
the lowest price bidder among the remaining plants not running but participating in the bidding. 
Remotely, the bid price reflects the short-term marginal costs of the system, but it is not directly 
the cost. An electricity generation system requires a certain amount of reserve capacity. Which 
plant has last been connected to the network impacts the quantity of remaining reserves that can, 
on short notice, be connected to the system. This in turn could impact the pricing of production 
at each new plant connected to the network. For example in PJM there is an incentive system in 
place to encourage new capacity development.
A prerequisite for the wholesale market to function properly is that access to the high voltage 
network must be opened to all participants symmetrically and without discrimination or cross-
subsidization from other Strategic Business Units (SBU’s) of the wires-company, or in any other 
fashion. Without open non-discriminatory access to the network the market cannot work 
properly. Operating the high voltage network can be organized in different ways, but giving 
operational responsibility of the network to a separate network operator, sends a clear signal of 
fairness to the markets.
As electricity cannot be easily stored, and travels at the speed of light, the amount of electricity 
consumed needs to be produced at the same time it is consumed. This is a complex requirement 
for the balancing of supply and demand both temporarily and maintaining the balance in the 
network. The task of the network operator in each component market is to ensure that at every 
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moment that there is sufficient generation capacity supplying the network. The operator 
determines the merit order according to which different generators are connected to the network 
to generate electricity. 
In the Nordic market the operators of national networks use the technical capacity in co-
operation with each other to transfer power between the national networks over national 
boundaries. This transfer capacity is, however, limited, which leads to price differentials from 
time to time. The principle of one price is true most of the time while transfer capacity-related 
price differentials emerge occasionally. Especially during peak consumption there will inevitably 
be geographically derived price differentials as the dominant generation form in Norway is 
hydropower, in Sweden hydro combined with nuclear, and in Finland primarily thermal power. 
The birth of competition:
Often the introduction of competition is based on a set of more or less coherent administrative 
and legislative decisions reflecting a matrix of intentions to bring competition to the electricity 
market. With these decisions, however, it is only possible to create an environment that could be 
favorable for the emergence of competition. For competition truly to emerge in high and low 
voltage electricity markets, the following four elements are often regarded necessary, but not 
always sufficient to make competition work: The network operators need to yield symmetrical 
access opportunities to the network; it needs to be feasible for such marketers to emerge that are 
willing to provide initiative for the customers to switch: unnecessarily high switching charges 
need to be abolished, a “referee” with sufficient powers to oversee the fairness of competition 
needs to be established at the same time as the introduction of competition legislation.
A key point in the above is that it is only possible to create an environment where competition 
could emerge by administrative decision, but industry actions will ultimately be required. Thus, 
without the involvement of the industry, competition cannot emerge. The emergence of 
competition requires collaboration by the actors in the market or the emergence of new actors. 
This can, however, be non-voluntary acceptance of the situation and therefore only a pragmatic 
realization of the situation. In case the industry should not actively participate in the promotion 
of competition the authorities have tools at their disposal to promote the birth of competition. 
I will discuss the four necessary actions required to enable competition to work, described above 
are hereunder more in detail:
1) A requirement for symmetrical non-discriminatory access opportunities to the network 
may be included in the administrative decisions in the form of the requirement to 
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establish Third Party Access rules, or juridical unbundling, etc. These will then require a 
certain degree of participation from the incumbent utility company in the form of timely 
action in favor of competition. Symmetrical access refers to granting access to any 
qualified body on similar terms without discrimination. These new entrants could be 
independent power producers, industrial plants selling excess power, utilities retailing 
excess power sourced over a variety of suppliers, traders acting in the market for profit, 
or actors from outside of the traditional industry. 
2) The environment has to be feasible for emerging of sufficient number of credible actors 
willing to provide incentive for the consumers to switch. For a consumer to be willing to 
switch, there needs to be an incentive. Without a clear obtainable benefit a consumer will 
not act and the expected outcome will not be reached. In addition customers need to be 
confident about the capacity of the new supplier to fulfill its promises. Often this requires 
certain backup supplier arrangements requiring the involvement of the incumbent.
3) Unnecessarily high switching charges and other obstacles related to changing the supplier 
has to be eliminated so the benefit would not be absorbed by the incumbent. Additionally 
the associated administration should be relatively simple; 
4) A “referee” to oversee the fairness of competition needs to be established, as there will be 
a need for a regulator or a competition authority to oversee the fairness of the market and 
the existence of real entry and exit opportunities. Very seldom in the electricity market 
can the state of competition be regarded as perfect competition in the sense described by 
Schumpeter (1964); thus, such a referee would be necessary to ensure that no dominant 
actor in the market is able to abuse the dominant position. 
Even if these preconditions for competition to emerge accurately reflect real requirements, there 
are still aspects that could hinder competition from emerging. Energy is sometimes a marginal 
expense, especially in the retail market, so trying to get competitive offers does not seem to be 
worth the effort. The price differentials can be insignificant due to the lack of true competitive 
pressure at one extreme, or the emergence of cut-throat competition at the other. As a result, 
shopping will not provide the desired savings. Further aspects could be lack of a fallback 
supplier arrangement (supplier of last resort), or legislated advantageous fallback rates, which 
combined with a lack of credibility of the new suppliers, could significantly hinder competition 
from emerging. Similar harm to the promotion of competitiveness can be caused if the fixed 
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bundled rates are lower than the competitive rates. If the referee established to ensure fairness of 
competition does not have sufficient enforcement powers, this could significantly slow down the 
process. Legislation could be contradictory as a result of layered parallel legislative structures. 
This is especially the case in the US where the roles of federal and state powers can lead to 
confusion in electricity market structure. Long transition periods and arrangements could 
likewise shape the characteristics of the market. Finally there could be non-visible cross-
subsidies in rates between different customer groups of regulated and non-regulated businesses.
The making of a sufficient set of administrative decisions resulting in enforceable laws and other 
regulations that bind the firms active in the market reflects political intention and determination 
to achieve the said objective of achieving working competition in the electricity market. These
decisions can be made by a body that has sufficient jurisdiction over the electricity market. In 
case of a nation state, the decision can be made by national parliament, government or any 
relevant part hereof, or by a transnational body like the EU with jurisdiction over nation states. 
In the US where the Federal Government has little or no jurisdiction over state internal matters, 
the decision can be made by the state congress, state consumer commission or similar, or any 
other body with relevant jurisdiction over state electricity markets. The most important factor for 
a competitive environment to emerge is the political will and determination to make decisions, 
and the arrangements required to implement them. 
It may be the case that the political determination is not clear, or it has a combination of different 
contradicting intentions. If this is the case, the path towards properly functioning electricity 
markets can become longer and more cumbersome. These decisions are by no means a guarantee 
for competition to emerge, but by administratively making and implementing this set of 
decisions it is possible to alter the market environment so that competition can become a reality. 
This creation of an environment that is favorable for competition may require several decisions 
that must also be consistent with the expected outcome. Because sometimes the impact of a 
decision does not push the process into the desired direction or bring the desired outcome, it may 
need to be replaced by a new decision that is more coherent with the original goal.  
Hunt (2002) presents the following conditions for the electricity market to function:
1) many buyers and sellers – a lack of market power on both sides of the market,
2) demand and supply responsiveness to price,
3) liquid and efficient marketplaces,
Chapter 3 – Research Site
57
4) equal access to any essential facilities, 
5) treatment of subsidies and environment controls so that they do not interfere with the 
workings of the market.
The conditions presented by Hunt (2002) actually define the state after market opening and the 
conditions presented above characterize the conditions required for competition to emerge.
Giving consideration to Porter’s (1980) five forces model, at the time of market opening, the 
balance of power can shift between customers and suppliers, depending on the supply situation. 
One company executive interviewed for this research stated that :
“Competition clearly shifts the balance of power between customers and shareholders on 
one hand and organized labor on the other. There is a clear shift away from organized 
labor, whereas in the purely regulated structure organized labor tends to be stronger. 
That’s one discernable shift. As between customers and shareholders, the balance of 
power can shift either way depending on external circumstances; competition is good for 
the suppliers when you have shortages, and it’s good for consumers when you have a 
plethora [of alternatives] and presumably it’s good for the customers in the long term 
anyway. Initially competition shifted the balance towards the customers. Most utilities 
were able to work out transition arrangements that kept those shifts from being 
destructive to shareholders”.
Chapter 4 – Research Methodology
58
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to review the relevant methodological approaches to research and
to justify the methodological choices made. I will describe the methodology and the detailed 
process of collecting and analyzing the data with the ultimate objective of developing theory. To 
capture information on the strategic interaction of utility firms active in a market that is opening 
to competition, a qualitative case research methodology with a reasonable number of cases 
appeared to be the obvious choice. Section 4.1 is intended to describe the research design and 
process, the content of Section 4.2 concentrates on the determination of the sample. Section 4.3
describes the data, and Section 4.4 reviews the processing and analysis of the data and leads to 
development of theory.
4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
A qualitative case research methodology framework was deemed the most appropriate for this 
research (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, Bensabat, 
Goldstein and Mead, 1987; Yin, 2003). Table 4-1 summarizes the key characteristics different 
scholars provide to structure case study research. The scholars quoted below each provide a 
useful “instruction booklet” for preparing a study. Not all cover exactly same issues but the table 
below is intended to illustrate which aspects are illuminated by each of the scholars. A more 
detailed table illustrating the key elements defined by each of the sources, the ways they have 
defined case study research, the characteristics of theory generation, how the referenced research 
have helped to assess the formed theory, criticism of the case method, and possible areas where 
the case study method could be applied is presented in an Appendix A20. The summary table 
presented below is intended to provide a general view of the characteristics of each approach. 
20 The in depth comparison of the Case Study Research methodologies ii presented in Appendix B.
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Bensabat et al. 
1987
Eisenhardt 1989 Glaser & 
Strauss 1967
Ragin & 
Becker 1992
Yin 2003
Phases / 
components 
included?
Unit of analysis, 
single vs. multi 
case, analysis and 
exploration
9 phase program 4 phase 
program
General 
discussion, not 
detailed 
instructions
5 phase process
Definition 
provided?
YES YES NO NO YES 
Contribution to 
theory 
generation
YES, emphasizing 
the researcher 
contribution
YES, begins with no 
theory
YES, 
emphasizes 
confidence
YES, Mills 
method 
presented
YES, “following 
the instincts” 
Tools for 
assessing the 
theory provided
NO YES, characterizing 
good theory
YES, five 
point program 
for theory 
generation
NO YES, emphasize 
validity and 
reliability
Criticism 
presented?
YES, descriptive YES, complexity and 
idiosyncrasy
YES, 
emphasizes 
confidence and 
testing
YES, requires 
strong 
assumptions
YES, emphasis on 
validity testing
Applications for 
use?
YES, for early 
phase, practice 
based 
YES, for situations 
where little is known 
NO YES, small N YES, to explain, 
illustrate and 
explore
Table 4-1 Questions regarding case study research methodology.
The case study method is regarded as especially appropriate for cases in a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003) and when little is known 
about the phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989; Bensabat et al., 1987). It results in developing theory 
that is often novel, testable and empirically valid, and that has an intimate connection with 
empirical reality (Eisenhardt, 1989). It also permits the development of a testable, relevant and 
valid theory that is based on the data obtained from the cases (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
Bensabat et al. (1987) point out that case study is appropriate when research and theory are at 
their early, formative stages, and in sticky practice-based problems where the experiences of the 
actors are important and the context of action is critical. 
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Indeed, the fundamental difference between case study research and alternative methods is that 
case study requires less a priori knowledge of what the variables of interest will be and how they 
will be measured. Discussing the characteristics of grounded theory method Suddaby (2006) 
points out that grounded theory is neither perfect nor easy. Nor is it simply a routine application 
of formulaic technique, theory testing or an excuse to ignore methodology. 
The unit of analysis in this research is the firm, the entire firm, rather than any specific part or 
division of it (Bensabat et al., 1987). Using this viewpoint puts the researcher in the position that 
is comparable to a shareholder considering various investment opportunities thus elominating the 
possible cross subsidy impacts within the firm (Dasmgaard, 2003). A shareholder could analyze 
the performance opportunities of a specific SBU21 and use that data to assess the future 
development potential of the share price, but would have to acquire equity in the entire company. 
The case firms could be small or big, one business or multi-business conglomerates, or firms that 
have experienced substantial changes both in form and in scope at or after market deregulation. 
These firms could have been initiated by the evolutionary process in competitive dynamics at the 
market opening resulting in consolidation of the industry, structural changes due to regulatory 
requirements, i.e. unbundling of offering, or structural pressure from the shareholders. 
The degree of vertical integration over the value chain may vary between various component 
markets and the firms depending on legal, regulatory and other restrictions or opportunities. The 
firms’ business presence in various parts of the value chain in different component markets could 
be different, depending primarily on strategies of the firms and the prevailing regulatory 
framework. It would be interesting to analyze entire component businesses of the firms, but this 
would require access to such company internal reporting information that is normally not 
available to outsiders. Many of the firms studied in this research (see chapter 5 for a full 
description) have changed their organizational and operational structure during the time span 
covered in this research. Thus concentrating on a sub division of a company or an SBU, and 
carrying out the analysis on that SBU level (e.g. distribution, retail or generation) would not have 
been possible without such in-depth company internal information that is not regularly 
publicized. One could say that the unit of analysis in this research is similar to that for an 
investor; he or she has to observe the firms as a whole without being able to penetrate deeper in 
the internal calculus of the company. He or she would have to invest in the whole firm and not 
any single unit or SBU of it. 
21 SBU refers to Strategic Business Unit.
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Often the level of analysis refers to whether the analysis takes place on the micro, meso, or 
macro level. In this context the analysis primarily takes place on a micro i.e company level 
leading, however, complemented by macro level theory formation. According to Yin (2003) case 
study research can take place on three levels: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. Although 
the collected data is sometimes analyzed by using numerous levels of analysis, Langley (1999) 
warns of using multiple levels of analysis because these may be difficult to separate from one 
another. In this research the level of analysis is primarily explanatory (Yin, 2003), but on 
occasions, all of the other levels of analysis have been used to complement the analysis. 
The core of case study research is to select one or alternatively a small number of well-defined 
cases and study these intensively with the aim of building theory based on the material collected. 
Case studies typically collect data from one or a low number (small N) of cases using multiple 
data collection methods, whereas statistical methods typically employ a large volume of data 
from different sources representing multiple case firms. In this respect case study research 
approach is substantially different from statistical methods.
When selecting cases for this research I screened the numerous component markets both in the 
US and in Europe. The opening of the energy markets for competition is, in many component 
markets, still either in an embryonic phase, has been implemented to a limited extent or has not 
been implemented at all. Moreover, the number of firms active in the selected component 
markets was lower, paving the way for a small N. Thus the number of cases in this research 
remained at a relatively low level; i.e. one from the US and three from Europe. Including such a 
small number of cases leads subsequently to using the Mill’s method22 (Ragin and Becker, 
2005).
The cases in this research were selected from component markets that have been opened for 
competition to a sufficient extent and for a sufficient number of years. In addition there needed 
to be evidence of competition taking place in the component markets to qualify for participation 
in this research. The number of selected cases had to be sufficient to enable a thorough analysis 
of the cases, thus eliminating the possible distortions from a single case design, but low enough 
to enable a thorough analysis in a natural setting (Eisenhardt, 1989; Bensabat et al., 1987) of 
each case for the purposes of theory development. In fact, it would be very difficult to increase 
the number of cases in this research because the markets in which electricity has been made 
competitive both in the US and in Europe are in fact a rarity. In the present research the number 
22 See Mills’ method described in Chapter 4.1.4
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of cases permits in-depth analysis of each single case, but still facilitates pattern matching 
between the cases. 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) address the researcher’s “job and training as to do what these laymen 
cannot do – to generate general categories and their properties for general and specific situations 
and problems”. Thus as we have now discussed the actual research process, the remaining issue 
is the formation of theory. The core ontological assumption in this research falls into the 
category that Morgan and Smircich (1980) categorize as reality as a “concrete process”, and the 
basic epistemological stance can be characterized as research on “systems and process change”. 
These categorizations subsequently attach this research to a selection of certain subsequent steps 
such as choice of research methods and assumptions regarding the viewpoint. Suddaby (2006), 
however, points out that when developing theory using the Glaser and Strauss grounded theory 
perspective, the researcher cannot closely follow a guidebook because there is not one. 
Yin (2003) discusses the research design and points out that it “is the logic that links the data to 
be collected to the initial questions of study”. Further, he defines four conditions that are 
required to be maximized in case study research: construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity and reliability. 
Glaser and Strauss (1967), argue that it is the intimate connection with empirical reality that 
permits the development of a testable, relevant and valid theory. According to Bensabat et alii 
(1987), one of the fundamental differences, between case study research and other alternative 
methods is that it requires less a priori knowledge of what the variables of interest will be, and 
how they will be measured. Bacharach (1989) regards the theory as a statement of relationships 
among concepts within a set of boundary assumptions and constraints. For this research the 
boundary assumptions are related to the time of opening the energy markets for competition in 
the US and in Europe. Bacharach (1989) defines the constructs as terms that, though not 
observational, either directly or indirectly may be applied or even defined on the basis of the 
observables. 
Although Eisenhardt (1989) points out that theory building based on case study research begins 
as close as possible to the ideal of no theory, she means by this that the researcher should not 
have any preconditions or mindset that would bias theory building. Yin (2003), however, 
characterizes the theory development part of the design phase as essential, especially in instances 
where the objective would be to develop or test a theory. Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggest that 
the researcher should enthusiastically start generating theory and should recognize theory 
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generating as the primary objective. The researcher should notice that evidence and testing do 
not destroy a theory but only modify it, and a theory is only replaced by a better theory. Though 
Eisenhardt (1989) emphasizes the ideal of initiating the research as close as possible to no 
theory, she does not regard the random selection of cases as either necessary or even preferable. 
A priori constructs can also help to shape the initial design of theory building research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The goal of sampling is to choose cases that are likely to replicate or extend 
the emergent theory; although at the initial stages there should not be a theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989).
In case selection the danger of jeopardizing the theory by selecting cases that initially reinforce 
the emerging theory while abandoning cases that clearly do not support the initial theory is 
always present (Collier and Mahoney, 1996; Curtis et al., 2000; Bennett and Elman, 2006). For 
the present research this argument is of major importance; most of the energy firms do not 
properly represent such markets that would have been opened for competition and thus do not 
provide representative results. The obvious main assumption prior to commencing the research 
project was that the opening of the market would result in new firms entering the market and an 
increased level of competition, which would then subsequently result in reduced profits for the 
incumbents that previously enjoyed a monopoly, and this fundamentally increasing pressure to 
take action and adjust strategy and resource configuration. In this research, giving up all 
impressions regarding what could have taken place at the time of the opening up of the market 
would not have been practical. These preconditions would have already led to bias through the 
selection of cases (Collier and Mahoney, 1996; Curtis et al., 2000; Bennett and Elman, 2006).
Langley (1999) indicates two possible strategies for analyzing process data that could be used in 
this research; process theory and variance theory. As she points out, it is difficult to keep these 
two options separate as the actual data is intertwined. The key strategy for processing the data, in 
order to provide information on the key Research Questions, concentrated on the variance theory 
approach, but aspects of process theory were included. Primarily the concept of Temporal 
Bracketing (Langley, 1999) was employed for sense making, but at times it was deemed 
necessary to complement the picture by employing a visual mapping strategy. The energy 
markets were made competitive over different time frames and schedules, requiring indexation 
accordingly. For illustrative purposes visual mapping was used as a support technique.
Mill’s method (Lieberson, 1985) provides an interesting opportunity to perform a comparative 
analysis in a small N environment. The basic premise is that the dependant and independent 
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variable of cases are illustrated in a matrix. The cases are compared to each other so that the 
dependent variable of two cases with different values and the determined independent variables 
are arranged for comparison on order to demonstrate the potential differences in independent 
variables. This methodology would have obvious merits regarding the identification of the 
possible causes of differences in the dependent variable. This method should help the researcher 
to identify the key independent variable that influences the value of the dependent variable, 
providing that there are no systematic causes for bias in the analysis.
Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggest that the researcher should recognize theory generating as the 
primary objective, and note that evidence and testing do not destroy a theory but they only 
modify it, and a theory is thereby only replaced by a better theory. They further illustrate the 
theory generating process as “The constant comparative method”, which consists of four simple 
phases. In comparison, Eisenhardt (1989) identifies nine phases in the theory generation 
process23. Bacharach (1989) sets two criteria for the evaluation of theory; falsifiability and 
utility. By falsifiability he refers to the possibility to refute the theory by experience. By utility 
he refers to the ability of the theory to explain and predict.  
In this research I will use the cyclical co-evolutionary interaction model, as proposed by Murman 
(2003). In this context the concern of Lewin and Volberda (1999), however will need to be 
observed. They propose specifically that sequence analysis be used to complement co-
evolutionary research. This research contains dynamic phenomena, which involves firm 
microevolution, industry macroevolution, environmental and technological evolution, and co-
evolution processes within a system. Thus in this co-evolutionary research My intention is to  
bridge and reintegrate strategy and organization theory within a holistic framework.
4.2 SAMPLE
The viewpoint used in this analysis is that of the electricity marketing / retail company. This 
model concentrates on the company that was primarily active at the time preceding and 
following the opening of the market for competition. The sample selection process resulted in 
case firms that represent such relevant markets from both Europe (EU 15), and the United States 
where retail electricity market has been made competitive or competitive to such an extent that 
where is evidence of the competitiveness of the market. 
23 See Appendix A for a more detailed description.
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In the EU and US, both consisting of a number of component markets that cover a defined 
geographical areas, it turned out to be quite hard to find markets that are competitive in the 
Schumpeterian sense24. The markets in the EU often coincide with national markets or other 
administratively defined geographical areas. In the US the component markets’ boundaries vary 
from case to case and can follow state boundaries, boundaries defined within a state, or 
groupings of utility firms’ business areas, or some other method. 
At the start of the research process I performed an initial screening of the primary characteristics 
of the key markets. For this purpose I screened information from the European Union, the US 
Department of Energy (DOE), CAEM (Center for Advancement of Energy Markets), Eurelectric 
and the Edison Electric Institute (EEI). This was necessary in order to get a general picture of the 
competitive situation in different markets, and thereby enabling a subsequent narrowing of the 
scope of the research towards selection of the sample. This initial screening combined with a 
personal knowledge of the industry enabled me to take further steps in the research process, 
determine the sample for the research and identify what additional information would be 
necessary to ensure a successful research process. 
The market opening process has been advancing in the component markets both in the US and in 
Europe, although the pace has been very different between various component markets. To cover 
most of the conceivable market opening / company reaction / performance differential 
permutations as cases, I selected firms from both the EU and US markets. I did not select failed 
firms, whose financial results would not have been satisfactory, as these firms may easily perish 
or become attractive acquisition targets for more successful firms. My initially assessed construct 
was that the primary features of the successful firms are the features that the failed firms were 
lacking. 
In the electricity utility industry the dissimilarities between the different markets are caused by 
many factors. There are a number of different possible regulatory models, the phase of 
deregulation in different markets varies, and the open market practices between the EU and the 
US are dissimilar. The motivational backgrounds for deregulation in different markets, the 
general expected impacts on the market, the number of players, and the relative market positions 
of each actor constitute a matrix of factors causing asymmetries between markets. In a way, one 
could even say that every case is so different that possible similarities are only coincidental. 
24 This refers to the Schumpeterian (Schumpeter 1942) definition of competitive markets, i.e. a market where no 
single actor may impact the price of the product at the market or any factor market thereof.
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Although in Europe energy market deregulation was initiated by the EU, and their directives set 
the overall rules for actions and timing, the differences between component markets inside the 
EU are still substantial. 
Notwithstanding the above, choosing the appropriate case companies is important. Miles and 
Huberman (1994) discuss the six principles of sampling: 1) The sampling strategy should be 
relevant to the conceptual framework and the Research Questions addressed by the research, 2) 
The sample should be likely to generate rich information on the type of phenomena which is to 
be studied, 3) The sample should enhance the generalizability of the findings, 4) The sample 
should produce believable descriptions / explanations, 5) The sample strategy should be ethical, 
and 6) The sampling plan should be feasible. Curtis et al. (2000) find these principles valuable 
for qualitative research. Bennett and Elman (2006) are concerned about the potential for bias in 
case selection because researchers can unintentionally select cases that reinforce the theory. 
4.2.1 Selection process of the US cases
Constellation Energy was selected to be the primary case company, and chosen to represent the 
US market. Constellation was selected primarily because it covered the entire electricity value 
chain, thus being very strong in retail and generation in the PJM area where the competitiveness 
of the markets is high in US terms. Constellation had used the opening up of the electricity 
market and thus expanded its business base substantially. 
The United States consists of multiple component markets. In general the markets in Texas and 
the North East are open for competition, whilst the states in the South and West have not, for 
multiple reasons that are beyond the scope of this research, opened their markets for competition. 
The framework for market opening in the states that have decided to open the market is quite 
different. In the US there is no general federal decision to open markets for competition, and 
different states have, in this respect, chosen quite different strategies.
When selecting the component markets in the US for this research I followed an algorithm 
developed by a US think tank promoting the competitiveness of the energy markets, the Center 
for Advancement of Energy Markets, CAEM. This method incorporates various variables 
illustrating the state of energy market restructuring in different states. The index was based on 22
attributes that, according to CAEM, function as an effective platform in transition to 
competition. The RED index is designed to illustrate, on an aggregate level, the state of 
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advancement of energy market competition. At the time the present research was conducted the 
most recent edition was published in 2004 and covered data for the year 2003, this reflected the 
fourth edition of the index calculation. 
In the 2003 version of the report CAEM had included some countries in Europe and Asia. The 
RED index is not directly applicable when comparing the state of advancement of energy 
markets in the US and Europe; if such a comparison was carried out the index would need to be 
expanded to include the European countries in greater detail. As the UK was included in the 
RED index calculation, it reinforced my view that some of the European countries’ energy 
markets were well advanced compared to their US counterparts.
Rank 2003 STATE Index 03 Index 02 Index 01 Index 00 Index 99 Average rev c/kWh
1 Texas 69 69 31 3 0 6.49
2 Pennsylvania 67 67 67 62 55 7,65
3 Maine 64 64 59 54 42 9,69
4 New York 60 61 58 47 38 11,38
5 District of Columbia 54 54 54 47 0 7,52
6 Maryland 52 52 53 47 4 6,74
7 Michigan 50 52 53 31 11 7,11
8 New Jersey 50 50 50 37 28 9,47
9 Massachusetts 42 42 34 31 31 9,49
10 Virginia 42 42 34 18 3 5,94
Table 4-2 The rank order of the open energy market in the top 10 US states
according to CAEM.
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Table 4-2 lists the top 10 positions in terms of advancement in the energy market, according to 
the CAEM US analysis, RED Index. A higher numerical value of the RED index indicates a 
more advanced electricity market on an aggregate level.
The overall US - Canada - Mexico transmission system consisted of three synchronized 
networks; the Western Interconnection, Eastern Interconnection and the ERCOT. The latter 
covered most of the State of Texas, while Western Interconnection incorporated the states in the 
Rockies and westwards and includes Canadian Western Provinces and some areas of Mexico. 
The eastern Interconnection incorporated the states east of the Rockies, including the eastern 
provinces of Canada. 
For historical reason most of Texas forms its own self sufficient synchronized transmission 
network and the power transfer between ERCOT and the Western and Eastern Interconnection 
takes place over direct current (DC) links.25 Thus Texas, although high scoring in the CAEM 
scoring has characteristics of an island market and could thus be regarded as a special case. For 
the purpose of this research I preferred firms that operated in states where the transmission of 
power over the state boundaries was not restricted by direct current links.  The transmission 
system in New York State is a separate market, as is the New England ISO26 incorporating the 
states of New England and representing two states in the list. The PJM states dominate the top-
ten CAEM market opening list with six states. 
In the CAEM study in 2003, the value of benefits from the introduction of competition in the 
energy market in PJM area were estimated to be 3.2 billion USD in 2002, corresponding to 15 
per cent of the consumers’ electricity bill, or an average rebate of 117 USD annually for one 
household. The study covered only residential, commercial and industrial final customers. The 
possible macroeconomic benefits for the society as a whole were not covered by the study. 
CERA analyzed the impact of deregulation in the overall price level in the US power markets 
and their finding was that over a period of 1997-2004 the total gain enjoyed by US residential 
customers was USD 34 billion. The overarching view resulting from this is that lower electricity 
price is the key positive outcome of market opening.
25 There are multiple technical and historical reasons for the DC connection between ERCOT and the rest of US. A 
discussion regarding these reasons is omitted from this research.
26 ISO stands for Independent System Operator, i.e. a transmission system operator that is independent from the 
commodity interests. An ISO could also operate distribution systems.
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Figure 4-1 The state of energy market restructuring in the US, 2004.
The possible cases for further analysis were chosen primarily from areas where market 
restructuring has been completed and the market is predominantly functioning. PJM and the 
firms primarily acting under the PJM regime was thus primary target when choosing cases for 
further analysis. Constellation Energy emerged as the most interesting company for more careful 
analysis.
4.2.2 Selection process of the European cases
At the time of undertaking this research the number of member states in the EU increased to 27 
from 15. Although the new members are obligated to include EU legislation in their national 
codex, in practice they have either not opened their respective markets for competition or they 
have opened so recently that there is not sufficient statistical information available on these 
markets. Even within the EU 15 the electricity markets that were opened for competition for 
such a period that enables the collection of historical data could only be found in UK and the 
Nordic area. Thus it was obvious that the case firms were selected to represent these component 
markets. The selected case firms representing the EU 15 were Centrica (UK), Fortum (Finland) 
and Vattenfall (Sweden).
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One key difference between the US and the EU is how the legislation is passed. While in the US 
each state may legislate relatively freely within the state and Interstate, commerce falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Government; in EU the laws passed by the EU have to be included in 
the national codex by all member states. The rules of opening up of the European electricity 
market were initially set in Directive 96/92/EC, adopted by the Council of Ministers on 
December 19, 1996. The Directive established common rules for the generation, transmission 
and distribution of electricity. These rules were intended to pave the way for the introduction of 
competition in electricity markets of the member states by introducing symmetrical competition.
According to the requirements set by the Electricity Directive the member states had, as a rule, 
two years to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to 
comply with this Directive. However, the first package did not achieve its objectives and thus it 
was subsequently complemented by second and third packages. The second package for opening 
the EU internal energy market for competition was introduced as Directive 2003/54/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 repealing Directive 96/92/EC. At the 
time of the research the third package had passed the European Parliament and was expected to 
become legislation after being published in the EU Journal. Again, at the time of the research 
there had been discussion about introducing a fourth package. 
According to a study prepared by the consulting firm Oxera for the UK Ministry for Trade and 
Industry the most competitive energy market in Europe, in 2002 and in 2003 was in the UK, 
followed by Sweden and Finland. This was confirmed by the EU commission report “Towards a 
competitive and regulated European gas and electricity market” published in July 2004. As the 
intention of this research is to investigate utility firms in markets that have been made 
competitive, it is natural to choose those firms from the markets most open for competition, i.e. 
UK, Sweden and Finland. This subsequently led to the choice of case firms representing these 
component markets. 
In Sweden and Finland the most traditional firms were deemed to be Vattenfall and Fortum. 
Both of these organizations have a long history in their respective home markets, but had also 
established a position in each other’s traditional markets, thus blurring the image of one key 
company home market domination. Given this, I chose Vattenfall and Fortum as case firms. 
The selection of case firm in UK was not as straightforward a choice. The UK electricity market 
had seen substantial changes since early the 1990s and the industry structure had been modified 
on several occasions. The initial industry structure of a vertically integrated monopoly was 
originally cut into regional distribution / retail firms and generation and transmission firms. Most 
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of these had seen changes in ownership structure and the introduction of new products27 in their 
sales portfolio. However, the company that had changed the overall image of the industry was 
Centrica, which was formed of the former sales arm of the former gas monopoly, British Gas. 
Centrica, with its roots in the gas industry, had emerged as the market leader in electricity retail, 
and thus it was deemed a justifiable choice for this research to pick Centrica as the case company 
to represent the UK electricity retail market. 
4.2.3 Brief presentation of sample firms 
A general presentation summary of the key features of the case firms is presented in Table 4-3
below.
Company Established,
year
Headquartered Net Sales 
USD
200528
BDI29 Electricity 
customers
Generation 
MW
Centrica 1972/1997 Windsor UK 25,1
Billion 
0,52 6 mill. 3 400
Constellation 1816 Baltimore US 17,1
Billion
0,28 1,2 mill. 12 500
Fortum 1932 Espoo FI 7,5
Billion
0,71 1,4 mill.30 11 300
Vattenfall 1909 Stockholm SE 17,7
Billion
0,72 5 mill.31 33 000
Table 4-3 Key data of the case firms.
27 Gas sales.
28 Currency conversion using May 24, 2006 exchange rate.
29 BDI stands for Business Diversity Index and illustrates the diversity of the company’s business, see Appendix B.
30 Annual report 2005.
31 Annual report 2005.
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All the selected case firms have a relatively long history, stretching back over more than 100 
years into the early history of the energy retail and distribution industry. However, the firms 
today have evolved far from what they were in the past. They all have at some point in their 
history enjoyed either a direct monopoly or an arrangement of a cartel nature restricting 
competition. All the firms’ markets have been opened and made competitive, and competition 
has really emerged in all the case companies’ businesses. However, in this respect the case firms 
differ. They have followed different strategies after the introduction of competition. With the 
exception of Vattenfall, they are all listed utility firms incorporating the whole value chain from 
generation to retail. The focal point of growth after introduction of competition has, however, 
been quite different. Some of the case firms have tried to grow by merging with similar firms 
thus maintaining the core nature of their business activities. An alternative pattern has been to 
organically grow new business areas as a means to complement the existing ones. Consequently 
the nature of the business activities of the different firms has grown in different ways. 
4.3 DATA 
To provide information on the interaction of the firms with their operative environment at the 
time of market opening for competition I tried to create a sequence of events that would 
characterize the development. To achieve this I gathered information on the chosen sample 
firms’ decisions both prior to and after making the markets competitive, and complemented this 
information by financial data and information collected from public sources, such as regulatory 
authorities. Firm decisions are probably best documented in the company internal 
documentation, but that documentation is not available to the public or for research purposes. 
The required data can be classified into three key categories, accounting data, event data, and 
data from confirmatory interviews.  
Once the sample had been determined, it was obvious that the way to begin the data collection 
process was from the primary sources, i.e. from the firms themselves. The listed firms appeared 
to be a bountiful source of information, because they constantly have to satisfy the information 
needs of investors. When the firms need to access capital from the markets they must satisfy the 
information requirement of the market, thus keeping the investors aware and up-to-date of the 
situation the firm is in and ensuring that the investors remain interested in injecting more capital 
into the businesses of the firm. The decision regarding what information to publish and when, 
can obviously be only made by the firm and the investor has no way to know if all information 
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has been made public and if there was further information the investor should know in order to 
be able to assess the potential future value of the investment. However, a firm is penalized by the 
market if it is found not to provide correct and complete information.
In order to enable triangulation (Jick, 1979), the collected data had to come from multiple 
independent sources. In this research triangulation was performed by using data from the firms 
themselves (including SEC and regulatory filings in the US), articles in publications (see 
references for a list of pub;ications), and through confirmatory interviews. The interviews were 
performed in the case firms themselves and other firms, at regulators, and with well-informed 
individuals (active and retired top executives, consultants, regulators, representatives of branch 
and research organizations). Using all these sources of data was instrumental to recreating, for 
every case firm, a sequence of events that had been initiated both by the firm and by the forces in 
its environment. This sequence of events was subsequently complemented by the accounting 
data describing financial outcome. The obvious benefit of recreating history is that the outcome 
is eventually known and can be reconstructed by combining data from multiple sources. This is 
not, however, the case for an investor. 
Practically all of the available information was collected, pushing the time span of the collected 
data as far as possible back into the history of the firm, and consequently including the most 
recent information that was available. However, the availability of data was limited in the case of 
Fortum and Vattenfall who had already experienced the processes relating to opening of the 
market for competition in the late 1990s.
Collecting accounting-based information is part of many research processes in the field of 
management research. Even through the accounting-based data was not at the core of 
information gathering, it was still deemed essential to creating a complete image of the firm in 
question. This is because accounting data provides a good source for triangulation.
For financial data collection I referred to the definition of accounting32 by Glautier and 
Underdown (1995) presents “the provision of information about the financial position, 
performance and financial adaptability of a firm that is useful to a wide range of potential users 
in making economic decisions”. Consequently, the intention with regard to gathering accounting 
data is to provide information on the financial position and adaptability of the firm, and use this 
to form an image of the overall position of the firm and its actions.
32 Accounting Standards Board in UK, 1989.
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In this research the annual reports of the firms were used as the primary source of financial 
information, complemented in the US by filings to the SEC, the FERC and the local regulator. 
Often the split of revenues between businesses in the annual report were not given in sufficient 
detail in the US, and thus the SEC and FERC filings proved to be a valuable addition. In the 
European cases the accounting data obtained from the annual reports was sufficient for the 
purposes of this research.
My intention was to collect event data from as far as possible from the history of the firm 
preceding market opening, and coming as close as possible to the present day. In order to 
accomplish this, the key was to be able to list all the actions the firm had taken, what were the 
essential processes taking place in the functional environment of the firm, how the legislation 
was progressing, and what the competitors and new entrants were planning to do. To this end, I 
used publicly available data such as company press releases, newspaper articles, company 
histories, material used for the preparation of legislation, and regulatory filings, and 
complemented this with information obtained from the confirmatory interviews. 
In the US, a rich source of event data was the regulatory case files that well documented the 
intentions of the companies, and the outcome approved by the regulator. Prior to the opening of 
the market for competition, the US utility firms were working under the strict scrutiny of both 
state and federal regulators. This procedure goes back in history to the early 1920s when the 
PUHCA33 was passed; while regulatory scrutiny goes even further back in the history.  For data 
on the period preceding the opening of the market for competition, the key source were the 
filings to SEC, FERC and the Maryland Public Service Commission. All the business issues 
were included in these filings, and thus they provided sufficient information to complement that 
issued through press releases on the actions the company was taking. In screening the data, slight 
changes in wording between the different annual filings could reveal changes in how the 
company sees its environment, and how the company formulates the internal discussion. In this 
regard the 10-K34 document filed at the SEC was especially valuable. This document represents a 
comprehensive detailed annual report, including the management discussion regarding the status 
of different businesses with an assessment of the business risks and future development paths. 
The electronic filings in SEC, FERC and in the Maryland Public Service Commission in general 
covered the history from the late 1980s or early 1990s. As, in general, the process of the market 
33 PUHCA = Public Utility Holding Company Act.
34 The 10-K document is the Annual report that the listed companies are required to file at the SEC. It is more 
comprehensive than the official annual accounts published primarily for investors.
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opening for competition had began in the late 1990s, the time span stretching out over a ten year 
was deemed sufficient. For the US firms these filings contain a detailed list of actions on a yearly 
basis. Constellation had been a regulated regional vertically integrated monopoly for almost a 
100-year period and during this period all primary business decisions had to be approved by the 
Commission.
For the European case firms the history of the firms was presented in their respective annual 
reports and on web sites, and this provided the foundation for a presentation of the events as a 
“path to competition”. The events contained in the company initiated history presentations could 
be expected to present the firm in a positive light and thus favor the firm. The firm data was 
complemented by that obtained through independent company histories, preparatory material 
used for legislatory purposes both at the EU level and at a national level, and case filings at the 
regulator.
A key source of recent company-initiated event data was press releases. The case firms provided 
detailed information of their activities in the form of press releases. Typically, the firms publish 
and make easily available press releases on all events that could have any public interest. 
Although there were differences in publicity legislation regarding listed firms in the EU and US, 
the firms were legally required to publish financial accounting information accurately, whether it 
was positive or discouraging for the market. 
Obviously the press releases were not directly designed to be used as a source for analyzing 
event data. Sometimes the key information was scattered around various parts of web sites under 
different SBUs, while the corporate web site only contained financial information. 
Complementing press releases with data from recent complementary sources, such as the SEC, 
FERC and other regulatory filings data further enhanced the picture. Basing the event data only 
on press releases would inevitably have provided only a vague image of the true event structure, 
or even a distorted the picture. 
A source of complementary secondary information was general articles about the case firms and 
the industry35. The information contained in these articles was, however, often reflecting the 
interpretations of the reporters, or reflecting directly the press releases provided by the firm, thus 
not providing any additional understanding. 
35 Electric Utilities Fortnightly, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Kauppalehti, Energia, 
Dagens Industri.
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Confirmatory interviews within and outside the case firms were designed to triangulate the 
collected data, further explore the complex nature of interactions between the firm and the 
environment, and to enhance and deepen the information. To achieve this, representatives of the 
top management of all the case firms, the regulators and a large number of knowledgeable 
individuals (active and retired top executives, consultants, representatives of branch 
organizations, research institutions, regulators and trade representatives etc.) were interviewed. 
These sources are listed in Table 4-4 below. This strategy was especially important in order to 
deepen and enrich the view of the co-evolutionary paths of the firms. Originally the view was 
based on the event data, so the confirmatory interviews were an essential contribution to 
triangulation.
Structured interviews were used for these confirmatory interviews. For each of the main 
Research Questions a set of detailed discussion topics was prepared to anchor this empirical 
phase into existing literature. In this interview I chose to use open-ended questions, with the 
intention to promote free discussion, and thereby permitting the interviewee to inform his/her 
statement according to how the interviewee saw the reality from their own perspective. As 
interviews are irrevocable by nature, in order to capture all relevant information during the 
interviews the questionnaire was tested in advance at an electricity retail and distribution 
company, Porvoon Energia. This was for pilot purposes only and is not included in the final 
sample. The interviews were recorded to ensure full detailed composition of the answers. Not all 
interviewees, however, agreed to recording and data from such interviews were captured by 
using traditional documenting means (manual writing).
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Source of confirmatory 
interviews
Numbers of people interviewed and their respective 
firms
Management representatives US: Constellation (2), Exelon (1), Sempra (1)
EU: Centrica (2), Fortum (1) Vattenfall (1)
Regulators US: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (3), Maryland 
Public Service Commission frequent multiple discussions 
and experience from participating in regulation in practice 
(over 10)
EU: EU Commission (DG COMP and DG TREN) (2+3), 
Energiamarkkinavirasto36, frequent multiple discussions 
and experience from participating in regulation in practice 
(over 10). Discussions with European energy regulators at 
the CEER (over 10).
Other authorities US: US Department of Energy (1), US Department of 
Commerce (1)
EU: VTT37 (1)
Individuals with substantial 
industry expertise
Former and present CEOs and other representative of top 
management of energy companies, industry consultants 
and other industry experts, legislators, regulators, 
competition authorities (22)
Table 4-4 Confirmatory interviews summary.
The confirmatory interviews were divided into four categories. They were performed at the 
energy firms, where a representative or representatives of the top management was selected to be 
interviewed. Additional interviews were performed with regulators, other governmental officers, 
and with knowledgeable individuals deeply connected with the energy industry. The 
36 Energiamarkkinavirasto is the Finnish Energy Market Authority, i.e. energy market regulator.
37 VTT was formerly known as The State Technical Research Center, but nowadays uses the name VTT.
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interviewees from governmental offices and from the regulators were representatives of the mid / 
top management of the organizations. 
Performing these interviews was rewarding, because the extent of the insights and information 
obtainable through only this means was substantial. The prior knowledge of the industry, and the 
network within the industry enabled me to get access to the top leaders of the industry, thus 
contributing to the completion of the research.  Later during my work at the Maryland Public 
Service Commission and at the Energiamarkkinavirasto, I used the opportunity to deepen my 
understanding of the regulatory process and the interaction between the regulator and the firm. 
The information thus provided cannot be obtained through any official channels. 
4.4 ANALYSIS
The data gathered represent all key aspects of company activities before, and immediately after 
the market opening for competition.  The naturally emerging question is then concerning, how 
this data can technically be used to produce information on both the overall development within 
the firm, and the interaction with the environment, at the market opening. 
Woo and Willard (1983) identify four primary dimensions covering most common financial and 
operational facets of business performance; profitability / cash flow, relative market position, 
change in profitability and cash flow, and revenue growth. Venkatraman and Ramajunam (1985) 
cautioned that indicators such as sales growth, net income growth and ROI should not be 
combined to form one composite dimension, because they seem to reflect distinct dimensions. 
These measures would multiply the position of profitability, as they are in fact calculated based 
on the same data.
Of these listed indicators I selected to calculate primarily profit margin, ROE and ROCE. 
Despite the obvious benefits of EVA or EP, I chose not to use them because calculating them 
would require the standardization of calculus and accounting procedures across the case firms to 
ensure comparability of the results. This could thus easily lead to a discussion on the differences 
in the cost of capital, differences in the nature of the business and bias derived from the 
regulatory tradition, the differences in administrative traditions, the role of regulated businesses 
or the role of regulator in the overall business control, et cetera. 
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The figures obtained from primary38 and secondary sources were taken at face value; i.e. I did 
not try to adjust the accounting-based figures to correct for the possible impact of differences in 
accounting standards or practices. Similarly the SBU structures of businesses given by the firms 
were taken at face value; i.e. I did not try to change the indicated business structures to facilitate 
following the development of certain individual businesses. Many of the case firms had changed 
their operative structure during the observation period, thus making it challenging to follow one 
individual business. Following the development of, say the distribution business would have 
required reconfiguring the accounts to facilitate this. Besides, all firms seem to change their 
reporting structures periodically. Trying to restructure the accounts in order to create consistency 
over the entire observation period could lead to bias resulting from interpretations and would not 
correspondingly improve the value of the results. This again reflected the viewpoint of an 
investor; the investor has to take the company as a whole, and not to try to split it into parts. 
As the firms in this research operated using different currencies, I primarily used the accounting 
currency of each company. This meant that for Vattenfall, the currency was Swedish Krona, and 
for Centrica the British Pound, and for Fortum the Euro. For Constellation the obvious currency 
is the US Dollar. The indices were thus calculated using the accounting currency. When 
monetary comparison was required the different currencies were converted to USD using the 
exchange rate on the date making the conversion. This date was documented.
The processing of accounting data begun by calculating several accounting-based ratios and 
indices, in case they were not originally provided in the primary sources. The intention was to 
process the collected data so that it would support the process of theory formation by revealing 
certain trends based on the data. The following indices were calculated:
• Business Diversity Index BDI39,
• Corporate Turnaround Index CTI40,
• Capital employed, calculated as equity plus interest bearing debt given in the financial 
statements,
• Return on Capital Employed, ROCE,
• Return on Equity, ROE, with equity as indicated in financial statements,
38 Primary sources refers to the companies themselves; secondary sources refers to external sources.
39 See Appendix B.
40 See Appendix B.
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• Return on Assets, ROA, Assets as indicated in financial statements and
• Profit margin, calculated as Net Profit over Net Sales. 
When calculating the profit margin I used the net operating profit indicated in the financial 
annual report as a proxy for EBIT, and the group net sales. Similarly, when calculating the 
financial performance, ROE, ROCE or ROA, the Net profit was used. This was done for 
simplicity, because opening the accounting to possible corrections would have not been possible, 
primarily due to differences in accounting standards and practices. This naturally causes a certain 
degree of error in the results, but due to the use of logarithms in calculating the CTI, the error is 
somewhat diluted. Net Profit was then divided by Equity, Assets or Capital Employed to 
calculate the corresponding ratios. Financial strength is calculated so that equity over assets 
reflects the overall financial leverage of the company, while gearing reflects the indebtedness of 
the firm. 
For the purposes of this research I used Total Assets and Equity as they appeared on the Balance 
sheet. Capital employed was herein defined as Equity added to the amount of interest-bearing
debt. Primarily due to the differences in accounting standards and practices, the figures provided 
in annual reports and calculated at this research were not necessarily the same, which is a 
possible source of error. In order to obtain consistency, I used the calculated figures, although 
the figures would have been provided in the annual report.
To illustrate the diversification of the firm, I developed a Business Diversity Index. Similarly, to 
illustrate the rate of change the firm had experienced, I developed a Corporate Turnaround Index 
(CTI). The formulae for calculating the Business Diversity Index and the Corporate Turnaround 
Index are presented in Appendix B. 
In order to create a view of the longer-term development of the firm and the regulatory / business 
environment in the beginning of 1990s and early 2000s, I assembled a verbal description of the 
state of the firm and the operative environment during these decades. To obtain more in-depth 
understanding of the longer-term influence of the interaction between the firm and the 
environment, I presented snapshots of the firm environment over a longer time frame. The 
intention was to establish a longer-term path of the development of the firm and the prevailing 
market conditions.
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During the time prior leading to the market opening for competition, the firms were consciously, 
or without any specific end, preparing themselves for forthcoming competition. There were clear 
signals of the forthcoming competition in the international discussions in the industry and in the 
business environment of the firms. The inevitability that the markets would be made competitive
should not have been a surprise. The actions the firms took constituted a path of actions by the 
management of the company, either purposefully taking the steps towards a recognized goal or 
just by drifting. The actions taking place in the immediate environment of the company provided 
signals of the forthcoming change to the company, and thus the company had the opportunity to 
react to these signals. I tried to categorize the company-initiated events vis-à-vis the forthcoming 
market opening by categorizing the actions on two dimensions, company-initiated – regulator-
initiated, and home market – new market. In this respect the new market could mean new market 
in a geographical sense or as a new product market (Ansoff, 1957).  As a path to the market 
opening I present these events as a sequence representing the function of time. 
Owing to the differences in sources, the collected event data obviously had very dissimilar 
characteristics. Data from annual reports, press releases and confirmatory interviews did not 
naturally fall into place and form a congruent set of events ready to be used for theory 
generation. The same applied to the actions taken by the regulators, legislators and customers. 
The timing information related to events was sometimes especially difficult to identify, and thus 
constituted an obstacle in creating a sequence of events. However, the interviews proved helpful 
in this respect, particularly for assisting me to place the various events on one time axis.
Pajunen (2004) calls the purpose of this historiography, a means to provide a realistic and 
verifiable knowledge of historical process, and Pajunen (2004) further describes the purpose of 
historical research as to “establish verifiable and true representations of past reality”.
Event structure analysis (Heise, 1989) is a methodology that combines various characteristics 
relating to processes into internally logical entities that might otherwise be impenetrable to the 
uninformed. Heise (1991) discusses dealing with recorded incidents so that an analyst first 
defines events, then defines logical relationships among the events, and subsequently defines 
how each event enables and expends other events. The result is a grammar of action accounting 
for recorded incidents, and this model can be displayed graphically, employed for simulations, 
and compared with related grammars for purposes of contrast or generalization. 
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In this research I followed the procedure used by Pajunen (2004), and attempted to put all the 
company and environment-initiated action events into a sequence and present them in a narrative 
form. Pajunen (2004) discusses the approximate nature of the narratives produced by the 
researcher using the incomplete information available for that researcher to describe the events 
taking place in the case firms. The researcher has, anyway, to base the analysis on the 
information that is available, on verbalized renditions of events (Heise 1991), and not on the 
information that could be out there but we are not aware of. Heise (1991) further points out that 
the reality constraints that are semantically embedded should be presented so that other culture 
experts can readily comprehend how the events are inherently structured.
Heise (1989) describes the process of preparing a series of events into a sequence so that 
informants relate and interpret incidents in which a computer could be used to assist their 
interpretations within a theoretical framework. Heise suggests that a software product could be 
used in this context. Event Structure Analysis (ESA) is a qualitative methodology for 
understanding sequential events. A prerequisite is that the events can be connected logically and 
this connection can be understood properly. Computer software that is available for (ESA) is 
known as Ethno software (Heise, 1987) and is available as a downloadable version from Indiana 
University41. As an end product the software produces a picture linking all the events, and in 
order to obtain this picture the researcher has to understand the linking of all events and to 
answer multiple questions asked by the program. In this regard it is necessary to input all the 
events into the program and answer questions, which thus define the inter-linkages between all 
the events. The program may be used as a grammar explaining the sequence of events. The 
analysis shows how observed events are interlinked with other elements.
After the press releases of the chosen case firms had been collected and complemented by the 
event data from the additional sources, the screening of the events begun by assessing which 
events did not have value for this research. In some firms the press releases were obtained from 
various sites on the corporate web site, because some firms had distributed releases about the 
different SBUs activities under these SBUs own web sites. By doing so they had focused only on 
financial information on the corporate main web site. The way in which the firms formulated 
press releases regarding unpleasant events could, however, bias the data. Sometimes the 
complementary information from other sources could justify the inclusion of press releases while 
excluding others. These press releases were analyzed from as long a period of time preceding 
market opening as possible, to as close as possible to the present time. 
41 http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ESA/ethno.html.
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The information obtained from the press releases and other sources such as filing information, 
company history and industry publications, and information obtained from the confirmatory 
interviews was then sequenced so that all events could be placed on one time scale. This
information was then used to produce a historical time line for each case firm, thus constituting a 
skeleton for the history of each of the case firms and complemented with the flesh and blood of 
the historical narrative. This was sometimes difficult because the various sources were often not 
very precise on the occurrence of the event and therefore timing multiple events from multiple 
parallel sources required very careful judgment. When the historical narrative was prepared I 
screened this narrative for important single events, removed events without significance and 
possible duplicates, and gave important events a variable name that could be later used as an 
input for the Ethno software (see Appendix C). These variable names were selected so that the 
name would be unique, but would have an understandable connection to the full concept of the 
variable. The event names are not, however, necessarily unique for all case firms. Before being 
able to begin feeding the variables into the software the causal relationships between the various 
variables had to be established. For some events this was relatively straightforward, but for 
multiple events taking place simultaneously but eventually impacting each other this was 
somewhat more challenging. If a firm and the regulator take action at the same time, the cause 
and effect can be arbitrarily defined either way. These variables were subsequently fed into the 
Ethno software while their linkages to all other variables were defined through answering 
questions presented by the program. The program produced a linkages picture illustrating the 
causal and temporal sequence of the events. Although the vertical axis illustrated in the picture 
represents time but the axis is non-linear, I chose not to present the years in the axis as tick 
marks.
The press releases included duplicates (the same event is publicized in several press releases or 
information related to the same event was extracted from different sources), information on the 
timing of the forthcoming publication of annual financial results, announcements of power 
outages and subsequent repairs of these outages, announcements of new signed power supply 
contracts, or any other events that are part of the daily normal operations of the firms. Obtaining 
new customers has no relevance regarding this research, publishing annual results is an integral 
part of the business of the firm, and information of a technical nature does not have strategic 
significance and thus of no interest for the research. An extreme example of an event that was 
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not included was the announcement by Constellation that they would keep the offices open on 
the day following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
To describe the interaction of the firm with its environment, several categories of action emerged 
from the data. These categories, listed below, seemed to be symmetrical for all case firms, 
although their relative position within a firm and within a certain regulatory framework naturally 
varied. These categories emphasize strategic nature of the interaction between the organization 
and its environment with specific emphasis on the actions the company takes. The final item, 
donations, was included because they often shaped the relationship of the firm with its 
environment, especially in the US where they are used as an essential instrument in conducting 
political strategies.
The actions fell naturally into the following categories:
1) acquisitions,
2) investments,
3) finance actions,
4) strategy / organization changes,
5) nominations,
6) regulatory actions,
7) accreditations and
8) donations.
Whether internally or externally initiated and oriented primarily towards internal world or the 
external environment of the firm, the essential events could be further organized into four major 
groups. The first is characterized by company-initiated events that interact with the environment. 
For example, investments and acquisitions, and divestments, that are intended to improve the 
company’s ability to sustain, and donations to benevolent organizations or other organizations 
that will have on impact on the microenvironment surrounding the firm. The second group can 
be characterized as company-initiated internal actions intended to shape the company in order to 
better face environmental variation. Example are nominations of people to key management 
positions, and organizational and strategy changes. The third group of actions is intended to alter 
the climate surrounding the company. This primarily consists of regulatory action. The fourth 
major group of events reflects the position of the company in its business environment. This is 
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measured as accreditations in the business community. These categories are presented in Figure 
4-2 below. 
Figure 4-2 Categorization of firm actions.
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5 CASES
The purpose of this chapter is to present the cases and their primary characteristics. I present 
the events that depict the behavior of the case firms at the time of opening the markets for 
competition. I illustrate the interaction between the companies and their relevant environments 
before, at and after the markets relevant for the company in question were made competitive. 
For every firm I present a review of the organizational context and performance, a historical
narrative, and subsequently illustrate the sequence of events as an ESA picture.
5.1 CONSTELLATION ENERGY
5.1.1 Organizational context and performance
Constellation Energy was a Baltimore; Maryland based company incorporated in 1995, whose 
roots go back almost two centuries to the very beginning of the US energy infrastructure 
industry. The configuration of Constellation at the time the study commenced could be regarded 
a result of the development of regulatory framework at both the federal and state level. 
Towards the end of the analysis period Constellation pursued a two-way strategy. First they 
intended to benefit from the opportunities offered by the wholesale interstate markets all over the 
United States.  At this time the local regulated distributor and retailer; BGE42 operated gas and 
electricity distribution networks in the city of Baltimore and provided Standard Offer Service 
(SOS) for those electric commercial, industrial and residential customers that did not select 
42 BGE = Baltimore Gas and Electric.
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competitive suppliers. For gas customers BGE had to maintain sufficient capacity to serve the 
POLR (Provider Of Last Resort) obligations43.
The operation of both owned and operated merchant generating plants all over the US was 
complemented by marketing and risk management operations, electricity retail and a consulting 
services. Constellation was one of the largest competitive electricity suppliers to large 
commercial and industrial customers, and one of the nation’s largest wholesale power sellers. 
Towards the end of the analysis period, the total generating capacity controlled by Constellation 
Energy was about 12 500 MW.
The Maryland base rates for residential, commercial and industrial customers were capped until 
June 2006, and the lifting of the rate cap resulted, in theory, by the introduction of competition in 
the retail business of BGE. Due to the long rate freeze and the substantial increases in fuel cost 
caused by natural disasters, the price of electricity was expected to rise on the first day after the 
price cap was removed. This did not, however, cause a wave of competition in the retail market.
Constellation Energy enjoyed a good reputation in the industry. As an indication of this the 
company was ranked as number one among utilities in the 2005 BusinessWeek annual evaluation 
of best performing firms on the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index. 
Towards the end of the observation period, the competitive wholesale function constituted a 
majority of the business base of the company. This function had been developed since the mid 
1990s; before the mid 1990s there was practically no wholesale function in the company. 
Developing such a major business function could tie in substantial resources such as 
management attention, HR, and most of all, capital. In 2006 Constellation announced its 
intention to merge with FPL, formerly Florida Power and Light; the new company would 
integrate the activities of both firms but have the name Constellation. This merger, however did 
not obtain regulatory approval, and was followed in summer 2008 by a proposed merger scheme 
with MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company and yet another competing merger scheme with 
the French company EdF. These merger schemes could be interpreted as a reaction to the rapid 
growth in the Constellation business base and the subsequent financial constraints.
Table 5-1 below illustrates the development of financial characteristics of Constellation for the 
period 1998 – 2004. There was a rapid growth of the share of competitive wholesale business for 
43 The local distributor had POLR obligations vis-à-vis the end consumers, so that all customers had a back-up
supplier of energy commodity. This was often done by the distributor in case the competitive suppliers failed to do 
so.
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Constellation, while the share of other businesses did not grow at a similar pace. Prior to 1998 
the revenues were regulated and the real growth primarily depended on the growth in the local 
customer base, the energy intensity and the price of the commodity. The financial performance 
of the company collapsed in 2001 as a result of the intense investment program started in the late 
1990s but regained momentum in 2002.
Table 5-1 Financial and BDI characteristics Constellation Energy 1998 – 2004.
The BDI development clearly indicates that from 1998 until 2002 the business portfolio became 
more balanced. Since then one business stream, the competitive wholesale began to dominate.
The reflection of the intensive investment program can be seen in the rise of total assets from 
1999 to 2000 and 2001. The investment program in the late 1990s did not, however, yield a 
revenue stream before 2002 – 2003, which obviously had an impact on the financial performance 
especially in 2001.
In calculating the financial performance, the net profit was divided by equity, assets or capital 
employed. Financial strength was calculated so, that equity over assets reflects the overall 
financial leverage of the company, while gearing reflects the indebtedness.
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5.1.2 Historical narrative
From the early 1900s up to the 1990s the company operated in a static business environment 
characterized by a vertically integrated local monopoly, rate regulation and the almost complete 
absence of competition. Thus, of the almost 200 years that the company had existed, the changes 
initiated in the early 1990s that continued up to early 2000s were more dramatic than the 
primarily technologically derived changes the company had seen before. Despite the 
restructuring of BGE in 1999 and the fact that BGE had sold its generation assets and 
concentrated on regulated distribution, in the eyes of the local clientele the perceived profile of 
the company remained unchanged. This was not moderated by the fact that the generation assets 
were transferred to the parent company of BGE, i.e. Constellation.
From the early times of the Baltimore utility, until the late 1990s BGE could be regarded as a 
very typical representative of its kind. In the electricity business BGE covered the business chain 
from generation, transmission and distribution to the marketing of electricity. To regulate the 
public utilities and transportation firms doing business in Maryland, in 1910 the Maryland 
General Assembly established the Public Service Commission (PSC) as an independent state 
agency. A regulated monopoly can have all of its used and useful operational expenses covered 
through its rates, so initiating rate cases regularly at the Commission was of vital importance. 
Prior to the introduction of competition, the primary risks associated with the activity originated 
from the operational risks associated with adjusting the generation assets to the client base, 
possible operational and storm damage-related risks, and coping with the overall technical 
development in the business environment. The credit risks, or interest risks, associated with 
collapsing credit rating were not a major risk because the risks associated with this industry were 
low. The product market was constant and the Commission was the body to which approval for 
all major business decisions had to be applied.
In 1992 the US Congress passed the National Energy Policy Act (NEPA) that effectively gave 
states the option of deregulating their electricity supply markets. The law also mandated that the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) open up the national electricity transmission 
system to wholesale suppliers on a case-by-case basis44. As a consequence, the legislation broke 
the regional utilities’ generation monopoly by allowing independent power producers to gain 
44 http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngmajorleg/enrgypolicy.html November 29, 
2008.
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access to transmission lines, thus enabling them to sell generated electricity45. Similar intentions 
had been shown in passing the PURPA in late 1970s, but it did not have such a deregulatory 
flavor.
Table 5-2 provides an illustrative snapshot of the firm and its prevailing environment in the early 
1990s and early 2000s. The key attributes characterizing the firm and the market environment 
are presented in the following tables, 5-2 and 5-3. The next table, Table 5-3, illustrates the key 
characteristics of the competitive environment proceeding opening of the markets for 
competition. 
Constellation / BGE Early 1990s Early 2000s
Primary company BGE Constellation
Power procurement, own generation, 
purchases
Own generation, balancing 
with PJM
Power procurement by contract 
(BGE), Generation business 
(Const)
Customer base Baltimore residents Wholesale customers in US, 
Baltimore residents
Coverage of business chain Regulated vertically 
integrated regional 
monopoly
Generation, trading & RM, 
distribution, POLR service46
Primary origin of growth Organic growth Competitive wholesale markets 
in entire US
Key risks in business model Availability of gen. assets, 
major storms, customer 
risk to small extent
Regulatory risk, customer risk, 
market risk
Key Strategic challenges To build the infrastructure, 
foresee the forthcoming 
regulatory changes
Find new  markets to be opened, 
management of risks and 
finance of multiple  projects 
Diversification characteristics One regional integrated 
business
Unbundled business chain, 
functional SBU:s 
Table 5-2 Characteristics of Constellation / BGE in 1990s and 2000s.
45 Accenture Case Study. Constellation Energy: Creating a Winning Mindset by Robert Thomas.
46 POLR Provider of Last Resort, default supplier.
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The characteristics of the competitive environment in 1990s and 2000s are presented in Table 
5-3, which aims to show the changes in the key attributes of the market and their changes.
Early 1990s Early 2000s
Key characteristics of market Vertically integrated 
monopoly markets
Generation unbundled, 
competitive wholesale, retail 
price caps 
Competition in the market No In generation, wholesale and 
retail (partially)
Form of transactions Static conditions, rate 
base regulation, 
guaranteed return
Competitive wholesale, price
caps hinder retail market 
development
Degree of market integration High Semi
Relationship between actors Arms length Competitive wholesale, no real 
retail competition
Cause of imperfect competition Legislative; 
distribution, retail 
and generation under 
one integrated 
company
In retail price caps, SOS supply 
arrangement
Table 5-3 Characteristics of Constellation / BGE markets in 1990s and 2000s.
The passing of the National Energy Policy Act of 1992 encouraged multiple requests by BGE47
(BGEREQ) to the Commission to permit it to set up a holding company that would allow it to 
enter competitive markets. This ultimately resulted in the Maryland Senate passing the 
restructuring legislation in 1999, as House Bill 703 and Senate Bill 300 (HB 703, SB 300) that 
created the overall foundation on which competition could emerge. However, some details of 
how the implementation was carried out, such as the scheme for covering the stranded costs in 
conjunction with setting of price caps for the residential markets while simultaneously cutting 
the price, made it difficult for competition to emerge in practice. 
47 Accenture Case Study. Constellation Energy: Creating a Winning Mindset by Robert Thomas.
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The BGE filed rate cases in the Maryland Public Service Commission regarding both electricity 
and gas in (e for electricity and g for gas), 1988e, 1990e, 1995g, 1995e, 1997g, 1999g and 
1999e. However, after passing the 1992 national law, and as a signal of the approaching market 
opening in 1993, the commission initiated an investigation of the allocation of costs relating to 
regulated and unregulated business activities within the company ING1993. In MDBOU1993
the regional boundaries for electric utilities service areas in the State of Maryland were 
established. In ING1993 and ING1994 the commission initiated an investigation of the 
promotional practices of BGE and their tariff structure. In ING1995 the Commission initiated an 
inquiry on the framework for gas business deregulation. Likewise in MKTr1995 BGE applied 
for a transition to market-based rates in its gas business. In addition, BGE placed gas 
procurement with a subsidiary (GASORG). In CTAR1995 the Commission set targets for the 
generation business. Constellation was (CONST) founded in 1995 with a strategy to incorporate 
the non-regulated businesses and benefit from the opportunities opening in the competitive 
market. 
Throughout the 1990s ENRON was the driving force trying to persuade both the Federal 
Government and the various states in trying to open the energy markets for competition48.
ENRON was a company that was founded on the idea of competitive energy markets and thus 
used substantial resources in trying to achieve this goal. ENRON was active in Maryland, trying 
to persuade the local legislator to introduce a competitive legislative framework.
On April 24, 1996 the FERC issued Order No. 888 FERC888 “Open Access Transmission 
Order” which set the standard for rules regarding access to the network for the generators and 
required transmission line owners to offer access to the grid at prices comparable to those they 
charge to themselves.
Later in 1996 (ING1996) the Commission initiated an inquiry into the provision and regulation 
of electric service. In December 1996 (INGa1996) the Commission initiated an inquiry of the 
company’s practices under certain tariffs regarding customer enrolment practices. This was 
followed in 1997 (ING1997) by an inquiry on the standards of conduct. In April 1997 
(FIL1997) the company finally filed the application to merge. This merger was then put into 
place in 1999 through a share exchange.
The foundation was laid that enabled the opening of the electricity market for competition by 
passing, in April 1997, Senate Bill 851 (SB 851), which created a task force on electric industry 
48 Multiple discussions at Maryland PSC.
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restructuring that was scheduled to issue a report by December 199749. In December 1997 
Maryland PSC issued Order 8738 (CO8738) establishing a framework for the restructuring of 
the electric power industry. The plan set a schedule for restructuring so that a third of the state's 
consumers would have retail access by July 2000, another third by July 2001 and the entire state 
by July 2002. 
The Commission had a role as an advisor to the governor, the state senate and house. The 
Commission being politically nominated by the governor kept continual contact with the 
governor and the state parliament, especially during the legislative sessions at the beginning of 
each calendar year. 
In January 1998 the Commission set performance targets for BGE generation activity 
(CPERF1998). This was then later followed by an application from BGE to recover stranded 
cost (BGESTRC). In September 1998 (OPC1998) the Office of the People’s Counsel, as an 
advocate of the consumer groups, requested the reduction of retail rates. In the 1998 Settlement 
agreement, the Maryland utilities (including BGE) OPC and the Commission agreed on a dual 
phase market opening incorporating all the actions into one package (SETL1998). In this 
package there was an agreement on the recovery of stranded cost, the rate freeze, and agreement 
on the transitional periods. Besides these, the agreement contained several confidential elements.   
In January 1999 House Bill 3 (HB 3) and Senate Bill 65 (SB 65) allowed BGE to form a holding 
company. The law was intended to make it easier for BGE to enter into new business ventures in 
a competitive market. 
In April 1999, with House Bill 703 (HB 703) and Senate Bill 300 (SB 300), the “Maryland 
Customer Choice and Competition Act,” restructuring legislation was enacted. The legislation 
included at least a 3 per cent rate reduction for residential consumers, funding for low-income 
programs, disclosure of fuel sources by electric suppliers, recovery of stranded costs through a 
non bypassable wires charge, and a 3-year phase-in for competition beginning in July 2000 and 
becoming complete by July 2002. As of July 1, 2000, all customers of electricity firms had the 
opportunity to choose their suppliers.  All industrial and commercial customers were given the 
choice of their supplier on January 1, 2001. The firms were obligated to serve a customer who 
did not choose to select a competitive supplier but chose to remain with the electricity supplied 
49 Maryland General Assembly.
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by the distributing electric company under Standard Offer Service. This Act required that all 
customers receive a rate reduction followed by a rate freeze. 
The restructuring legislation prompted Maryland utilities to revise their restructuring proposals. 
BGE submitted its new plan to the PSC. Thus, in July 1999 Baltimore Gas & Electric filed a 
proposed restructuring plan with the PSC (RESTRPLAN). The plan included the required 6.5 
per cent rate decrease over six years for residential customers, $528 million for stranded costs, a 
six year rate freeze and the phasing out of transition costs, and customer choice beginning by 
July 1, 2000. The rates would be unbundled and generation assets transferred to an affiliate 
company while BGE would provide the initial funding of a low-income assistance fund and act 
as default supplier (POLR) for customers deciding not to switch suppliers. 
This rate freeze, set to last until 2006, froze the rates to such a level that as a probable unintended 
consequence the competitive suppliers had lost their competitiveness in the BGE market area. 
The intended introduction of competition in the BGE market area was thus delayed at least until 
the expiry of the rate freeze.
On December 20, 1999 FERC issued Order 2000 (FERC2000), its final rule on regional 
transmission organizations (RTOs). This order was intended to begin the process of setting 
criteria for new, regional transmission organizations (RTOs) to maintain reliability, avoid 
congestion, coordinate power flow among different regions, and plan new transmission 
construction and upgrades.
Subsequent to the 1999 legislation, in March 2000 the generation assets of BGE were transferred 
to Constellation at book value (GENTRANS). After this transaction, due to the congested 
transmission system, Constellation was primarily in charge of the electricity supply to the 
regulated distribution business in the city of Baltimore. Due to the sourcing regulations, part of 
the electricity demand was sourced from competitive sources after competitive auctioning. 
Constellation, however, supplied most of the power requirements of BGE.
Donations, especially to United Way50 seemed to be a constant agenda item for Constellation. 
This could be interpreted to be a form of a corporate citizenship program where the company 
was trying to improve its profile among the local clientele and to prepare the ground more 
favorable in the forthcoming changes in the regulatory framework.
50 United Way is an organization dedicated to support building a stronger America by mobilizing the communities 
to improve people’s lives.
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Throughout the observation period the share of residential customers switching supplier was 
negligible. However, it has to be pointed out, that this was the case only among residential 
customers while the larger industrial customers typically did use the opportunity to switch 
supplier51. The primarily commercial and industrial customer switching is indicated as 
COMPSWITCH.
The year 2000 included the IPO of Constellation; the trading began on the NYSE on May 3rd.
Acquisition of power generation assets included assets in New York. Similar actions were the 
investment in Wolf Hills Energy, Chicago, University Park Energy, Illinois Power Plant, Seguin, 
and the acquisition of Nine Mile Point generation share.
At an organizational level, on October 23rd it was announced that the CEG’s52 merchant energy 
business was to be separated from retail services business (SEPAR). Except for the separation of 
merchant and retail businesses, there were no further major nominations.
The company promoted deregulation and customer choice by several actions. Donations, 
specifically to United Way (UWDON), were constantly on the agenda.
The strategy implementation of the company could be seen in the investment decisions and the 
acquisition of generation assets. This was an indication of the strategic orientation of the firm 
towards building up a strong position in the generation market on a national basis. The number 
of donations indicated involvement in political activity, which could be interpreted as an attempt 
to soften the political pressures towards the company on the local environment, especially among 
the OPC. Financially, the year 2000 represented investments and increased indebtedness as the 
investments were primarily financed by debt. 
The beginning of 2001 was characterized by continued investments in different competitive 
power generation projects, with the raising of the required capital to accommodate these; 
investments had already begun in 2000. Financially 2001 was not a good year. Profitability 
collapsed to 2,3 per cent as the development of new plants did not yet provide additional 
revenues but rather, consumed a substantial amount of funds. This resulted in financial problems 
(FINPR).
In April the plan to divide the company into a merchant company and a generation company was 
made public.
51 Monthly customer switching statistics provided by Maryland PSC.
52 Constellation Energy Generation.
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At the beginning of 2001 the company saw moderate organizational changes. This was, however, 
altered in October by the nomination of Mayo A. Shattuck as the president and CEO. At the 
same date the plan previously announced to separate the unregulated merchant energy company 
through a spin-off to shareholders was cancelled. There were no further investment or 
acquisition decisions taken in 2001. 
As the new CEO had come into energy business from banking world, he brought along the use of 
innovative financing tools to finance the power generation projects that have subsequently paved 
the way to substantial company growth. This new way of financing generation projects required 
careful risk assessment of the projects, combined with proper coverage of all the relevant 
associated risk positions.   
When nominated, Shattuck gave the following comment: “When I got here I found a poor 
infrastructure, a siloed organization, misguided management, no visibility into our cultural 
values, and no competitive business targeting a market that was about to open…. We knew we 
had to make rapid-fire decisions to first stop the sinking ship, and then to right it.”53
The new CEO quickly changed the strategy and the organizational shape of the firm 
(NEWSTRAT, NEWORG).
A detail worth noting is a press release from September 11th, whereby the company announced 
that the offices would be kept open on the following day. 
The revenues of Constellation Energy grew steadily from 1998 to 2004. However, in 2002 there 
was a shift to an accelerating growth rate because the consistent stream of new buildings began 
generating additional revenues in 2002, thus improving the financial situation of the company 
(FINIMP). For 2002 the net income over revenues grew to 11,1 per cent. 
While the share of competitive wholesale had been rising substantially, this had at the same time 
reduced the BDI (see appendix B) of Constellation because so much of the revenues were 
dominated by the Wholesale competitive. From 2000 to 2002 the BDI grew, indicating an 
increase in the business diversity of Constellation.
The year 2002 was characterized by a continuous wave of nominations (NOM), including the 
nomination of Mr. Shattuck as the chairman to replace Mr. Poindexter. 
Though the customer choice program was intended to be complete by July 2002, no significant 
changes in customer switching was observed.
53 Accenture Case Study. Constellation Energy: Creating a Winning Mindset by Robert Thomas.
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The beginning of 2003 marked a continuation of the investment wave. This was later 
complemented by a number of nominations and accreditations. In the fall of 2003 there were two 
natural phenomena that had substantial impact on the industry in general and on the company; 
the great “North-eastern black-out” in August, followed by the damage caused by hurricane 
Isabel.
In 2003 the profitability collapsed to 2,8 per cent as the share of competitive wholesale in the 
revenue stream increased threefold, while the margin contribution of this business was 
substantially less than typical for the businesses in the portfolio. In 2003 the net income over 
revenues was at a similar level to 1999, while revenues had almost three doubled. 
In 2003 and 2004, however, the BDI declined to a level lower than at the times prior to market 
deregulation. This is an indication of increased dominance of one business area, i.e. competitive 
wholesale.
In April 2004 the Maryland Senate passed Senate Bill 285 (SB 285) that required electric firms 
in Maryland to conduct a study tracking shifts in generation and emissions as a result of the 
restructuring the electric industry.
In January 2005, BGE and other transmission owners filed a joint application at FERC to have 
network transmission rates established through a formula that tracks costs instead of through 
fixed rates in accordance with FERC guidelines (BGEFERC). The formula approach would 
have taken effect in June 2005, and transmission rates would accordingly be adjusted in June of 
each year based on the formula without the need for another transmission rate filing.
Prior to the introduction of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPA2005), the development 
opportunities for the regulated distribution business were restricted by the physical boundaries of 
the activity and the overall growth in demand within the territory. The new legislation would 
change this, as the distribution functions no longer needed to be geographically connected to 
each other.
The rapid expansion to competitive wholesale, including the required investments, can be seen 
on the chart illustrating the financial situation of the company. The total assets have more than 
doubled since before the deregulation, and the increase in assets appear to have been financed by 
short-term debt and other short-term liabilities, as the total capitalization has not increased 
correspondingly. Based on the observations from the 10K report submitted to the SEC on March 
11, 2005 and the financial statements of December 31st 2004, the Balance Sheet contained 
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current liabilities worth USD 7.5 billion. Of the total assets of USD 17.3 billion, this was a 
substantial portion. In 2004 profitability was an unsatisfactory 4,3 per cent.
The major hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the fall of 2005 caused a rapid rise in the prices of 
natural gas, followed by a rapid rise in the power market prices. As the rate freeze was 
determined to expire in July 2006, there was a general anticipation of a substantial price shock 
for the retail prices of electricity.  The expected rate increases caused an intense political debate, 
which resulted in an arrangement that de-facto postponed the rate increases by a year (Expected 
price increases).
Throughout the observation period the general public, i.e. the customers of BGE were in 
continuous contact with politicians through direct contacts and through writings in the media, 
primarily the local newspaper, the Baltimore Sun. At that time the individual whom would later 
be elected as the new governor of Maryland in the 2006 elections, Martin O’Malley, was the 
mayor of the city of Baltimore. Turning the energy issue into the election theme supported his
election efforts and ultimately gave him access to the Maryland governors’ mansion.
In November 2006 the gubernatorial elections were strongly characterized by energy issues. The 
forthcoming lifting of the rate freeze and the anticipated increases in the electric rates helped 
Martin O’Malley to win the elections primarily using energy as his election theme. (ELECT06).
The obvious outcome of the political process was more strict Commission policy and 
subsequently proposed changes in the competitiveness of the retail energy market. 
The failed market competitiveness arrangement in California had an impact on the public 
discourse in Maryland throughout the 2000s. Opponents of competitive markets primarily used 
this as a model showing how a competitive market is a one-way street to disaster. This in 
combination with the expected retail price increases and the election of new governor with 
subsequent nomination of very political commission there were strong expectations of 
forthcoming changes in the regulatory framework applied in Maryland.
5.1.3 ESA of Constellation Energy
Figure 5-1 illustrates all of the most important events vis-à-vis the market opening for the 
Constellation Energy and its operative environment. I have presented the events using the 
“swim-lane” presentation often used in process management to emphasize the role of the initiator 
and the primary target of the action.
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The initial events setting into motion the market opening in Maryland could be traced back to the 
passing of the NEPA 1992. The role of ENRON in the structural changes in the energy market in 
Maryland was essentially active. What, if any was then the role of ENRON in the preparation of 
the NEPA would be a theme for another study. The initial phase in Maryland lasted until the 
settlement of 1998, while the passing of House Bill 703 and Senate Bill 300 in 1999, 
fundamentally put into motion the irrevocable process that ended in the transfer of the generation 
assets from BGE to Constellation, and the IPO of Constellation. In the early phases of market 
opening, the initiator, setting the process in motion, was the legislator, but the primary action 
mainly took place between the regulator and the company, thus fundamentally forming the 
opportunities for the firm to conduct business.
The impact of the US two-tier regulatory system can well be seen in the Constellation case. The 
federal level policy impact was represented first in the passing of the NEPA92 and subsequently 
in the rulings of FERC with resultant primary impacts on the interstate wholesale trade and 
transmission of electricity. The state regulatory policies were, to a certain extent, derived from 
federal policies, such as passing of the restructuring legislation in 1999, which followed the 
pattern set in the NEPA92. The state regulatory policies fundamentally set the framework for 
company action within the state. Thus, the federal and state regulatory policies would not, in 
theory, overlap, but they did have some interdependence.
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Figure 5-1 ESA of Constellation Energy.
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The interstate wholesale market was regulated by the FERC, while the state regulator’s primary 
concern was the cost of electricity supplied to the local SOS clientele. However, as sourcing took 
place on the interstate wholesale market, the local retail prices thus reflected the FERC regulated 
markets. The commodity was consumed by a customer connected to a low voltage distribution 
network, regulated by a state regulator. This in turn needed to be fed from a FERC regulated 
transmission network, whose costs were ultimately borne by the final consumer.
After passing the state restructuring legislation in 1999 the company became the key initiator in 
the process of shaping the environment. The company introduced new top management, new 
strategy, and new organization and overall ways of working. One of the key elements in this 
field was the introduction of risk management policies in the daily operations. This is reflected in
the variable, NEWSTRAT, in Figure 5-1.
The role of the Commission as a consultant for the Governor, the House, and the Senate should 
be emphasized. This role included commenting on the legislative initiatives by the individual 
representatives and senators, and regular briefings of the state of energy matters within the state. 
In the figure this is reflected as the bar “Continuous Consulting”. 
The interaction between the legislature and the public took two key forms. Both the politicians 
and the public participated in the public discourse within the media. The politicians gave 
interviews and published writings about their intentions, while the general public primarily wrote 
articles in the media, but also approached the politicians directly. Obviously, the most active 
individuals were more active on this front and thus the signals the politicians heard did not 
correspond to the opinion of the public as a whole. However, as Downs (1957) points out, 
politicians do not have knowledge of the opinions of the people if those people do not express 
their opinion to the politicians. Downs likewise states that by showing activity interest groups, 
can have their voice heard.
The Commission provided information for the public about the opportunities the competitive 
market would provide. In the start the Commission issued a media campaign promoting a 
competitive electric retail market. However, at the same time the Commission was deeply 
concerned about the pricing level of the SOS electricity, which led to take action to make the 
SOS prices as low as possible. A side impact of this concern was, in practice, the elimination of 
competition opportunities by any other service provider.
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Towards the end of the observation period, the transfer to market-based rates, i.e. the expiry of 
the rate freeze in conjunction with the market turmoil caused by hurricanes, stirred the otherwise 
straightforward process through normal democratic influence. Obviously, here gain, the loudest 
voices were best heard. This led to a discussion of whether the competitiveness of the markets in 
Maryland would have to be stopped, or even reversed, as was the case in Virginia.
In summary, the process was initially a legislator-initiated interaction between the regulator and 
the firm, but as a result of the process this was expanded into a multi faceted configuration of 
parallel interactions at multiple fora. The focal point in the process thus drifted from the 
legislator passing the laws, implemented by the regulator regulating the process, to the company 
adjusting strategy, organization and resource deployment to best manage in the overall business 
environment. As a consequence of the company actions, the customers’ role as voters, in 
elections and the subsequent impact on the activity of legislative function in the process should 
be emphasized. 
5.1.4 Analysis of Constellation initiated actions vis-à-vis market opening
The following figure, Figure 5-2, illustrates all of the key business actions taken by Constellation 
during the time frame 2000-2004. The actions are divided into the 8 defined categories. The 
figure presents the distribution of the events that have been included in the analysis. 
Figure 5-2 Classified actions of Constellation Energy 2000 – 2004.
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The figure above indicates that since 2000 the pace of change in Constellation Energy has been 
very fast. The rate of investments has been in decline since 2000, and the number of nominations 
to key management positions has been prompt.  The number of accreditations has been rising 
lately; this is because the forerunner role of Constellation had been appreciated by the industry 
analysts. An interesting feature is that donations have risen dramatically from the prevailing 
level in 2004. This could provide a hint about the attitude of the firm in the wake of the 
approaching expiration of a rate cap.
Figure 5-3 CTI and component indices Constellation Energy 2000 – 2004.
The Figure above further reinforces the impression of the pace of change in Constellation, as 
measured by the CTI (see Appendix B).  The overall development has been really rapid 
throughout the analyzed period after market opening. From the year 2000 until the year 2004, the 
main contributor of change shifted from investments to changes in management and acquisitions, 
resulting in substantial increase in revenues. One could say that the constitutors of CTI growth 
have been carefully sequenced, but it is highly unlikely that the management would have planned 
it to be this way.
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5.2 FORTUM CORPORATION 
5.2.1 Organizational context and performance
Fortum was a vertically integrated power company listed on the Helsinki Stock exchange with 
the Finnish state as the majority shareholder. The company was active in the Nordic power 
market in electricity generation, retail and distribution, and in the power plant service business. 
Fortum was formed in the late 1990s by merging government-owned companies, and an oil 
company and a power company. The intention was to create a powerful energy company, but in 
practice this did not materialize and the merger was later demerged. 
Table 5-4 below illustrates the key financial figures of Fortum Corporation from the time prior to 
the merger up to the time prior to the demerger. The sales figures include the structural change in 
accounting base effective from the financial statements of 2002 to 2003.   
Table 5-4 Financial and BDI characteristics Fortum Corporation.
The revenue growth of Fortum had been relatively modest. For both the oil and electricity 
businesses market prices influenced the sales revenues, because the prices were indexed to the 
market. Thus the revenue level on two consecutive years might be shown to be declining 
although the sales volume measured in physical volumes increased. 
In the capital structure of Fortum the peak in assets and debt in 2002 was caused by the 
completion of the Birka acquisition, already initiated in 2001. Equity had been growing steadily, 
indicating the drive in the company to improve overall financial structure. Return on equity, 
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assets and capital employed likewise show an upward trend. These figures reflect a combination 
of figures provided by the annual report of 2004 and other calculated figures. There was 
obviously a change in how Fortum has defined certain accounting concepts, primarily in the 
definition of capital employed from 2002 to 2003 (both figures are provided in the annual 
report), because return on equity exceeded the return on capital employed. The line illustrating 
return on assets is calculated based on the annual report figures.
Acquisitions, and the subsequent financial requirements, had a certain impact on the financial 
strength of Fortum Corporation. The rising trend from 1998 to 2001 was cut in 2002 and 2003. 
This was primarily due to the completion of the Birka acquisition. In 2004, the company 
managed to reverse this trend and returned to a path leading to improvements of the capital 
structure.  
The Business Diversity Index developed favorably indicating that over the analyzed period 
Fortum became more diversified. As such, this highly depends on the internal structure of the 
company and the subsequent reporting practice. However, this trend was, cut by including the 
demerger in 2005 in the figures.
The profitability of Fortum had likewise developed favorably. Part of this could be attributed to 
high electricity price in the market in conjunction with well-timed investments in carbon free 
generation base.
5.2.2 Historical narrative
The roots of the company go back to the construction of the Imatra hydroelectric plant in 
Finland. The construction of the power plant started in 1922, and when commissioned in 1929 
comprised of two units, and was the largest hydroelectric power plant in Europe. The production 
capacity was regarded to be very large and to facilitate the usage a transmission cable was built 
across the country to the city of Turku. Subsequently, the company bearing the name of the city 
of where the plant was located and the predecessor of Fortum, Imatran Voima was formed in 
1932 to operate the plant. By the time the seventh unit was completed in 1951, the power plant 
had reached its present capacity, 170 MW. The plant’s capacity corresponds to about one per 
cent of the present peak load in the Finnish market.
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The following table, Table 5-5, provides a framework for analyzing the company from the early 
1990s to the early 2000s. This table, in conjunction with Table 5-6 that follows it, illustrates the 
most important characteristics of both the company and its business environment during the time 
frame.
IVO / Fortum Early 1990s Early 2000s
Primary company IVO Fortum
Power procurement, own generation, 
purchases
Own generation, 
balancing with 
neighbors
Own generation, 
wholesale, distribution 
and retail, balancing & 
RM at market
Customer base Wholesale customers in 
Finland, service and 
operating
internationally
Wholesale and  retail 
customers in Nordic, 
trading in Nord Pool
Coverage of business chain Generation, 
transmission and 
wholesale
Generation, RM 
wholesale retail, 
distribution
Primary origin of growth Organic growth first,  
acquisitions later
Competitive wholesale 
and retail markets 
Key risks in business model Availability of gen. 
assets, customer risk to 
small extent
Regulatory risk, customer 
risk, market risk 
Key Strategic challenges To build the 
infrastructure, foresee 
the forthcoming 
regulatory changes
Find growth opportunities, 
management of  multiple  
risks 
Diversification characteristics Solid national business 
chain where all parties’ 
position static
Unbundled competitive 
business chain, functional 
SBU:s 
Table 5-5 Characteristics of Fortum / IVO in 1990s and 2000s.
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Early 1990s Early 2000s
Key characteristics of market Closed monopoly 
markets
Competitive generation 
wholesale and retail, few 
players
Competition in the market No Yes
Form of transactions Static conditions, 
wholesale and retail 
tariffs with regulatory 
review
Competitive pricing in 
wholesale and retail, few 
players 
Degree of market integration High Semi
Relationship between actors Arms length Competitive with few 
players
Cause of imperfect competition Generation and 
transmission under 
integrated company, 
fixed relationship with 
distributor retailers
Oligopolistic competition,  
low number of players 
with generation and retail 
under same company
Table 5-6 Characteristics of Fortum / IVO markets in 1990s and 2000s.
From the establishment of Imatran Voima until the early 1990s the Finnish market was very 
rigid. IVO was the key wholesaler while many industries covered part of their generation needs 
in-house or through a special generating company. The transmission grid was owned by IVO and 
an industrial consortium. Prior to the establishment of Fortum in 1998, its predecessor Imatran 
Voima (IVO) was seeking growth opportunities pursuing an internationalization strategy 
(IVOSTR) building on its in-house engineering competence obtained by designing and building 
its own generation capacity in Finland. IVO tried to leverage on this both domestically within the 
power generation industry and internationally. As a result of this strategy, in 1985 IVO 
constructed and commissioned the Rauhalahti CHP plant to supply the city of Jyväskylä with 
power and heat. This was followed by the establishment of IVO International (IVOI), an
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engineering function primarily dedicated to the design and build of power generation plants. This 
was then followed by establishment of service function for the same market area.  
In 1993, IVO generation services was established (IVOGES). The unit was granted the 
Operative and Management arrangements for the Peterborough and Briggs power plants in the 
UK. In 1994 Telivo, a subsidiary for providing national long distance telecom services was 
established. In 1995 the Geluk Gong CC gas turbine plant in Malaysia was commissioned. IVO 
decided to participate in the Nordic Joint Venture to construct a hydro power plant in Tanzania. 
In 1996 IVO established a maintenance company in Hungary.
The path leading to the opening of the internal energy market for competition in Europe was 
started in 1988 when the EC Commission publishing a document ''The Internal Energy Market''. 
This document discussed the obstacles of introducing the internal market principles in energy 
and the possible means available to overcome these obstacles.   
The initial preparatory steps towards the internal energy market were taken by introducing a 
directive for the transit of electricity through transmission grids (90/547/EEC) and a Community 
procedure to improve the transparency of gas and electricity prices charged to industrial end-
users (90/377/EEC). From the beginning of 1994 this was to also apply in Finland. For this 
reason this requirement was included in the 1992 Finnish government energy policy statement. 
The government’s proposal relating to law opening power markets for competition, electricity 
market act was proposed to parliament in August 1994 (HE 138/94) and later passed as law 
386/1995 (EMA95). This legislation fundamentally changed the nature of energy business in 
Finland by introducing competition to the end user markets and required the firms to unbundle 
the generation and marketing of power from distribution and transmission. Prior to this, the 
legislation covering the electricity markets in general were the electricity law of 1979 (319/79), 
the law on competition restrictions from 1992 (480/92) and the consumer protection act of 1978 
(38/78). The new legislation subsequently replaced the key elements of the said laws. The 
transmission network operators and all key players in the power market provided an opinion on 
the proposed legislation (LEXCOM).
At the time of preparing the legislation it had became apparent that there was a need to establish 
a regulator to regulate the power markets. A law proposing the establishment of an electricity 
regulator was then subsequently put before parliament as government proposal HE 202/1994 
(REG). This proposed law establishing the Electricity Market Center (the predecessor of the 
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Energy Market Authority) was to enter into force two months prior to the electricity market act, 
or at the latest at the same time. 
The establishment of Nord Pool, which had taken place in 1993, as a power exchange in 
Norway, and the association of Finnish El-Ex as an affiliate company under Nord Pool, laid the 
foundation for integration of the Nordic wholesale markets and the opening of the markets for 
retail competition. 
In 1995 Finland and Sweden become members of the European Union whereby both countries 
subsequently needed to implement EU legislation in the national codex.
In fall 1998 and spring 1999 two individuals complained (TECOMPL99) about the distribution 
rates of Tuusulanjärven Energia (later Fortum Distribution). The energy market Authority ruled 
in 2001 that for 1999 the rates would need to be corrected retroactively (EMA01).
As a reaction to the simultaneous introduction of competition in Finland and Sweden, in 1996 
IVO had started implementing a new strategy (IVONSTR) to enter the Swedish market by 
buying shares of Gulspång (ACQGS) in Sweden; aiming to gradually gain the majority 
shareholding of the company. Later Gulspång acquired Skandinaviska Elverk (SEV) (ACQSEV)
and grew substantially. By 1998 IVO had acquired 100 per cent of the equity of both firms, 
which enabled a merger of these firms. This enabled further moves on the path towards the 
establishment of Birka, a joint venture with the City of Stockholm (ESTB).
As directives 90/547/EEC and 90/377/EEC set the overall framework for the opening of the 
internal energy market for competition, Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council dated 19 December 1996 (1stPackage) set out the framework for common rules for 
the internal market in electricity. This first package has subsequently been complemented by the 
second package (2003/54/EC) (2ndPackage) and a third package is not completed at the time of 
the completion of  this study. 
Subsequent to passing the electricity market act Fingrid was established as a national 
transmission grid operator by merging the transmission networks of Imatran Voima and 
Teollisuuden Voimansiirto on November 29, 1996 (FG). The company began commercial 
operations on September 1, 1997. 
The process leading to forming Fortum begun in 1997, when The Finnish Ministry of Trade and 
Industry put forward a proposal to combine the oil, gas and chemicals companies Neste Oy and 
Imatran Voima Oy into a new integrated energy group. The final decision for forming the 
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Fortum Group, incorporating both IVO and Neste was finally made in December. On 28 
February 1998, the holding company IVO-Neste Yhtymä Oy (FORTUM) was established, and 
in June the company was renamed Fortum. This was followed in December by the listing of 
Fortum Corporation on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Fortum's new organization became 
effective on 1 January 1999, thereby making the former separate firms Neste and IVO 
subsidiaries of Fortum.
The first chairman of Fortum, Matti Vuoria came from the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The 
CEO of IVO, Heikki Marttinen was nominated as the CEO of Fortum (1stCEO).
The strategy of Fortum has evolved during the short history of the firm. When Fortum was 
formed, the strategy was a combination of the strategies of the merged firms Neste and IVO, and 
the resources naturally consisted of those of the parent firms (FINISTR). As there were no 
significant synergies between the activities of the merged firms, and the businesses were 
developed separately the nature of the merger was primarily financial.
At the beginning, the newly merged company did not have a clear profile and the media often 
blamed the company’s two-headed management structure for causing a lack of direction and 
profile in the company (PR1). This was substantially clarified when Mikael Lilius was 
nominated as a CEO of Fortum in September of 2000 (CEONOM). After his nomination, 
however, the current strategy of Fortum began to emerge. The new strategy, with a clear focus 
on the Nordic power market, built on Fortum’s position in every part of the vertical value chain 
within the Nordic electricity markets. The generation portfolio was heavy with regard to 
hydropower. Services would complement this pattern with no such geographical focus 
(FORSTR).
In 2000 Fortum increased its generation capacity by acquiring Stora Enso’s power assets in the 
Nordic region (ACQSE) and Wesertal (ACQWE), a power utility in northern Germany.  
Additional retail and distribution businesses were acquired in Finland through the acquisition of 
Länsivoima Oyj (ACQLV), which was then merged with Fortum. The parallel development in 
Finland and Sweden regarding opening of the electricity markets for competition enabled the 
acquisition of these assets.
Natural Gas production started in the Åsgard gas field in Norway in October 2000.  
In 2001 an agreement with the City of Stockholm was signed regarding the purchase of the 
outstanding shares of Birka Energi (ACQBIR). The transaction was finalized in 2002. This 
constituted a substantial increase in the distribution and retail assets of Fortum through which the 
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company become the operator of the Stockholm city energy system. In addition, in 2001 
Fortum’s affiliate in Norway, Fortum Petroleum AS was awarded an oil and gas exploration 
license (a 30 per cent share thereof) in the northern North Sea, adding a substantial position to 
the Norwegian upstream production assets. 
The Energy Market Authority found Tuusulanjärven Energia Oy to have exceeded the highest 
permitted return on capital employed in 1999. (Dnro 213/42/98 and 80/421/99) (EMA01). As a 
response to this ruling Fortum applied to the Supreme administrative court in May 2001 
(FOR01).
In 2002, Fortum introduced a new strategy that concentrated on the power and heat industry in 
the Nordic area. As a consequence of this new approach Fortum decided to sell their shares of 
Fortum Energie GmbH in Germany (DIV02) (Wesertal utility and generation plus a portfolio of 
power plant development projects.), indicating thus the end of the presence of Fortum in the 
German electricity and gas market. The company decided likewise, to divest the Norwegian E&P 
business (production of oil and natural gas, and exploration license share) and the Omani oil 
production assets. Fortum shares in Borealis petrochemical activities had already been divested 
earlier. These divestments were in line with the new strategic orientation.
In early 2002, the distribution industry in Finland applied for some changes to the methodology 
used to calculate the justifiable return on invested capital. The supreme administrative court 
ruled in December that the EMA ruling of 2001, 2002 (3349, Dnro 1244/2/01) was correct 
(KHO02). Fortum merged their distribution businesses (DISMER).
The parliament approved the construction of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant (OL3APR).
The second package in opening the EU internal energy market for competition was introduced as 
Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council dated 26 June 2003. This 
concerned common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealed Directive 96/92/EC 
(2nd package).
In 2003 Fortum decided to participate in the new nuclear generation project in Olkiluoto by 
investing EUR 185 million in TVO's new nuclear power plant (OL3FOR). At the same time the 
company commenced preparations to separate its oil business into a new company and 
subsequently to list the new company on the Helsinki stock exchange. This effectively reversed 
the merger of IVO and Neste, which was initiated in 1997 and created Fortum. 
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Fortum strengthened its position in the Nordic retail market by acquiring a stake in Norwegian 
energy company Hafslund. Another move intended to solidify the position of Fortum in the 
Nordic market and areas closely attached was the asset swap with E.On, whereby Fortum 
obtained a position in Northeastern Russia. This was continued in 2003 by increasing Fortum’s 
shareholding in OAO Lenenergo.
Fortum increased its share of Lenenergo again, in Russia 2004 and divested its Hungarian 
subsidiary. The same year continued with the divestment program of non-core businesses. An 
attempt to enter the Norwegian power business failed. In October, the Swedish government 
abandoned negotiations with the primary generating firms (including Fortum) regarding nuclear 
power.
In 2005, the Oil businesses were separated from Fortum. The name of the new oil company 
became Neste Oil Corporation (DEMER). This was then followed by the IPO of Neste Oil. 
Later Fortum further strengthened the retail portfolio through the acquisition of E.On Finland 
(ACQEON). The Competition Authority approved the merger in 2006. The construction work of 
Olkiluoto 3 generating station commenced in 2005.
5.2.3 ESA of Fortum Corporation
The figure below, Figure 5-4, shows the ESA of Fortum Corporation. The early phases of the 
process took place at the time when Finland was not yet a member of the EU and thus the EU 
directives did not initially apply to Finland. The national legislation, however, was passed in 
1995 thus opening the national electricity markets for competition and establishing at the same 
time the energy regulator. However, membership in the European Economic Space (EES), and 
subsequently full membership in the EU from beginning of 1995, implied that the EU directives 
would need to be included in the national codex. 
Initially the focal point in the process was the company interacting with the competition 
authorities during the closed markets phase. At the time of passing the competition legislation 
and establishing the regulator the point of focus obviously shifted to the legislative level. As the 
energy market act had been passed, the focal point of company action obviously shifted towards 
managing the process vis-à-vis the competitive markets. The key elements in this were strategy 
formation, and subsequent changes at the organizational level and resource configuration. 
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In the competitive markets the focus of the company action was on managing the interface with 
the market and the competition. This was reflected in forming a new company strategy that 
emphasized the customer interface and the direct access to the customers. Customer complaints 
regarding the distribution tariffs filed at the competition court could be seen as a cause to initiate 
the merging of the various distribution firms within the group.  
The development of the EU level directives was, at the time of commencing the study still 
pending. The initial and second package had been passed, but the third package was still being 
processed. The fact that the development of national legislation had progressed at a faster pace 
than the general EU-wide legislation implementation process had required, yielded the company 
with a benefit compared to firms operating under a slower development pace. A degree of 
predictability and legislative stability obviously creates an operative framework for the company 
that enables that company to better plan the activities, because the environment is not expected 
to be in constant regulatory change. Thus, the firms functioning under legislation that already 
follow the forthcoming legislation, will have a benefit because they have already proceeded 
along the learning curve and adapted their organizational models and resource deployments to 
meet the foreseeable changes in the operating environment. Clearly, the counter-argument is that 
delaying introduction of competition enables the firms to prepare themselves for the forthcoming 
changes, while maintaining the earnings opportunities of a closed market. As parliament had 
approved the concept of constructing the next nuclear plant, the company decided to participate 
in the construction of that plant thereby enabling them to source generated nuclear power from 
the new plant. 
The process ends in demerging the company so that oil and power activities took separate ways. 
Reversing the merger process of 1998 could be interpreted as recognition that the decision of 
1998 was a mistake. However, the decisions are products of the prevailing information at the 
time and are based on the views available at that time. Obviously these decisions cannot be 
undone – they can only be reversed. 
The process begun in a stable static state that could be characterized by the interaction between 
the firms and the competition authorities while the prevailing regulatory environment kept 
competition out. This was impacted by the passing of the competition act that caused the system 
to seek for a new stable state. At this new static state the company was primarily interacting with 
the competition and customer base with the new static regulatory framework.
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Figure 5-4 ESA of Fortum.
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5.2.4 Analysis of Fortum initiated actions vis-à-vis market opening
The actions in the context legislator-regulator-firm-customer have been discussed above. In the 
following the company actions are discussed in the market context, i.e. primarily between the 
firm and the market. This context falls outside the context discussed above, and thus 
complements the analysis with a different perspective. The following figures illustrate the 
actions the company took vis-à-vis the changes in the market place. The actions are divided into 
eight categories. Subsequently the company-initiated actions are used to calculate the CTI.
Figure 5-5 Classified actions of Fortum 2000 – 2004.
Figure 5-5 illustrates the classified actions at Forum between 2000 and 2004. One of the major 
differences between Nordic and US firms is that Nordic firms do not donate funds for 
philanthropy through benevolent organizations. A natural cause for this is the fact that in Nordic 
societies the state provides a safety net for its members and businesses do not need to be 
involved in these kinds of activities.
Analyzing the CTI reinforces the impression already obtained through analysis of the events. 
The change Fortum has gone through can be sequenced so that originally it was primarily 
acquisitions, then management reorganizations, and finally investments that changed the 
company. As such, the change is fundamental and has extended through all parts of the 
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company. An interesting detail is, however, that the strategy index has not changed; indicating 
that despite all these changes the company has not grown much. 
Therein perhaps lies the problem for Fortum – how could it grow and benefit from being a 
streamlined organization with well-oiled processes. The Nordic market is small and the growth 
in the market is slow. Growing outside the home base would require a different set of resources; 
these Fortum does not have. Another possible path is to find a cooperation partner from other 
markets, pursue a merger plan, or become a takeover target.
Figure 5-6 CTI and component indices of Fortum 2000 – 2004.
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5.3 VATTENFALL
5.3.1 Organizational context and performance
Vattenfall is Europe's fifth largest generator of electricity and the largest generator of heat. The 
government of Sweden holds all the shares of the firm. The company acts in all parts of the 
electricity value chain - generation, transmission, distribution and retail, electricity trading and 
generation and sales of heat. 
Vattenfall had operations in Sweden, Finland, Germany and Poland. The parent company, 
Vattenfall AB, was wholly owned by the Swedish state. . In 2005 the company had 32 231 
employees with net sales of 129,2 billion SEK (13,7 billion EUR), consisting of electricity sales 
of 221,0 TWh, generation 169,1 TWh and heat business 34,1 TWh. 
The following table, Table 5-7 presents the financial characteristics of Vattenfall over the period 
1999 – 2004. Vattenfall altered the reporting structure in 2001 and thus in the presentation 
financial performance from 2000 to 2001 has been changed accordingly. The inclusion of 
German business led to a change of the structure of the company to a geographical structure 
because previously the company was organized along the lines of a business-based structure. As 
such, one can question, would it not more beneficial to organize the businesses along business 
lines and not geographically, because by this structural organization, obtaining potential benefits 
inside the businesses could be hard to realize.  Sometimes it can be hard for the management of 
the acquired business to adapt culturally to the operating structure of the acquirer and they wish
to retain the old reporting and operative structure.  
The impact of the German acquisitions especially, is clearly reflected in the balance sheet of 
Vattenfall. The inclusion of German assets in the financial statements is also reflected in the 
return figures. The difference between Capital employed and Total assets consists mostly of 
provisions regarding future storing of nuclear waste, deferred tax liability and negative goodwill, 
as booked according to Swedish accounting standards. 
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Table 5-7 Financial and BDI characteristics Vattenfall.
The return on equity, assets and capital employed at Vattenfall were somewhat contradictory and 
as it is not clear on what basis the different items were shown in the financial statements. The 
ROCE figures were show both as calculated and as provided in the financial statements.  
A surprising aspect was finding that inclusion of the newly acquired German businesses 
immediately yielded increased return on both assets and capital employed, which would indicate 
a very profitable investment. As the way these return ratios were calculated seemed to differ 
between the annual reports and the calculations herein, I did not regard it fruitful to speculate 
why the figures were different.
The impact of the German acquisitions can clearly be seen in the picture indicating the financial 
strength of Vattenfall. Although a substantial part of the equity and liabilities in the balance sheet 
was covered by provisions, depending on the way the ratios were presented, the equity over 
assets dived immediately after the acquisitions, with the similar but mirror image impact on 
gearing.  
The Business Diversity Index over the researched time frame has remained relatively constant. 
There are ups and downs but essentially no SBU has dominated the overall figure. This could 
naturally change if the business units were defined in a different way.
The overall profitability of Vattenfall, calculated as net income over revenues, remained 
relatively stable over the researched period. Only in 2001, after the German acquisitions, was 
there was a dip. The inclusion of the profit contribution of the German businesses naturally helps 
to recover the investment expenses emerged.
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The trend points upwards, and if this trend continued, the grounds for possible IPO look very 
promising. However, the policies of the present owner and Swedish internal politics impact 
strongly the company’s ability to begin to obtain funds from the private equity capital market.
5.3.2 Historical narrative
Vattenfall was formed in 1909 from the Trollhättan Canal and Waterworks Administration to 
produce electric energy from water. At the time, electric power technology was still in its 
infancy. But many people saw the opportunities of electricity and wanted to make use of the 
potential of Sweden's waterfalls. Parliament's decision to establish Kungliga Vattenfallstyrelsen 
(the Royal Waterfall Board) indicated the government’s wish to engage actively in electricity 
production.
Although the region of Norrland in central Sweden had already been connected to southern 
Sweden in the 1930s, it was only in 1952 when the Swedish power network was interconnected. 
The Harspranget hydroelectric plant, inaugurated in 1952, and at the time the world's largest 
hydroelectric plant, led to the development of a 1 000-kilometer power line, reaching to the south 
of Sweden. The power cable was the world's first power transmission cable with rates up to 380 
kilovolts. 
In 1963, Vattenfall was one of the initiators of the Nordel electricity alliance between Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway, and Finland. The alliance, which created a common pool of electric power, 
was launched in 1965, marking Vattenfall's first international sales of electricity. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, resistance grew to further exploitation of the rivers for hydropower 
generation. At the same time, electricity demand continued to rise and popular opinion was that 
Sweden should invest in nuclear power. In collaboration, AB Atomenergi and Vattenfall set up
the first research reactor in 1954 at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm to generate 
both heat and electricity. The Ågesta plant, south of Stockholm was a heavy water reactor, 
fuelled by Swedish, non-enriched uranium. The emergence of nuclear power was used as an 
argument to hinder further development of the large rivers for power generation purposes. 
Preparations for the launch of the first Swedish reactor began in 1965 and this reactor at 
Oskarshamn came online in 1972. Through the 1970s and 1980s, Sweden added a number of 
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new reactors, including two more at Oskarshamn in 1974 and 1985, four at Ringhals between 
1976 and 1983, three at Forsmark between 1980 and 1985, and a plant at Barsebäck in 1977. 
The following table provides a framework for analyzing the company from the early 1980s to 
early 2000s. Table 5-8 in conjunction with the Table 5-9 below illustrate the most important 
characteristics of both the company and its business environment over the researched time frame.
Vattenfall Early 1990s Early 2000s
Primary company Vattenfall Vattenfall
Power procurement, own generation, 
purchases
Own generation, balancing 
with neighbors
Own generation, wholesale,  
balancing & RM at market
Customer base Wholesale customers in 
Sweden 
Wholesale and  retail 
customers in Nordic, trading 
in Nord Pool
Coverage of business chain Generation, transmission, 
wholesale distribution and 
retail
Generation, RM wholesale 
retail, distribution
Primary origin of growth Organic growth first, 
acquisitions later
Competitive wholesale and 
retail markets acquisitions
Key risks in business model Availability of gen. assets, 
customer risk to small extent
Regulatory risk, customer 
risk, market risk 
Key strategic challenges To build the infrastructure, 
foresee the forthcoming 
regulatory changes
Find growth opportunities, 
management of  multiple 
risks 
Diversification characteristics Solid national business chain 
where all parties’ position 
static
Unbundled competitive 
business chain, functional 
SBU:s 
Table 5-8 Characterization of Vattenfall in 1990s and 2000s.
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Early 1990s Early 2000s
Key characteristics of market Closed monopoly markets Competitive generation 
wholesale and retail, few 
players
Competition in the market No Yes
Form of transactions Static conditions, 
wholesale and retail 
tariffs with regulatory 
review
Competitive pricing in 
wholesale and retail, few 
players 
Degree of market integration High Semi
Relationship between actors Arms length Competitive with few players
Cause of imperfect competition Generation and 
transmission, distribution 
and retail under integrated 
company, fixed 
relationship with other 
distributor retailers
Oligopolistic competition,  
low number of players with 
generation and retail under 
same company
Table 5-9 Characterization of Vattenfall markets in 1990s and 2000s.
In the late 1970s the nuclear power debate in Sweden led to a referendum on the fate of nuclear 
power in the country. This discussion was not dampened by the Three Mile Island incident at 
Harrisburg, USA in 1979. In the early 1980s a referendum was arranged concerning the destiny 
of nuclear power in Sweden. This referendum (NUCREF) resulted in the decision to end further 
nuclear plant development, complete those reactors that were under construction, but not to 
commence construction of any new plants. This decision left Sweden with twelve reactors, seven 
of which were owned by Vattenfall. The phasing out of nuclear energy by 2010 was a major 
setback for Vattenfall. The firm began research and development on alternative energy sources 
(ALTEN), including wind and solar power, as well as gas turbines and fuel cells. Natural gas 
was introduced in Sweden in 1985 by a consortium in which Vattenfall had a major role 
(NGINT85).
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The discussion regarding opening the market for competition had begun in the 1980s as the 
generation capacity in Sweden had peaked after commissioning of the nuclear plants that had 
been under construction at the time of the referendum. Of the nuclear plants Barsebäck I was 
shut down in the fall of 1999 (BCLO99). Barsebäck's second reactor shut down was scheduled 
for 2005 (BCLO05). The timetable for further shutting down of nuclear generation plants was 
not determined. 
In 1992 Vattenfall was incorporated as a public limited company (VINC92). However all shares 
remained in the hands of the government. Various roles of the company, such as managing the 
core network infrastructure, canal operations, and contingency planning for the entire power 
industry – were deemed to be too important to be part of a private company subject to 
competition. As a result of these discussions the national power transmission network, Svenska 
Kraftnät was unbundled (SKDEM). Prior to this move the Nordic power firms had had friendly 
co-operation (Nordel), and they shared the annual proceeds they could obtain by sharing the peak 
load and backup capabilities. In 1992 the company took the first steps to enter the Polish energy 
market (POLENT92).
Vattenfall concluded the first major sales contracts in the Finnish market by selling power to 
Enso-Gutzeit and mining group Outokumpu in 1995 (INTSALE95). In 1995 Vattenfall's board 
charted out an international growth strategy for the firm (INTSTRAT). However, it took some 
years to put this decision into practice. It requires a strategy to be in place that has suitable target 
firms for acquisition, win the possible competition to acquire them, arranging finance for the 
purchase and the fundamentally difficult part is to integrate the acquired company into an 
existing structure. 
At the beginning of 1996 the electricity market was opened for competition (DEREG96). The 
process was designed so that by November 1, 1999 all consumers would be free to choose the 
power supplier and switch without cost. At the same time a regulator, 
Energimarknadsinspektionen (EI96) was established. 
Nord Pool was founded in 1993 in Norway as Statnett Marked (NP93). In 1996 Sweden joined 
the power exchange and the world’s first multinational exchange for trade in power contracts 
was created (SWPN96). Statnett Marked was renamed Nord Pool. In 1998 Finland joined Nord 
Pool and in 1999 Western Denmark joined the market place. In 2000 the Nordic wholesale 
power market became fully integrated when Eastern Denmark joined Nord Pool. NordReg. 
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Vattenfall became an early entrant in Finland by setting up a subsidiary, Vattenfall Oy, in 1994 
(VFOY94). The following year 1995, the company purchased two regional electricity producers 
in Finland (FINACQ95). Subsequent to the Finnish market opening for competition in 1995 
(FINDER95), the company also began selling electricity directly to customers in Finland. 
Likewise, in 1995 Vattenfall entered Norway (VFN95) and Denmark (VFD95), setting up 
offices in those countries. 
Vattenfall looked for growth farther a field. The company targeted the fast-developing Asian and 
South American markets, setting up an investment vehicle, Nordic Power Investment (NPI). 
Through NPI, Vattenfall began acquiring shareholdings in a number of Asian and Latin 
American power plant projects, such as the 1995 purchase of a 25 per cent share in Thailand's 
Thuen Hin-Boun hydropower station. 
The economic crisis that swept through much of the Asian and Latin American markets in the 
mid-1990s cut short Vattenfall's expansion plans in those regions. Instead, the company decided 
to return its focus closer to home, where pressure had been building toward the deregulation of 
the entire European Community energy market. Germany, the single largest European energy 
market, appeared a natural choice for Vattenfall's expansion, with deregulation expected to come 
in 1997. In 1996, Vattenfall took its first steps into the German market, setting up a joint venture, 
Vesa Energy (GER96), with Vattenfall taking a 75 percent share. The JV was based in 
Hamburg, in partnership with Kommunalfinanz. Vesa's operation initially targeted East 
Germany, buying gas-fired plants in Neubrandenburg, Schwerin, and Cottbus. 
However, with deregulation in Germany stalled Vattenfall returned its focus to the Scandinavian 
market. In 1998, the company launched a joint venture with Denmark's NESA, forming the 
company Stroem AS. Vattenfall also launched a $625 million acquisition offer for Stockholm 
Energi, the third largest electricity supplier in Sweden. However, this did not progress and the 
City of Stockholm accepted a proposal from Fortum.
The opening of a component market adjacent to the traditional market area created opportunities 
for Vattenfall to expand internationally. In 1996 competition was introduced in the Swedish 
power market and Finland and Norway had about similar schedule. Vattenfall bought a 
distribution company in Finland, Hämeen Sähkö in 1996 (HS96).
Vattenfall continued to expand into Germany, where the electricity market was deregulated in 
1998 (GERDEG98). The German Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office) demanded that the 
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largest power conglomerates of the country, RWE and E.On, must give up their assets in the 
former East Germany in order to prevent them from dominating the German power market. In 
1999 Vattenfall acquired 25,1 per cent of Hamburgische Elekrizitätz - Werke AG (HEW) 
(HEW99), a company that had supplied Hamburg with electricity and district heat for over 100 
years. 
The Figure above illustrates the actions Vattenfall took before the year 2000. The striking feature 
of the action is that they concentrate on company-initiated actions in new markets and externally 
initiated actions in the home market. Although Vattenfall had all the time been a 100 per cent 
state controlled entity, in a business sense it had relative liberty to take action as it saw fit.
Vattenfall Europe was formed in 2000 (VFEUR00). As a result, the number of employees 
increased from approximately 8 000 (10 per cent outside Sweden) to just over 12 000 (40 per 
cent outside Sweden).
In 2000 Vattenfall acquired a 55 per cent holding in Electrocieplownie Warszawiskie (EW) in 
Poland (POLACQ00), which is Warsaw's electricity and district heating company and Poland's 
largest electricity supplier, Gornoslaski Zaklad Elektro-energetyczny (GZE). 
When acquiring the minority share of HEW, Vattenfall had the option of acquiring the remaining 
shares of HEW and thus in 2001 Vattenfall became the majority shareholder in HEW. Through 
HEW, in 2000 Vattenfall acquired a generation and transmission network company Veag 
Vereinigte Energiewerke AG and the fuel supplier Lausitzer Braunkohle AG in former East 
Germany (VEAG01). Likewise, through HEW, in 2001 Vattenfall become the majority owner of 
the City of Berlin energy company, Bewag that had begun its activities in the city in 1885 
(BEWAG01).
Before 2001 the key business line was electricity, primarily in Sweden. This was complemented 
by smaller auxiliary businesses. As the acquisition of Finnish and especially German businesses 
expanded the business base, the reporting in the financial report was changed accordingly. The 
impact of the German acquisitions to the overall business base of Vattenfall cannot be 
overemphasized, as the company effectively doubled its revenue base, not to mention the impact 
on assets (GRWTH)
The actions of Vattenfall during 2000 – 2004 strongly reflected the major Polish and German 
acquisitions. A fact that makes these acquisitions special is that they were carried out during a 
very short time frame. Such a large number of major acquisitions over a very short period would 
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be a risky pattern for any listed company, but Vattenfall appears to have managed these 
acquisitions relatively well. 
5.3.3 ESA of Vattenfall 
The figure below, Figure 5-7 shows the ESA of Vattenfall. The events begin at the nuclear 
referendum in the early 1980s that still today limit the company’s ability to take economically 
feasible decisions. The early phases of the process took place at the time when Sweden was not 
yet a member of the EU and thus the directives of 90’s did not initially apply for Sweden. 
However, the national legislation opening the market for competition in 1996 was passed, 
establishing at that same time the energy regulator. The membership in the ESA and 
subsequently full membership in the EU from the beginning of 1995 however implied that EU 
directives would need to be included in the national codex. 
Initially the focal point in the process was the company, as part of governmental structures 
during the closed markets phase, taking orders from the government. Passing the competition 
legislation and establishing the regulator obviously shifted the focal point. Prior to opening the 
markets for competition the governmental agency Vattenfall was turned into the company 
Vattenfall, maintaining however full governmental control in the company. The first indication 
of internationalization was the entry into Poland in 1992, although the internationalization 
strategy was approved in 1995. Although this decision was taken in 1995, obviously this 
decision to establish an affiliate company in Finland in 1994 was part of the scheme. This could 
be regarded as a sign of the time it takes to prepare the decisions so that the process of making 
the decisions begins substantially prior to the time when the decisions are made public.
As the energy market had been made competitive, in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark the 
focal point of company action obviously shifted towards managing the process vis-à-vis these 
competitive markets. The key elements in this were strategy formation, and subsequent changes 
at an organizational level and resource configuration. Here we are dealing with multiple markets 
simultaneously, with the investment needs and resource configurations evolving in parallel. 
The internationalization strategy appears to be in the center of this process, because all the entry 
and investment decisions are subsequent to this. Another parallel development was the 
establishment of the Nord Pool wholesale trading market that fundamentally formed the basis for 
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a development of real Nordic market area. Without establishing the trading platform 
development of the pan Nordic market area would not have become possible.
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Figure 5-7 ESA of Vattenfall.
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5.3.4 Analysis of Vattenfall initiated actions vis-à-vis market opening
Figure 5-8 Classified actions of Vattenfall 2000 – 2004.
The company-initiated actions of Vattenfall appear in waves, as is the situation for most of the 
case firms. Strategy / organizational announcements and nominations, and somewhat 
surprisingly divestments dominate the action pattern in 2001. The pattern of 2001 is followed in 
2002 by investment, again a logical step after the major acquisitions in 2001. From 2002 to 2003, 
and in 2004 the overall number of actions steeply decline. This could be interpreted to reflect the 
time it takes to digest the major acquisitions and integration into existing businesses. Towards 
the end of the analysis period, the investments gain momentum again, as accreditations begin to 
emerge. 
The overall CTI rises steeply over the entire period. The main contributors to the CTI are, at the 
beginning acquisition, then complemented by strategy and management changes. Later this is 
further complemented by investments.
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Figure 5-9 CTI and component indices Vattenfall 2000 – 2004.
In general the overall picture is relatively consistent; the actions by the management seem to be 
on a continuous path directed towards fundamentally altering the nature of the company.
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5.4 CENTRICA
5.4.1 Organizational context and performance
Centrica was a multi product energy retail company with primary activities in the UK, but a 
significant position outside the UK market. The history of Centrica and the British gas industry 
goes back to the early 1800s. Centrica at the time of the study was built on the foundation of the 
demerged commercial arm of British Gas, formed as a result of the restructuring of the industry 
and opening of the market for competition. The company had, on multiple occasions, been 
shaped by decisive government actions practically every 20 years. Examples of these decisive 
government actions were the nationalization of gas industry in 1948, the decision to introduce 
natural gas to replace manufactured coal-based gas in 1966, and then finally privatization in 
1986 with a subsequent demerger into transmission, retail and storage. Centrica, although not a 
traditional electric utility company was included in this study due to the intensive role as an 
electric retail company and the position the company had reached in the UK. 
In 2004 Centrica had net sales of GBP 18,3 billion. In the gas business Centrica had lost market 
share, especially in the industrial and commercial segments, but had managed to leverage the 
customer base in residential retail. Table 5-10 presents the financial characteristics of Centrica 
between 1998 and 2004. Since 2002 the reporting structure has been altered indicating the 
introduction of both new geographical markets and new areas of business. 
The reduction of revenues from 1998 to 1999 clearly reflects the impact of opening the market 
for competition. The reduction in revenues could have been much more substantial if the 
required reduction of market share was more significant. 
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Table 5-10 Financial and BDI characteristics Centrica.
The change in business configuration reflected herein made it difficult to follow the evolution of 
the different businesses inside the company. This can clearly be seen between 2001 and 2002. 
Additionally, the decisions reflecting the internal distribution of profits impaired opportunities to 
carry out analysis over the entire period. 
In terms of capitalization, the most striking feature is the large gap between total assets and total 
capitalization. Possibly in the balance sheet there are a lot of reservations, receivables and 
payables that do not bear interest. Of the total value of assets, the share of conventional 
capitalization is less than half. This has not, however, changed during the analysis period. The 
substantial gap between the return on asset, equity and capital employed reflects the share of 
non-interest bearing capitalization in the balance sheet. The increase in capital employed from 
2001 to 2002 is reflected in as a dip in return graph.
Regarding the financial structure of Centrica with respect to equity over assets and gearing we 
can identify a trend line; a constant improvement of the financial structure from 1998 to 2004. 
With the exception of a few years, the share of equity in the overall capital structure has been 
increasing and gearing figure declining. For Centrica there was probably an optimum in the 
equity over assets figure, where with a constant profitability and cash flow the share performance 
will be optimal.
The business diversity of Centrica has developed favorably since 2001. The company managed 
to increase diversity by starting new businesses that provided growth for the company and 
reduced the dependence of one business area.
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The last of the financial pictures illustrates the profitability of the company, i.e. net income over 
revenues. The figure throughout the analysis period is positive, although not very high. It is in 
the nature of trading-related businesses that the margins are not high, but the company is doing 
well if it consistently shows a positive return from your to year.   
5.4.2 Historical narrative
The following table, Table 5-11, is prepared as an illustrative snapshot of the firm and its 
prevailing environment in the early 1990s and early 2000s. The key attributes characterizing the 
firm and the market environment are presented in the following Tables, namely Table 5-11 and
Table 5-12. The next table, Table 5-12 illustrates the key characteristics of the competitive 
environment proceeding opening of the markets for competition.
Table 5-11 Characteristics of Centrica / British Gas in 1990s and 2000s.
British Gas / Centrica Early 1990s Early 2000s
Primary company British Gas Centrica
Power procurement, own 
generation, purchases
Vertically integrated national monopoly 
gas company. No power business
PPA:s, own generation, wholesale,  
balancing & RM at market
Customer base All gas customers in UK UK retail, wholesale, distribution, 
trading 
Coverage of business chain Vertically integrated national monopoly 
gas company
Gas production, generation, RM 
wholesale retail, distribution
Primary origin of growth Organic growth first, acquisitions later Expansion to competitive wholesale 
and retail markets acquisitions
Key risks in business model Availability of production assets and 
customer risk
Regulatory risk, customer risk, 
market risk 
Key strategic challenges To build the infrastructure, foresee the 
forthcoming regulatory changes
Find growth opportunities, 
management of multiple risks 
Diversification characteristics Monopoly national business chain Unbundled competitive business 
chain, functional SBU:s 
Chapter 5 – Cases
133
Table 5-12 Characteristics of Centrica / British Gas markets in 1990s and 2000s.
The events included in this study go back to late 1960s but primarily the key sequence began in 
the 1980s. However, to understand the present state of the UK gas industry, a short review of the 
history facilitates better understanding. For this study these events add to the scene in which later 
events take place. 
The origins of British Gas can be traced back to the Gas Light and Coke Company, which was 
set up in 1812 to supply London with gas manufactured by partially burning coal. Of the 
facilities operated by the original Gas Light and Coke the gas lamps around the Royal Palaces 
and Westminster are still in operation today, and they are still managed by British Gas.
In the early 1900s the gas market in the United Kingdom was mainly run by county councils and 
small private firms. By 1920 gas had become a major feature in British homes, through 
appliances designed for cooking, water heating and heating of living spaces. 
Up to 1948 the gas industry in Great Britain was still run in much the same way as it had been 
for over a hundred years. Gas was manufactured from coal, an indigenous fuel and was supplied 
by a series of private and municipally operated gas firms. The 1948 gas act changed this by 
creating a nationalized gas industry throughout England, Scotland and Wales (GA48). Clement 
Early 1990s Early 2000s
Key characteristics of market Closed monopoly markets Competitive generation 
wholesale and retail 
Competition in the market No Yes
Form of transactions Static conditions, wholesale and 
retail tariffs with regulatory 
review
Competitive pricing in 
wholesale and retail 
Degree of market integration High Semi - low
Relationship between actors Vertically integrated monopoly Competitive wholesale and 
retail, multiple players
Cause of imperfect competition Legal monopoly in gas and 
electricity
Competition, but number of 
players could be higher
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Attlee's Labour government thus nationalized the UK gas industry and the 1062 privately owned 
and municipal gas firms were merged into twelve Area Gas Boards, each a separate body with its 
own management structure. Each Area Board was divided into geographical groups or divisions 
which were often further divided into smaller districts. 
Surveys in the North Sea performed in 1960’s had indicated that there were large reserves of 
natural gas in the North Sea (NGDISC). Thus in 1966 the decision was taken to convert Britain 
to natural gas and a year later the first North Sea gas from the West Sole field was brought 
ashore at Easington terminal. During a ten-year national conversion program every appliance in 
the country was converted from town gas to run on natural gas (GASCONV). Visits were made 
to 13 millions homes and factories and 34 million individual appliances were converted. This 
national conversion program was completed by 1977.
The 1972 gas act paved the way for greater centralization, with the creation of the British Gas 
Corporation (GA72). Taking effect in 1973, the 12 old gas boards became regions, responsible 
for a particular geographical area. 
In 1982 the Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act (EGA82) gave the government the powers to dispose 
of British Gas' assets opening up the corporation's pipelines to third party suppliers (TPA82). On 
24 August 1986, some 38 years after it had been nationalized, it was decided to return the gas 
industry to private hands (PRIV86). On 8 December, 1986, £9 billion British Gas plc shares 
were floated on stock markets world-wide. As part of the policies of then Prime Minister 
Thatcher, the giant state-owned monopoly gas company was first privatized and effectively 
become a private monopoly in the residential market. The residential market was not open for 
competition and it was not perceived to be opened. At the same time, the legislation established 
the regulator, Ofgas (OFGAS), to regulate the industry and protect the interest of customers. 
Ofgas had two primary roles; one was to regulate the network part of British Gas so the company 
would not discriminate against competitors in the business market, the second was to control the 
regulated monopoly in the household market.
A part of the original transaction had been to introduce competition in the commercial business 
gas market, and British Gas was thus requested to reduce its market share (MKTSRED). This 
created an opportunity for newcomers to enter the commercial and industrial gas retail market. 
These newcomers consisted of different firms, regional electricity firms, upstream gas firms, and 
trading firms; just to mention a few (NEWCOMP).
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In 1992, industrial and commercial customers using between 2500 and 25000 therms of gas per 
annum were given the opportunity to choose the supplier freely. A range of alternative suppliers 
entered the market.
The same year, British Gas called for a wide-ranging Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC) inquiry to balance the needs of customers, shareholders, suppliers and employees. When 
the MMC published its report in 1993 (MMC93), its proposals were rejected, but the 
government decided instead to open domestic gas market to competition by 1996 
(DOMCOMP). In response to this proposal, British Gas carried out a major restructuring to 
prepare the UK business for the onset of competition. Five business units were formed.
The vertically integrated privatized gas monopoly company was demerged in 1997; the 
transmission activities were included under Transco and the British Gas’ gas sales, services, and 
retail businesses, together with the gas production business of the North and South Morecambe 
gas fields, were demerged into Centrica plc (BGRSTR97). British Gas was to change its name to 
BG plc. An Extraordinary General Meeting that approved the demerger was held in February 17, 
1997.
This demerger was a company-initiated decision and was not dictated by the government 
(DEMER). Basically, four causes could be identified for the demerger decision: due to the strict 
competition control exercised by the regulator, almost all benefits obtainable by working under 
one corporate control were already lost; the operational business culture for a network business 
and a sales business are substantially different; the development of share price of the integrated 
British Gas had been poor and in that light the demerger looked good; and finally the company 
had too much gas at too high a price so transferring the liabilities to one company would save the 
other.
As a result of this transaction, Centrica inherited a selection of businesses it would not 
necessarily have chosen. How the business portfolio was split between BG and Centrica could be 
regarded arbitrary, but Centrica had no influence on which businesses it would inherit.
In 1997, after the demerger, the main focus was on improving the financial performance of the 
company. The introduction of electricity sales was a key component because the electricity 
market had recently opened for competition (POWSAL97). Centrica decided to be the first 
mover and leverage its strong brand position combined with its trading and risk management 
capabilities. By May 1998, four months ahead of the first phase of domestic electricity 
competition in September 1998, British Gas had attracted over one million electricity customers 
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through an offer that, on an average, was 12 per cent below the prevailing price level. At the 
same time 120,000 had already signed contracts to buy electricity from British Gas 
(CUSTSWITCH).
In May 1999, Centrica acquired the British Automobile Association, AA. The reasons for this 
acquisition was to access an increased customer base through AA, and to have the ability to cross 
sell this way. Following the acquisition, Centrica had an expanded range of services, comprising 
three principal areas: home services and energy supply under the British Gas brand name, 
motoring services under the AA brand name, and insurance and financial services under the AA 
and Goldfish brands.
By July 1998, 4 per cent of customers switching gas supplier cited dual fuel (the capacity of the 
seller to sell both gas and electricity) as the main incentive. By October 2000 this figure had 
risen to 21 per cent. Awareness of competition was at 95 per cent and every month at least 300 
000 customers switched supplier. Domestic gas customers had seen their total bills reduce by 
around £1 billion a year while customers switching electricity supplier had seen their bills fall by 
nearly £300 million. 
In May 2001 Centrica acquired a 60 per cent share in Humber Power Limited which owned and 
operated a 1260 MW gas fuelled power plant in Stallingborough, North East Lincolnshire, 
providing Centrica with 750MW average power output (HUMACQ01). This was complemented 
in December by acquisition of Enron’s former energy customer business and certain of its assets 
(ENACQ01).
Centrica had thus reached a position of the market leader in the electricity retail market, while 
retaining its strong position in gas. The two products complement each other, as the systems 
required for administration purposes are often the same. 
Then intensity of actions of Centrica included in this research in the late 1990s, immediately 
after opening the market for competition, was at a modest level. More tangible actions had 
already begun in 1999 through acquisitions, and continued at an accelerating pace until 2002. In 
2003 acquisitions were reduced to gain momentum in 2004. Throughout the analyzed period all 
other activities have been relatively modest. Strategic announcements, nominations and 
divestments have had a role, but they have never overshadowed acquisitions.
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5.4.3 ESA of Centrica
The figure below, Figure 5.10 illustrates the events described above in a graphical form. The 
most striking feature is that at the beginning the interactive process takes place between the firm 
and legislative level. Before the establishment of the regulator in 1986 there was no energy 
regulator in its present sense. The role of the then prime minister, Thatcher, must be emphasized 
in this context as it was her government that set in motion the opening of the markets for 
competition. The original force that set the process in motion reflected the ideological concept
PM Thatcher shared with US president Reagan of replacing governmental orders by the markets 
as a device to ensure good performance. The economic advice from the Austrian Economists was 
thus well received. Likewise, the personal political goal of PM Thatcher to reduce the power of 
the unions probably played a role in this context.
After the establishment of the regulator that regulator obviously could assume his or her 
regulatory role in the interaction between the firm and its environment, and thus the focal point 
of activities shifted towards interaction between the firm and the regulator. The firm initiated two 
investigations at the MMC that ultimately resulted in opening the final non-competitive sub-
market, the residential market, for competition. 
The complete opening of the market for competition caused the focal point of the action to shift 
from that between firm and the regulator, to that between the firm and its business environment. 
When the market is not yet open, or the process is still pending, a firm’s activities could most 
benefit the firm if directed towards the regulator and thereby impacting the process and the 
anticipated outcomes of the process. As the overall framework for the firm to act had been set, 
the actions that could most benefit the firm could be directed to accommodating the firm to adapt 
to the changed environment, and addressing the competition.
The role of the interaction between the consumers and the firm is shown by customer switching. 
During the early phases of the process, Centrica was forced to reduce market share in various 
component markets, but each individual switching decision was obviously carried out by an 
individual customer. However, the interaction between the customers / voters and the 
government is not well documented. In the late 1990 Thatcher’s political support within the 
conservative party had declined to such an extent that it effectively encouraged her to resign 
from the post of PM. Possibly, this deterioration of support within the party reflected the 
deterioration of her support among the greater public.
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An impact arrow from the TPA legislation of 1982 to the transmission network access directive 
of EC in 1990 is included in the figure. The data available did not provide clear evidence of this 
link and thus it is marked with a dotted line. However, timing wise the introduction of the UK 
legislation could have provided the initiative for the EC directive, and the UK politicians could 
have provided influence to introduce the community directive. In any case the development of 
the UK market took place at an earlier stage compared to the rest of Europe. Thus the UK 
development could have been a model for rest of Europe.
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Figure 5-10 ESA of Centrica.
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5.4.4 Analysis of Centrica initiated actions vis-à-vis market opening
The actions discussed above are in the context legislator-regulator-firm customer. In the 
following the company actions are discussed in the market context; i.e. primarily between the 
firm and the market place. This context falls outside the context as discussed above and thus 
complements the analysis with a different perspective. The following figures illustrate the 
actions of the company vis-à-vis changes in the market place. The actions have been divided into 
eight categories. Subsequently the company-initiated actions have been used to calculate the
CTI.
Figure 5-11 Classified actions of Centrica 1997 – 2004.
The action portfolio of Centrica in the 1990’s was not dominated by any form of activity. Only 
in the early 2000s did the acquisition wave take off. This was simultaneously accompanied by 
strategy and organizational announcements. Thus, it was primarily acquisitions that changed 
Centrica.
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Figure 5-12 CTI and component indices Centrica 1998 – 2004.
Analysis of the CTI further illustrates the position of acquisitions with regard to the changing of 
Centrica. The overall change is relatively modest; the main contributor is acquisitions, 
complemented at the beginning by profitability increments. 
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6 ASSESSMENT OF THE DYNAMICS IN THE 
ENVIRONMENT AFTER MARKET OPENING
In this chapter I discuss the characteristics of the operating environment of the firm including an 
assessment of the characteristics of the interaction framework preceding the market opening.
This is intended to lay a foundation on which the subsequent changes are based as the markets 
are opened for competition. The discussion is organized so that it begins with a description of 
the interaction between the firm and the customer market. This is followed by a description of the 
interaction between the firm and the regulatory judicial environment. The interaction between 
the customer-voters and the political environment is covered in the discussion regarding the 
political intentions and characteristics of the process itself. The outcome of this process sets the 
scene from which the firms may take action. This leads to a discussion of the characteristics of 
the dynamics in the demand, the competitive and political regulatory environment, with a 
discussion on the subsequent impacts on the firm strategy and structure when markets are 
opened for competition.
6.1 THE FIRM / CUSTOMER MARKET INTERACTION PRECEDING 
MARKET OPENING
The prevailing business environment prior to the market opening was often a regulated 
monopoly. In this environment all the costs of conducting business were carried through to the 
consumer. The price of electricity for different consumer categories did not necessarily reflect 
the cost of supplying electricity to that particular consumer group, but the prices for different 
groups could include some degree of deliberate cross subsidies. The incentives to optimize the 
cost structure were small. The regulator controlled the prices / rates and thus the total level of 
service cost had to be approved ex ante by the regulator. Consequently all rate increases had to 
be approved by the regulator before they could be implemented. The regulatory traditions of the 
prevailing jurisdiction had an impact on how easily and fully the rate increases were confirmed 
by the regulator.
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This pattern, but with local characteristics, has been applied under all analyzed jurisdictions. The 
following statement from one of the interviews characterizes the decision environment at the 
regulated phase: “The fact that if you went in, and on a good cause basis, and decided to spend 
money to build a power plant, then you did not need that (power plant) and you recovered that 
(expense)”. The business risk was practically eliminated; all expenses could be recovered and 
there were very little or no incentives for the firm to be efficient. Only when the firm did not 
manage its business properly, and the quality of service was poor, could changes be induced 
from the outside.
As there was no competition in the retail of electricity, and practically nothing in the generation 
market, the business environment could be regarded as relatively stable and predictable. The 
absence of competition in the industry was often reflected in the attitude of firms towards each 
other in same market. There was a lot of co-operation, even in the field of marketing. There was 
co-operation between the firms in the development of common marketing campaigns, common 
marketing publications for the general public and co-operation in educating the customer in the 
economical use of electricity and gas. This friendliness between the firms prior to opening the 
markets for competition could possibly have constituted an inhibitor on the path towards 
competitive markets. The industry people that had been on friendly terms with each other, even 
sharing marketing-related data, were not tempted to start competing with each other. 
The overall size of the market, the geographical distribution of customers and distribution by 
segment, and the possible presence of major customers, all contributed to the overall 
attractiveness of the market. If it was the case that the market was more attractive, it would more 
easily attract competition after it was opened. Large customers were especially lucrative targets 
and thus promoted the introduction of competition. The other general aspects of the market that 
shaped the competitive landscape were the overall effectiveness of the structure and the degree 
of integration in the value chain. 
If the value chain prior to market opening was vertically integrated, i.e. there was one company 
that controlled the entire value chain from generation to retail, the formation of a wholesale 
market for sourcing and risk management purposes asked for cutting the value chain into pieces 
and establishment or facilitating evolution of independent actors vertically. In addition, in the 
retail part, unbundling distribution from retail needed to be carried out.  
Structure of supply, supply balance, interconnections and distance to other markets impacted the
ease by which actors from outside the market took a position in the market. In the case of an 
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island market, the generation and consumption would need to be in balance, without any 
opportunities to bring in power, capacity or backup from outside. 
Had there been in the pre-market opening environment, distortions in pricing principles or the 
actual price level in form of possible pricing flaws or hidden cross-subsidizations, these could 
have generated interest with new actors wishing to penetrate the market. In the UK, there was a 
substantial bubble in the pricing structure resulting in an excessive level of the price for the 
consumers. Centrica, a company with a history in the gas business, saw this opportunity and 
based on its risk taking ability, sold itself short in the market place providing the consumers with 
substantial savings compared to the prevailing price level; thereby they managed to subsequently 
reach the market leader position. Clearly, Centrica took an enormous risk, but the risk-taking 
rewarded the company as the overall market price level fell just as the company had predicted. 
The traditions of the market regarding the way it reacted to new entrants, and the way the 
cultural profile of the newcomer was perceived in the new market, was sometimes an issue. 
These irrational aspects, such as the way consumers saw non-traditional suppliers, could impact 
the ability of newcomers to solidify a position in the market. For example, Vattenfall stated that: 
“In Norway we worked for some time, but it never became a success so we decided to step out. 
Maybe the reason was that we were never accepted really in Norway”.
6.2 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE FIRM AND THE REGULATORY 
JUDICIAL ENVIRONMENT PRECEDING MARKET OPENING
In the United States the Constitution defines the division of powers between the states and the 
Federal Government leaving the Federal Government with very little authority over issues within 
an individual state. Thus, the market opening for competition within the states fell within the 
powers of the states, and the Federal Government could not accomplish a nationwide process, 
even if there was the will to do so. The only market in which the Federal Government had 
jurisdiction was that of interstate commerce, i.e. the trading of gas and electricity over state 
boundaries. In Europe, although the EU is a union between sovereign independent member 
states, EU legislation is binding on all member states, and they are obliged to include EU 
Directives into the national codex. This differing approach could be seen in the way the Energy 
directives for electricity and gas that all member states were obligated to follow was actually 
passed. Not all member states implemented the directive at a symmetrical pace in their national 
legislation, leading to dissimilarities between member states. 
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Another source of differences is the overall structure of the judicial system; i.e. the differences 
between countries that adopt common law and those countries that only have Written Law.
These differences resulted in dissimilarities regarding the ways that structural changes in the 
energy markets could be realized. In case a firm was active under several jurisdictions, it could 
use these differences for its own benefit, and place the production facilities and market presence 
under beneficial jurisdictions. One further source of differences related to jurisdiction was the 
enforcement powers of the authorities. In case the regulator lacked enforcement powers, or had 
to act through the courts, enforcement was much less efficient.
Centrica initially had a negative attitude towards the regulator and the regulator had a negative 
attitude towards the firm. The Nordic firms, Forum and Vattenfall had a pragmatic approach to 
the process of the introduction of competition, while the US utilities, in general, tried to steer the 
process to their benefit. 
If the attitude of the firm towards the regulator was important, even more important was that of 
the regulator towards the firm. This was reflected in how the regulator approached the firm and
what role the regulator considered to be fit for the firm. One extreme was that the regulator saw 
its role to be to set the general framework to regulate the entire business, and the other would be 
to see itself as only acting as a consumer advocate, with the intention of pressing to keep the 
prices down. The regulatory philosophy of permitting the price signals to go through from 
wholesale market to retail market and visa-versa enabling thus the actors to make investment 
decisions based on the correct price signals the regulator would have a more constructive role. 
These attitudes are illustrated in Figure 6-1. In this figure Ce stands for Centrica, Co for 
Constellation, F for Fortum, and V for Vattenfall.
Figure 6-1 Regulator attitudes vs. firm attitude in case firms.
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A factor related to the previous issue was the tradition or history as to the extent there could be 
discussions between firms and the regulator, and to the extent that these discussions were mutual 
or unilateral. The regulatory process in the UK reflected a unilateral approach, whereby the 
regulator formed the regulatory environment without too much discussion with the then British 
Gas. A cause for this could have been the fact that there was practically no experience of 
opening energy markets for competition, so the process had to be improvised. Whereas in the 
Nordic area, the process could be characterized as smooth and carried out through mutual 
discussion, and trying to understand and listen to the other parties’ position. In the US regulation 
had been present in the energy business for a long time, and lifting the regulatory barriers was a 
new feature.
In a market environment, where competition is introduced after long period of monopoly, the 
idea of adaptation to the forthcoming new situation will be painful for the firms, or at least they 
often perceive the new situation as painful. Bonardi (2004) studied the global and political 
strategies of deregulated industries, and found that former monopolies are often considered as 
perfect examples of firms using defensive political strategies to their advantage. In the firms with 
a long monopoly history, the governance structure and operational patterns have been developing 
as a result of the long monopolistic history, and they are easily tempted to pursue political 
strategies to shape the forthcoming actions of the regulator so that this could be stopped 
altogether, or the competitive future would be shaped in their favor. Sometimes these actions are 
justified, as the substantial structural changes in major corporations are not easily accomplished 
– unbundling, divestments, changes in operational structures, and reductions in workforce are 
often not easily realized, and long transitional periods could thus be justifiable.
However, the objectives of these political strategies are not always easily obtained. The regulator 
could pursue its own strategies that originate from a superior body, or the political agenda 
presented to the regulator. A coordinated co-evolutionary development path, however, will 
produce the best results, because the firm exists to provide a service for society, and thus the 
policies of regulators should not be conducted in contradiction with the interests of the firm.
6.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIRM PRIOR TO OPENING OF 
THE MARKETS FOR COMPETITION
The characteristics of the dominant firm in the market, such as positioning along the value chain, 
degree of market dominance, overall strategy, size, business diversity, characteristics of the 
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management, ownership structure and competitiveness, were different. These could all impact 
the readiness of the firm to face competition. Brand position and the overall reputation of the 
firm in the market impacted its readiness to face competition. The financial characteristics, i.e. 
profitability, financial leverage, liquidity and the strength of the balance sheet, could all have an 
impact. 
Prior to the market opening most firms lived protected life under the monopoly. The only risks 
they faced were related to operative and regulatory aspects – price did not pose a threat to the 
company. According to most informants interviewed, the attitude of firms towards risk was one 
of the most important factors the firm needed to change. During the monopoly period the firm 
had been able to recover all costs from the market, but after the market opening it was no longer 
achievable. Instead, the firm needed to always consider what cost level was acceptable, and what 
risk level was acceptable.
The firms could find it hard to adapt to new technical challenges or diversify to new markets 
(Malerba, Nelson, Orsiegno and Winter, 1999). The firms may stick to their history without 
recognizing the impact of the changes in the environment to their business base.  This could be 
especially valid for static business environments, like pre-deregulation electricity business. 
The pre-deregulation strategy of the firms was primarily determined by the business 
environment; whereby the firm was active and thus quite different between the various 
distinctive groups. For the US utilities, the origin of the firm was as a regional vertically 
integrated monopoly with generation, transmission, distribution and retail. Constellation Energy 
was originally the utility company in Baltimore (Baltimore Gas and Electric, BGE). Owing to 
the nature of the structure in the Nordic component markets, the origin of both Vattenfall and 
Fortum/IVO was in a national wholesale electricity provider, with a modest presence in the retail 
market and a substantial role in high voltage network operations. All firms were active under the 
non-competition umbrella; they did not have to face competition, and the business risk was 
transferred to the customers. The risk elements facing the firms were operative risk at the plants 
and regulatory risk. 
Due to structural causes, all firms were profitable and competitive in their own area and their 
size was determined by the characteristics of the market. Because prior to market opening all 
firms were active under a non-competitive environment, firm competitiveness after market 
opening depended on an array of characteristics; such how well the firm had managed to 
benchmark its cost structure against the industry and how well the management managed to 
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streamline the possible flaws in the operative structure. Business diversity was essentially 
determined by the characteristics of the business environment, and there was not too much room 
for diversification outside the core business. The position on the value chain was also determined 
by the environment, and there was not much room for maneuver. The US case firm was publicly 
owned while the stock of the Nordic and UK case firms was held by the state.
All the firms had a substantial customer base prior to market opening, either directly or via 
captive retailers. With the exception of Centrica, which was primarily a gas company, all firms 
were power companies prior to the market opening. However, Centrica had a substantial gas 
customer base that it could use to build up the electricity business. Centrica had a “home base”, 
with customers to whom it had been supplying gas over a long period prior to the deregulation.
All the firms had a strong balance sheet, which provided a solid financial standing in 
combination with the ability to transfer all risk to the customers and cover all investments 
without financial risk. The lending rate for a monopoly utility company would be low and 
obtaining funds for investments would be relatively easy due to the low risk of the business. For 
Vattenfall, prior to 1992 this was even easier due to the fact that it was incorporated only 1992. 
Prior to that time it was directly part of the organization of the Kingdom of Sweden. 
Sometimes the firm under a monopoly umbrella could be charged for obligations that such a firm 
would not have under normal business circumstances. These obligations can relate to a 
requirement to sell at a discounted price to a certain customer group, electrifying an area with 
low consumption, paying extra dividends for the owner, or otherwise being abused by the owner 
or the government. 
6.4 POLITICAL INTENTIONS SUPPORTING THE MARKET 
OPENING FOR COMPETITION
The original intention or vision of what was desirable or could be achievable through 
deregulation or introduction of competition in the electricity market varied greatly between 
markets. In the EU the vision to have common markets in Europe with free movement of goods, 
labor, capital, and services towards “promoting the harmonious development of economic
activities, continuous and balanced expansion, increased stability, a rapid rise in living 
standards and closer relations between its’ member states” had been pronounced clearly, 
originally in the Treaty of Rome, but repeated later in other documents. 
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In the United States the concept of competitive markets and free enterprise was often referred to 
as an essential building block of society. However, the grand scheme of wholly opening the 
electricity markets for competition was actually never defined as a Federal objective, even 
though the actions, especially by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, had been 
consistent towards this goal. The means available for the FERC were, however, limited, 
primarily due to the lack of jurisdiction of FERC over the state’s internal matters, and 
secondarily the lack of political determination at a Federal level. Within the states, it was the 
different Commissions that had full jurisdiction over these matters. As a consequence, the pace 
of market opening varied greatly and in California the process, although introduced with 
determination was subsequently halted, presumably until 2018. The process could be different 
between the states due to different causes, but the primary causes for the differences could be 
dissimilarities in political intentions pursued by the initiators of the process and political 
strategies pursued and the incumbent utility firms throughout the process.
In the US, gas business competition has been implemented for many years. Gas was often 
produced outside the state in which it was consumed and thus subject to FERC regulation. On 
the other hand, electricity the production and consumption took place in the same State, leaving 
the FERC without any jurisdiction over the regulation of the business.
In the case of California, the intention was clearly to have a competitive electricity market in the 
state. However, the mechanism set up to reach this goal was so flawed that it was almost bound 
to fail. Capping the retail rates and letting competition set the price in the wholesale market 
cannot be regarded as a balanced approach to an open the market. Sempra characterized the 
process as: “The philosophy behind all this was that the customer should pay what the true cost 
was. There should be some volatility in retail prices to change the demand. When they did it [the 
system] they never envisaged that the price would go above 6,5 ¢[/kWh]. They thought that for 
the utilities the customers would see the actual cost of energy, and it would never go above 6,5 
¢[/kWh]. The cap would give you the headroom and it would not be a factor in terms of actually 
controlling prices”. In real life the wholesale prices climbed well above the expected maximum 
of 6,5 ¢ and reached the level of 17 ¢ / kWh. So, because retailers were permitted to sell power at 
6,5 ¢ to their customers and they had to purchase the power from the wholesale market for 17 ¢, 
it was clear that nobody could continue on that path for long. As a result, one of the three utilities 
went bankrupt and the State of California rescued the utilities by starting to purchase power for 
them. At the same time, market opening was cancelled with a few exemptions, and the prevailing 
situation will possibly continue until 2018.
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The emerging of the PJM market into the present state was an example of a process not directly 
steered by political decisions. Some utility firms in the PJM area had, in the 1920s, already made 
the decision to connect their networks to gain backup generation and security of supply. Later, 
the operational cost optimization made available by common dispatching in the PJM area had 
become more important. The states made separate decisions to open their respective markets for 
competition, but the mere emergence of PJM as a market place and an ISO was not a result of 
these decisions. Rather, it was a market that had grown from the need to obtain backup 
generation capacity into a comprehensive power trading market with sophisticated hedging 
features. Phil Harris, the president and CEO of PJM at the time stated, that PJM tried to create 
solutions that would benefit everyone and promote the interests of the whole industry. In the case 
of PJM the initiative to form a competitive wholesale market emerged from within the industry, 
while the political incentives and guidance were limited. Furthermore PJM was used by the 
FERC as a good example that could be copied by other markets. PJM membership was voluntary 
and the participating utilities gave up their sovereignty to obtain the economic benefits 
achievable through coordinated central dispatching.
In the Nordic market, the introduction of competition started in Norway and later spread to the 
neighboring countries. The fundamental concept behind market opening was the political 
determination to promote the interests of the consumer and increase the efficiency of the 
industry. Later the EU directive repeated this need to open the market for competition, but the 
Nordic area had been well ahead of the overall European schedule. Although not every company 
was confident of the importance of opening the market for competition, it was generally carried 
out with good common understanding. In each of the component markets in the Nordic Area, the 
incumbent firms pursued political strategies at the time of the introduction of competition. In the 
Nordic and UK markets the role of Enron as a promoter of competitive wholesale market must 
be emphasized. In the US, the role of Enron cannot also be ignored. They were active at the 
Federal and state level wherever the competition in the energy market was deemed achievable. 
In the UK, the market opening, beginning with the opening of the gas markets was the result of 
an ideological drive of Prime Minister Thatcher. Her intention was to privatize the industry and 
at the same time make the markets competitive. One could even state that the campaign of Mrs. 
Thatcher was a political crusade against forces in society; including the unions whom she 
regarded as counterproductive. 
The matrix forming the array of political motivations behind the deregulation varied from case to 
case and was almost always different. However, the outcome of the process was not always what 
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was intended, and by subsequent corrective actions set in movement and fuelled a co-
evolutionary process between the firm and the environment. Not all of the political intentions 
were always pronounced, but they could contain aspirations by the political initiators and the 
incumbent firms that were not documented. 
6.5 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MARKET OPENING PROCESS
The characteristics of the market opening process consists of two areas: Background / motivation 
and the Process itself. The background factors include the initial spark to begin the process, a 
pronounced and silent political agenda including its clarity, the role of regulator to regulate or to 
press price, and finally resourcing of the regulator to prepare and implement regulation in the 
then regulated part of the business. 
In the process itself there are several factors that can have an impact on the outcome. These 
could be the characteristics of interaction between the parties during the process, the breadth of 
the process (which firms are included), and how broadly the market is influenced. Further 
characteristics that may influence the outcome are, what steps are included and the actual steps 
(unbundling, ISO, forming of forward markets etc), how the process is managed, how the trend 
is maintained (orientation and goal of transition, and is reiteration permitted), treatment of 
stranded assets and liabilities, and the possible distortions in rent distribution. The smoothness of 
transition, requirements relating to corporate governance, favorability of legislation impacting 
the process, and ultimately the schedule of implementation, can all impact the outcome. In 
addition, the balance between wholesale and retail plays a role in the process. On top of all this, 
the authority of the regulator and the ability of that regulator to enforce decisions will have an 
impact on how the process succeeds.  
The traditions relating to the way society operates differ substantially between societies and 
markets, and are reflected in how the market opening process is handled. It is relatively clear that 
all parties could benefit from the process of market opening if it is carried out in co-operation.
The UK and California cases represent a process whereby the political intentions in forming the 
regulatory process and overall rules, and the reactions of firms towards it, created an 
environment that could even be called “hostile”. In the case of Centrica, the regulator was 
created at the same time as legislation to privatize the former British Gas was passed in 1986. 
Not earlier than in 1993-1994 did the new chairman recreate a positive attitude within the 
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company towards the regulator, and fully accepted competition to be a fact of life: “The 
competition is here to stay and we just have to learn to live with it and if we are not going to live 
with it we will not survive. You have to take competition as a fact of life and learn to be much 
more efficient and dynamic”.
The CEO54 of Exelon stated during interview: “Initially competition got shifted the balance 
towards the customers. Most utilities were able to work out transition arrangements that kept 
those shifts from being destructive to shareholders”. 
Regarding the California process, the COO55 of Sempra stated: “The creator of the crisis was the 
disconnect between the two (wholesale and retail market)”. “It was totally a flawed design; you 
cannot have deregulation and have capped retail rates that are supposed to change your demand 
side equation and have uncapped wholesale rates so there is no demand response at all as there 
are no price signals given to the customers”. “The utilities had requested the approval to be able 
to enter into long-term contracts or to hedge their portfolio so that if you have a 6,5 c rate cap to 
hedge so that you knew that the wholesale cost would be capped at 6,5 c or less. The 
Commission had not authorized the utilities to do either of those things. The commission 
required that the utilities could only buy at the power exchange on an open competitive 
wholesale market and could not hedge and could not enter into long-term contracts”. “The 
philosophy behind all this was that the customer should pay what the true cost was. There should 
be some volatility in retail prices to change the demand. When they did it [the system] they never 
envisaged that the price would go above 6,5 c. They thought that for the utilities the customers 
would see the actual cost of energy, and it would never go above 6,5 c. The cap would give you 
the headroom and it would not be a factor in terms of actually controlling prices”.
Strategy VP of Constellation stated:  “but I think the market risk everybody underestimated was 
that once then plants were no longer protected by regulation it became pretty much a commodity 
business like so many other businesses that handle commodity”. “In the past you go back, say 25 
years, the meeting with the regulators was more a formal presentation and discussion and you 
would give some philosophical statements and say directly here’s where the company is going. 
Now you are in every state saying here is our suggestion how you change this market and there 
are people on the other side who are against this idea so it is polarized in different positions. 
That is what we see more today and the ability to effectively manage this state by state 
54 CEO = Chief Executive Officer
55 COO = Chief Operating Officer
Chapter 6 – Assessment Of The Dynamics In The Environment After Market Opening
153
regulatory compact [and] thus to change and create markets does create us the ability to make 
money”. 
Exelon’s statement: “They kick you like a football”, perhaps characterizes the frustration 
sometimes felt by the utility firms at the time of the regulatory process.
The statements described above could be plotted in a matrix in which the dimensions are home 
market / new market and actions initiated by company internally / externally. Plotting the actions 
accordingly yields Figure 6-2 below.
Figure 6-2 Internal and external initiated actions of the company prior to market opening.
In the environment of a traditional utility company, characterized by a generally predictable 
development, low level of competition and regulatory control but satisfactory level of earnings 
for the incumbent, the initiator for changes can be either the company or the regulatory 
environment. The actions were related to the home market where the company was active. 
Technical change, or any other externally initiated force would introduce the change element, but 
the company would be able to channel the efforts to its own benefit.
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6.6 CHANGES IN DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS
Here, the primary focus is on electricity retail and thus the characteristics of the wholesale 
market are omitted. Of all the analyzed markets the wholesale markets had been open for the 
longest time, and had the most customers and thus had already utilized the opportunities that the 
open markets provided. 
For the case firms in this research the introduction of competition did not have an immediate 
impact on demand. One could expect the price elasticity of demand to be negative and thus any 
decrease in price should result in an increase in demand. However, in electricity the decline in 
the electricity price did not cause an immediate reaction in the market. Electricity could replace
other primary energy sources for the medium to long-term, but immediate reactions were often 
not substantial.
The increase in demand could be seen as a result of the actions the firms took in trying to enter 
new geographical and product markets, and not so much in customers demanding more 
electricity because of its lower price.
In Norway and Sweden the residential retail customers were more likely to change supplier than 
in Finland. A possible cause for this was that the average demand per customer was higher in 
Norway and Sweden than in Finland, due to higher share of electricity for heating living spaces. 
Higher consumption levels seem to be positively correlated with incentives to switch supplier. 
This could be stated as well so that higher quantity demanded would yield more savings 
incentives for switching the supplier.
One change in the demand characteristics was the increase in the multiplicity of contract 
offering. Various fixed price contracts, hourly variable prices and green power contracts began to
emerge in the market place. This was, however, primarily caused by product development by the 
retailers, and not so much based on the demand by the consumers. 
6.7 CHANGES IN COMPETITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
Centrica experienced market deregulation two times. The company was originally the incumbent 
monopoly gas company that was subject to the introduction of competition in its market and the 
obligation to reduce market share in those markets. The second time Centrica went through the 
introduction of competition the company was making inroads into a new market and product 
area.
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Originally, in UK the introduction of competition and the establishment of a regulator were 
carried out at the same time in 1986. The regulator came with two primary roles. One related to 
the business market;56 to regulate the network part of Centrica so it did not discriminate against 
competitors. The second was to control the regulated monopoly in the household market. It 
should be pointed out that in 1986 only the commercial and industrial (C&I) markets were 
opened for competition, while the residential market was to remain a monopoly supplied by 
Centrica. 
The market share development in the UK gas market after opening the market for competition, 
and the overall development in the market is described by Partanen (1998). By 1997 Centrica’s 
market share had fallen in the competitive sectors so that among large industrial consumers the 
Centrica market share had fallen to 15 per cent and in interruptible gas market to 11 per cent. 
The overall market share of the firm had declined from 100 per cent to about 50 per cent as a 
proportion of the total market, including industry, domestic, commercial, and power production, 
and the so called others.
After deregulation of the retail gas market in 1986 the upstream gas producers, traders, and 
marketing firms started selling gas to Centrica’s customer base. Likewise, the electricity firms 
began cross-selling gas to their customer base. The idea to begin cross-selling electricity was 
really not very far fetched. A main structural difference between electricity firms selling gas and 
Centrica selling electricity was that Centrica was a company with a national brand, while the 
regional electricity firms only had brand recognition in their own marketing areas. The electricity 
firms’ gas selling activities had taught customers the concept of buying several energy products 
from a single seller, so Centrica’s entry to the electricity market in 1998 was not perceived as 
anything extraordinary.
A feature that made Centrica’s entry into the electricity market interesting was the fact that the 
firm did not possess any generation assets. Nor did it have sufficient volume of power supply 
contracts to backup its sales efforts. It was practically selling itself “short”, thus taking a sizeable 
risk by offering a 12 per cent discount to residential customers, compared to the prices of the 
incumbents.
This discount resulted in a very rapid growth in number of electricity sales contracts. The reason 
why Centrica took this chance was the belief that the prevailing price level on the electricity 
56 Commercial and Industrial market, often referred to as the C&I market
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wholesale market was inflated, and it would not be sustainable for long. Had this view of the 
market prices been false, Centrica would have had to bear the financial consequences. 
About 8 years after market opening, Centrica had become the market leader in retail electricity 
with 6 million customers. To cover its power needs the company acquired generation assets and 
secured the sourcing position by PPA:s (Power Purchase Agreements). 
At the opening of both the UK gas and electricity retail market for competition, the key areas to 
providing competitiveness were the large customer base, combined with the ability to perform 
the administrative tasks of customer management efficiently; this was a key asset in entering a 
new product market. National brand position helped Centrica to obtain a role in the electricity 
business and finally the distortions in market price discovery mechanism combined with the risk 
taking ability prepared the way for success.
In 1995, at the time preceding the opening of the Swedish market for competition a Swedish 
consulting community, NUTEK prepared a study on the expected impact of opening the Swedish 
market. The company used examples from UK, Chile, Norway and Argentina. The study 
suggested that the expected outcome of market opening would be, first an increase in the number 
of competitive suppliers, followed then by a decrease a few years later. Secondly, they expected 
the margins associated with the retail to be reduced, leading to consolidation of the market. 
Subsequently the firms would segment the market more carefully, and concentrate on the 
activities they do best.
The image painted by NUTEK appears to have been quite accurate. At the time of market 
opening, many firms started to expand their marketing organizations believing that the marketing 
of power to customers would become the key issue in competitive markets. The firms did not 
realize that by splitting the overall electricity price to two components, the commodity price and 
the transmission/distribution component, meant that each part should carry its cost and show 
profit. As, by definition, the commodity element becomes competitive, the associated margins 
quickly melted away. Thus one key learning point for Vattenfall, and for many other firms, was 
that it is not the marketing of power that will provide highest margins.  
The margins in distribution were regulated and not very high. Fundamentally, key margins could 
be earned at generation combined with the entire value chain through continuous cost 
optimization and attention to risk management.
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The characteristics of the retail electricity commodity market began to resemble banking, 
whereby only the interest differentiated the banks. Correctly timing the purchase decision could, 
however impact significantly the overall cost.
Immediately after market opening in Sweden there were alternative suppliers. Statoil marketed 
power at their gas stations, and different unions tried to sell electricity to their members. Statoil 
had a substantial customer base, but obviously the organizational structure was not well suited 
for this particular business. The systems used at customer administration were not especially 
well supportive to the activity. Statoil were not effective enough and had to withdraw from the 
market, selling their entire customer base.
6.8 CHANGES IN POLITICAL OR REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The interaction between Constellation and its environment can be characterized by the company 
having a long experience in working under regulation. The company and the commission 
fundamentally knew how the regulated business functioned and despite changes in the details the 
fundamental undercurrent remained the same.  Although the wholesale market had already seen 
competition for some time, most of the retail customers were not aware of the opportunities. The 
US special two-tier regulatory structure obviously had a limiting impact on how the company 
could operate and how it could be organized. Operationally it eliminated the opportunity to 
create certain cross-functional activities within the company. 
Immediately after opening the gas market for competition Centrica behaved as if nothing had 
changed and found it difficult to recognize the authority of the regulator over its activities. As 
such, the situation was new for both Centrica and the regulator, and much of the confusion could 
have originated from this fact. As a result of this the company was taken to the competition 
authority several times. However, only as at early as the 1990s did a new chairman come from 
outside the industry and make the company change its attitude towards the regulator. His 
message was that competition is here to stay and Centrica just have to learn to live with it or it 
will not survive. Centrica had to “take competition as a fact of life and learn to be much more 
efficient and dynamic”. 
The key process in the market was the unbundling of the former British Gas into Centrica and 
Transco in 1997. This process was a deliberate decision to demerge, and was based on business 
logic. 
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In the Nordic area the regulatory logic seems to be consistent. The opening of the markets for 
competition was a straightforward process and was followed by a political environment that 
supported the new competitive business pattern. In all Nordic countries the politicians 
acknowledged that competition would be beneficial for society as a whole and thus did not 
object with the concept of creating a common Nordic wholesale market place.
6.9 FIRM STRATEGY AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES
In the common Nordic market the unification of the wholesale market released much reserve 
capacity because every country did not need to arrange their own reserve capacity with regard to 
generation, but they could be pooled together. This pooling had indirectly caused an increase in 
generation capacity because the overall generation resources could be used more effectively. 
Owing to pooling of generation resources and market-based price discovery, the price of 
electricity better reflected its real value. 
Prior to opening the markets for competition the incumbents were often generators, wholesalers 
and transmission grid operators. The immediate reaction by the incumbents after the retail 
market opening was to solidify the position in the retail markets. Most firms pursued this by 
implementing a wave of acquisitions. By these acquisitions the firms obviously intended to 
obtain a more balanced position between the upstream and downstream markets. Apparently, 
there was a common belief among the incumbents that the retail function would capture a major 
part of the value added along the value chain. However, the firms’ views on where along the 
value chain the margin could be made shifted over time to reflect more closely the invested 
capital and risks that exist along this value chain. Obviously, the convergence of the regulatory 
framework unified the industry’s view of the value added distribution. Thus as the NUTEK study 
proposed, the various companies active in retail after market opening seemed to follow a similar 
strategy. 
Fortum’s acquisitions in Sweden and Vattenfall’s acquisitions in Finland after the opening the 
markets subsequently become key components of the firms. However, many of the acquisitions 
by firms from outside the Nordic area have been further sold to new owners. Clearly, these 
investments could be regarded as strategic temporary investments by the acquirers because 
realizing the economies of scale becomes harder with increases in geographical distance.
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However, this acquisition wave has, since the early beginning, become much quieter. There are 
no longer interested sellers, and the incumbents cannot continue their wave of acquisitions 
without hitting the market share cap. After initial euphoria major newcomers have not shown 
interest in obtaining a position in the Nordic market. The introduction of hourly metering 
capability could potentially impact this further.
There are issues impacting the producer’s freedom to choose their strategies. The Kyoto 
restrictions, for example, will have an impact on different actors’ ability to take action. How the 
emission reductions will be allocated to firms in the future is still an open question. 
The development of Fortum cannot be analyzed without taking into consideration the merger-
demerger process that took place parallel to the opening of the markets for competition, and the 
company’s interaction with the markets and the regulator. Clearly the focal point shifts away 
from being between the legislator. This is different from the other cases because in those other
cases the focal point shifted to interaction between the firm and the customer.  
The company did not have prior experience of being a regulated energy company although 
pricing decisions had to be approved ex ante. Demerging the wires business from the generation 
and sales business and finding the new business logic in the demerged company took some time. 
In addition, the regulator was a new function and creating the operational procedures between 
the regulator and the firm took some time and effort from both the regulator and the firm.  A 
chapter that still needs to be written in the synopsis is the increased activity of the customers in 
requiring more from the suppliers.
In the case of Constellation / BGE, the company had captured two identities, the regulated BGE 
and the non-regulated Constellation. The firms belonged to the same corporation, but had quite 
distinct profiles. This was a result of a two-tier regulatory framework. The fact that the 
generation assets were transferred to Constellation and the characteristics of the local network 
provided locational cost benefits remained a source of competitiveness. On the financial side 
both firms issued their own debt, while it was only Constellation that issued equity. 
Operationally, the firms could not have much in common. However, the fact that the BGE 
generation assets were transferred to Constellation and the configuration of the BGE 
transmission network was such that a vast majority of the power generated within the BGE load 
pocket was generated by Constellation, thus enjoying the higher locational marginal price within 
that load pocket.
Chapter 6 – Assessment Of The Dynamics In The Environment After Market Opening
160
The BGE business remained active in Baltimore under the jurisdiction of the MD Commission, 
while all non-regulated activities were gathered under the Constellation umbrella. The 
generation-asset-stripped-actions of BGE were arranged in a fashion quite similar to the one 
proceeding market opening. As Constellation was active in the non-regulated markets and 
businesses, most of the actions were company-initiated. However, Constellation had to react to 
actions taken by the FERC and SEC. 
This pattern applied to all the US utilities, because the restrictions regarding communication 
between the regulated and non-regulated arms of the corporate were quite strict. Operationally 
there cannot be much communication, but naturally finance, risk management systems and IT-
related benefits could be achieved. However, operationally firms needed to act separately.
The United States is the largest national economy in the world with over 300 million inhabitants 
and a high GDP. The mere size of the home market clearly opened substantial opportunities for 
the company to grow, and the company was not bound by nation state boundaries. Expanding 
into a neighboring state was not as substantial a barrier as expanding into a neighboring nation 
state where perhaps culture, business traditions, habits, language, and operative customs are 
different. 
Constellation started by a wave of nominations, complemented initially by investments and later 
replaced by acquisitions. This clearly reflected the policies of the new CEO and his ideas of 
managing the business. The focal point of regulatory interaction was shifted from being between 
the regulator/legislator and the firm to being between the firm and the customer. The interaction 
between the regulator and the legislator and between the customer / voters and the legislators 
remained relatively constant.
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7 TOWARDS A THEORY OF CO-EVOLUTIONARY 
INTERACTION AT MARKET OPENING
This chapter develops a theory based on the data collected and processed during this research. 
The chapter is organized so that the presentation of results of the research is carried out by key 
research question. At the start of the chapter the results regarding the key question related to the
changes in the competitive dynamics at the time of market opening are discussed. Similarly, the 
findings and research practicalities based on the research material are discussed which is then 
followed by the Propositions. Presenting the results related to key research question regarding 
the co-evolution between the firm and its environment and the interaction between the firm and 
the environment at market opening follow a similar format. A discussion regarding the 
justification of the selected methods and the findings based on the research can be found in the 
Discussion, Chapter 8. 
7.1 PROPOSITIONS REGARDING CHANGES IN COMPETITIVE AND 
MARKET DYNAMICS
For the purposes of this research I defined the firm in sub-chapter 2.2 as a goal-oriented 
(Aldrich, 1979) boundary maintaining (Aldrich, 1979; Williamson, 1996) governance structure 
(Williamson, 1996) that makes use of the productive resources for the purpose of supplying 
products and services (Penrose, 1959). The ability of a firm to conduct business successfully 
after the market opening process depends on an array of different factors: First, the accumulated 
history of the firm itself, (Chandler, 1962; Quinn, 1985; Aldrich, 1979), second, the market and 
the regulatory environment prior to the market opening together form the general scene on which 
the process may take place (Schumpeter, 1964; Williamson, 1975; Aldrich, 1979; Coase, 1988; 
Kahn, 1988; Kirzner, 1992; Foss and Christensen, 2001), and finally the ability of the firm to 
take action and implement the plans (Chandler, 1962; Aldrich, 1979; Andrews, 1980; Quinn, 
1985; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985).
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I first focus on the process of market opening itself, the motivation and characteristics of the 
process and its fundamental impact on the way it changes the environment in which the firm can 
take action (Murman, 2003; Lewin, A. Y. and C. P. Long, 1999). In the opening of the market 
for competition the publicly pronounced and silent political intentions and aspirations related to 
market opening combined with the characteristics of the pre-market-opening state of the firm. 
The market and regulatory framework, combined with the process of market opening 
fundamentally form a cluster that impact the ability of firms to take actions in pursuit of success 
after the market opening, and can push the firm into a certain direction. The political aspirations, 
characteristics of the market, the firm and the regulatory environment all interact with each other 
as described in the initial interaction cycle illustrated in detail in chapter 2.
The state of the markets, the firm, and regulatory framework prior to opening the markets for 
competition have often evolved over a long period of time. This result of historical 
developments, including its functional characteristics, is known to the industry, to all participants 
and to the regulator. When the market opening takes place, the characteristics of the process 
itself are added to the cluster of factors shaping the optional outcome matrix available to the 
firms (Murman, 2003; Lewin, A. Y. and C. P. Long, 1999). The emerging process does not 
necessarily follow the intended development paths, but any events occurring during the 
implementation can and will impact the process and its optional outcome matrix.
In a regulated market the key activities take place between the firm, the regulator and the 
legislator. The firm maintains its profitability by initiating rate cases, or submits applications to 
the regulator regarding adjustment of the rates. In the case of major a natural catastrophes the 
firm will initiate a process to cover the costs from its customer base. After opening the market 
for competition the firms active in the market will need to react to signals from the market. If the 
regulatory framework remains relatively stable firms can devote their energy to addressing the 
competitiveness of their offering in the market place. The customer has no opportunity to impact 
the firm directly, but has to act through the legislative and regulatory interaction channels. The 
customer is obligated to purchase energy from the monopoly supplier, while as long as the 
monopoly supplier acts according to the framework set by the legislator and the regulatory 
authority that supplier cannot lose market share.
In the regulated environment the level of operational risk for the firm is very low, because rate 
payers will eventually carry all risk and the retail pricing covers all the costs of procurement. In 
the regulated environment the firms typically covered all the expenses through the regulated 
rates and changes in the expense base were handled through rate cases. In conjunction with the 
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introduction of competition, the firm became exposed to risk, which consisted of several 
elements such as the product price, factor cost, market volume, plant operability, interest, and 
regulatory risk. It became essential for the firm to understand the emergence of these risks and 
how the firm could manage these risks. Additionally, these risks change over time and thus the 
firms need to constantly modify their view of the environment. In a deregulated environment, 
provided the deregulation is carried out in such a way that the retail and distribution functions 
are unbundled, the regulator regulates the distribution function, but retail is competitive. The 
margins in the retail business were often low, in the distribution business the risk level was low 
and the risks associated with the generation business could often be covered through the 
financial markets.  
Prior to market opening, there could be artificial constructs the incumbents wish to sustain in the 
time following market opening that do not acknowledge the possible distortions in the market 
place. These artificial constructs could be rigid supply contract structures or contractual terms, 
high pricing or an otherwise distorted pricing model, harsh termination clauses, or take-or-pay 
commitments. These could reflect a) the high cost of production fleet or contractual sourcing 
pattern optimized for the situation prevailing prior to the deregulation (stranded cost), b) overall 
inefficiencies in the system, c) any other possibly long forgotten construct derived from how 
business has been conducted up to the market opening. If extended from the time preceding the 
market opening, these artificial constructs could distort the overall competitiveness of the 
business and open up new opportunities for newcomers to exploit the situation. The incumbents 
are often the conservators that have shareholders interest to safeguard in the new business 
environment. The new entrants’ role in this play would be to act like predators, aiming to attack 
the incumbents and at dismantling such artificial constructs.
In the UK electricity market, the pricing structure and level represented an opportunity for 
somebody to break the rules of the game and shake the market.  This happened as Centrica 
started selling power to customers with a substantial discount compared to the prevailing retail 
price level of incumbents. If the prevailing price level would have been justifiable, this move 
could not have been possible. However, as Centrica had such a strong belief in the price 
reducing, and it could source power from the market to support its sales contracts, it aggressively 
used this position. In the UK it had already been possible for some years to purchase gas from an 
electricity company, so buying electricity from a gas company did not represent an obstacle. In 
addition Centrica was a nationwide brand, which was not the case with the regional electricity 
firms. 
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After the opening of market for competition firms could no longer directly cover all the changes 
in expenses through rate cases. They needed to be able to assess the risks associated with the 
commodity procurement, and ways to protect themselves against exposure. Symmetrical risk 
management on the factor and product market became the key to covering the costs. This could 
be especially difficult for the incumbents that had a long established way of operating. These 
firms could find it hard to realize that the electricity business after competition is different from 
the old model.
Before opening the markets for competition the key action took place between the firm and its 
regulatory environment. Whether this was the regulator or the legislator, the customer had a 
minor role in the picture. The customer’s only channel to influence the firm was through the 
legislator and this channel was a long one and the outcome through the democratic process for 
the customer was highly uncertain. The action options available to the customer were contacting 
legislators or regulators either directly or as a pressure group. Forming a pressure group, 
however, would require that there are sufficient customers that share the same discontent 
regarding a company’s actions and that they are prepared to start action on the issue vis-à-vis the 
legislators. 
The firm concentrated key activities towards the regulator because this was the way to impact 
profitability and gain success. However, opening the markets for competition opens 
opportunities to customers to impact directly the firm by utilizing their new opportunity to 
switch supplier. Subsequently the firm needs to become concerned about their reputation among 
customers or face a decline in market share and profitability as was seen especially by Fortum 
and Vattenfall. 
Referring to the Assumptions 1a, 1b and 4, Research Question 1 and the discussion above, the 
following Propositions and their relation to the key empiria are presented in Figure 7-1.
Proposition 1a
 During the process of opening the retail electricity market for competition, the focal interaction 
point of the process shifts from between the legislator / regulator and the firm to between the 
firm and the customers / markets
Chapter 7 – Towards a theory of co-evolutionary interaction at market opening
165
Proposition 1b
Subsequent to opening the retail electricity market for competition and the shift in the focal 
interaction point of the process to between the firm and the customers / markets, the degree of 
detail in regulation will increase
Proposition 1c
In the mutual cyclical complex evolutionary interaction process that ties energy firms, 
customers, legislators and regulators to each other, each participant has a dual role both as a 
subject and as an object (i.e. an individual as consumer and voter) acting in interaction with 
each other. Influencing voters through supporting candidates with firm friendly agenda before 
elections counts as an example of such impact across the cycle.
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Figure 7-1 The relationship between the Assumptions 1a and 1b, the empiria and the 
Propositions 1a, 1b, and 1c.
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Following the pattern identified by Stiroh and Strahan (2003) and Smith and Grimm (1987), both 
in the US market and in the Nordic market, large firms have been actively strengthening their 
position by acquiring generation assets, customer bases and distribution networks in order to 
solidify their position and presence in more than one component market. Thus, they intended to 
be able to benefit from the economies of scale in operative, administrative, and marketing 
activities, and enhance their more-than-local character. These firms were very concerned about 
the competitiveness of their product offering and wanted to be able to attract big and small 
customers over the entire functional area with their product package. In the US the major firms 
actively strengthened their generation base in order to gain competitiveness in this way. 
In all of the analyzed markets the likelihood that the customers would change supplier was 
directly correlated with the level of usage. Obviously, for the large consumers of electricity, the 
relative importance of search and switching cost (Damsgaard 2003) would be lower and 
subsequently the absolute cost cutting potential higher. The reverse was that in most markets 
residential customers were least tempted to use the opportunities offered by the competitive 
markets. Even when customers had the opportunity to switch supplier, many of them seem to be 
lazy, uninterested or unaware of the opportunities the open market would provide. The larger 
customers with subsequently larger savings potential were more tempted to switch suppliers. 
In general the market opening introduced dynamism into the characteristics of the competence 
matrix of the firm required to sustain in the new market. In the cases analyzed the firms needed 
to install a risk management function and as well otherwise modify the company internally to 
cope with the changed environmental challenges.
There are a large number of small firms both in the US and Nordic market that have a very local 
character. In the US there are the co-operatives, a group of distribution enterprises established in 
the 1930s and still occupying the same geographical distribution area.  In the Nordic market 
there are a large number of small distribution and retail firms with a distinctly local character 
that supply electricity to the local community. These firms represent the small end of the 
spectrum; firms relying primarily on the local distribution business as a cash flow contributor 
and procuring electricity only to a local clientele. If it is the case that the regulator does not set 
demands for continuous efficiency improvements that these small firms could probably not meet, 
and as long the local community remains faithful to the local retailer, there are no obvious threats 
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to the existence of such firms. In the distribution part of the business it will be possible to run the 
operation of the network with minimum personnel and thus there will not be strong pressure 
towards consolidation.
Although the largest energy consumers are likely to use the opportunity to switch supplier, in 
some cases purchasing the electricity from the local supplier seems to defy the logic of economic 
man. Although low voltage customers have to buy the distribution service from the local 
regulated monopoly service provider, the customer would not always be obligated to purchase 
the energy commodity from the same supplier. However, some customers, rather than setting the 
price as their first priority, seem to appreciate the locality of the supplier and they buy the 
product from a local supplier, even at a higher price. The process leading to purchase decision 
could thus be complemented by a new variable reflecting the perceived added value through the 
locality of the supplier. 
Between the large power firms active in many component markets and the small local 
distributors there seems to be a gap. Medium size firms tend to be taking over targets for the 
largest firms, while the smallest firms only have a limited customer base and thus may appear 
uninteresting to the largest firms. The medium sized firms would typically have a limited 
customer base outside the primary distribution area that they supply with exchange procured 
electricity and risk management. Such customer bases could become interesting as an acquisition 
target by a major, or they could simply take the customers by means of price and supply terms.
7.2 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE FIRM AND THE ENVIRONMENT
7.2.1 Market opening for competition as a contributor to co-evolution
In chapter 2, Figure 2-2 introduced a cyclical model of regulatory impact. In this cyclical form, 
four distinctive component interactions markets were identified that, in concert, constitute this 
model. These interactions were discussed in detail in chapter 2 and this discussion included the 
following elements and mechanisms: 
1) Interaction between the Legislator and the Regulator,
2) Interaction between the Regulator and the Firm,
3) Interaction between the Firm and the Customer, and
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4) Interaction between the Customer and the Legislator.
However, the findings of this study show that this model is not capable of fully capturing the 
elements of the rich interaction between the firm and its immediate environment at the time of 
opening the retail market for competition. Nor is it capable of fully explaining the various 
characteristics of the mutual interaction taking place in the four elements of interaction as 
discussed above. Thus it is necessary to complement the model by increasing its complexity by 
adding secondary, and tertiary impacts and the external initiated interaction to the model. 
7.2.2 Complementing the Cyclical model with a secondary interaction
The findings of this study suggest that the model presented in chapter 2 needs to be 
complemented by the feedback interaction cycle, spinning counterclockwise. This level of 
interaction is called the secondary impact interaction and it complements the model by 
addressing the feedback mechanisms in the model.
The concept of co-evolution (Murmann, 2003) between the firm and the environment, especially 
under a changing regulatory environment, could be used to explain the interaction – as defined in 
chapter 2 – between the utility industry and its immediate environment. In the co-evolutionary 
model Murman (2003) proposes that firms and institutions (North, 1999), government included, 
influence each other in interaction between the two so that both influence each other and form a 
relationship of cross-fertilization between the two. The interaction cycle, presented in chapter 2, 
does not have a clear beginning or end, but the process is in a continuous development or flux. 
The initiator that sets the cycle in motion could be anyone, and the process consists of a complex 
combination of parallel mutual interactions. Adding the feedback loop provides clarity to 
understanding the interaction mechanisms by complementing the model by one additional 
dimension. In reality, the influence is not unilateral, but the action by a subject causes a reaction 
to the object, which often subsequently is felt by the initiator. In the following discuss the 
characteristics of the feed back loop at a component level.
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Figure 7-2 Cyclical model of regulatory impact complemented by a secondary impact 
mechanism.
Feedback interaction between the Legislator and the Regulator
The regulator, in the role of the administrator of the regulatory framework as defined by the 
legislator, provides reviews of the overall functioning of the regulatory framework to the 
legislator. Depending on the legislative framework, this could take place continuously, upon 
request, or during the special legislative sessions.57 As an example of this is the consultative role 
the Maryland PSC has vis-à-vis the state legislator. The PSC provides assistance for the 
legislator during the legislative sessions and consults the governor throughout the year.
The legislator obtains feedback information from the energy markets through the monitoring 
function and the executive role of the regulator. Thus the regulator is the body that is used as the 
instrument to ensure that the objectives of the competitive energy markets are met. However, the 
legislator can obtain complementary information through other sources, such as through special 
independent surveys or from the various pressure groups discussed more below. The 3rd package 
of development of European energy regulation58 is expected to declare the status of regulator as 
being independent from the legislator/government, i.e. promoting “legal and functional
separation”. In order to be able to produce rulings that are truly independent the regulator has to 
57 In the United States the States customarily have a legislative session that lasts only part of the year. As an 
example the Maryland legislative session begins in early January and lasts for 90 days. In Virginia the General 
Assembly meets annually, beginning on the second Wednesday in January, lasting for 60 days in even-numbered 
years and for 30 days in odd-numbered years, with an option to extend annual sessions for a maximum of 30 days.
In nation states the legislator is in session throughout the year, with the exception of holidays and recesses.
58 The 3rd package was given in September 2009.
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be independent from the legislator / government. This should include complete budgetary 
authority; the regulator should have no budgetary restrictions set by the legislator/government. 
However, when there are disputes any involved party should always have the right to appeal to a 
body independent from the parties involved. In Finland this would mean appealing the rulings of 
the Energy Market Authority to the Market Court.
Both in Europe and in the US there is an organization whose role is to provide organized 
feedback from the regulator to the legislator / government. In Europe the organization in 
question is the ERGEG (Energy Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas) complemented by 
CEER (Council of European Energy Regulators). The ERGEG is a body established by the 
European Commission to assist with various regulatory matters. The CEER is a voluntary 
membership organization of the European energy regulators with the aim of promoting 
regulatory action in general, and to advance best practices in energy regulation.  In the US the 
organization is called the NARUC (National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners).
Feedback interaction between the Regulator and the Firm
Besides functioning as the means to ensure good performance (Kahn, 1988), regulations could be 
intended to eliminate certain types of behavior and to promote certain other types of behavior 
that are preferred by the legislator in the pursuit of the “public good”. Thus, the most elementary 
form of signaling feedback by the firm to the regulator can take place simply by following the 
regulations; i.e. not to rebel against the establishment, but to act in an expected and desired 
fashion. This can take place by the firm adapting changes to the immediate regulatory 
environment by altering its strategy, structure and resource base.
The second form of feedback would emerge through the firm meeting with the regulator and 
discussing the state of regulations, and their impact on the firms’ activities. The firms could also 
inform regulators by giving speeches in conferences. Another aspect of this feedback is the 
behavior of the firm during rate case proceedings. The objectives of the firm will become evident 
to the regulator during the process. This is characterized by the firm interacting with the 
regulator in various regular processes. Failing to accept the regulator’s rulings, but applying to 
an administrative court, thereby seeking a second opinion from courts, is a way to signal 
dissatisfaction with the regulator’s policies.
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The third form of feedback would be using political strategies in order to influence the 
forthcoming regulations or rulings. This is characterized by the firm giving unilaterally signals to 
politicians and the regulator to change the set rules. As an example of this can be highlighted the 
interaction process of Constellation with the Maryland PSC and the FERC during the period 
form 1992 to 2000. Likewise the introduction of the international strategy of Vattenfall in 1995 
and the complaint to the MMC of 1993 by Centrica.
Feedback interaction between the Firm and the Customer
Any changes in the way the firm makes the products and services available to customers will 
ultimately impact the customer and the set of behavioral options available to that customer. 
According to classical economic theory the supply and demand curves intersect at an equilibrium 
price where the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded. Subsequently, if the price 
supplied differs from this equilibrium price the quantity demanded will be impacted. Classical 
economic theory assumes perfect competition of a symmetrical commodity product with no 
brand value. Following the classical model, deviating upwards from the price dictated by market 
transactions would eliminate the demand for the product of the firm. Deviating downwards 
would, increase the demand but yield unsatisfactory return for the firm. However, in real energy 
markets there is substantial inertia in the market. Changing price often only causes symbolic 
complaints but no substantial wave of switching. For many customers the cost of electricity is 
still affordable and increases regarded as marginal do not change this picture. However, the firms 
can never be sure how high an increase will cause a massive wave of fleeing customers. 
Depending on the competitive situation (Rao, 2002), customers can react in different ways to the 
actions of the firm.
After opening the market for competition the smallest customers seem to be the least tempted to 
switch supplier. In the absence of the potential for tangible savings to the customer, the costs of 
letting competition work can be regarded as too high. Similarly, customers with the highest 
energy costs are most likely to switch supplier whenever this is made possible. Industrial and 
commercial customers with significant electricity costs in each of the surveyed markets have 
already used the opportunity to change power supplier. The decline in customer numbers and the 
subsequent reduction in power throughput should signal to the supplier its competitive position 
in the market. Many suppliers are thus most interested in serving the largest customers with the 
largest absolute earnings potential in relation to customer number, while the smallest residential 
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customers yield a small absolute margin per customer, but cause high cost. As examples of this 
dimension of interaction is customers using the opportunity opened for them, i.e. the power to 
switch supplier. Likewise the Swedish nuclear referendum in 1980 can be seen as a signal from 
the customers to the firm.
Feedback interaction between the Customer and the Legislator
According to Downs (1957), government listens to various pressure groups and lobbyists when 
considering which decision would yield most votes for the governing party or coalition in the 
next elections, and makes decisions accordingly. The government can perform opinion surveys 
and try to obtain information about what voters want, but as Downs pointed out, there is no 
consistent information channel from the voters to the political parties that constitute the 
government and the opposition. However, if members of the public are irritated enough they will 
submit articles in the local media and thus make their voices heard at the legislative level. 
Similarly, legislators are able to convey their message to the public by appearing in the media.
Silence from the voters’ side regarding a certain issue can be an indication of voters’ satisfaction 
with the prevailing situation. However, it could also indicate that political parties are asking the 
wrong questions. Constant signaling of the opinions of the voters by pressure groups can be 
interpreted as a certain signal regarding voter satisfaction with the agenda of the government. 
Political parties obviously try to keep the public informed of their actions, as this should make 
them electable in the next elections. Politicians appear before the public on various occasions, 
give interviews to the media, write books, appear in the newspapers and yellow media, and try 
otherwise to be on the top of minds of the people. However, if the politicians’ primary objective 
is to be electable in the following elections, they primarily want to show to voters how well they 
promote the perceived interests of the public. As an example, a component of this could be how 
much and from whom the politicians receive funds needed for their election campaigns. 
Sometimes politicians wish to avoid publishing this information as it could impair their public 
image as impartial. This form of feedback interaction can be seen in all cases in the form of 
media appearances. The legislators give interviews and intentionally present their view on the 
policy issues in media. Sometimes the counterproductive feedback is obtained through 
unintentional appearances.
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7.2.3 Adding the tertiary impact to the model 
The next phase in the development of the model is to add the third dimension of influence; i.e. 
the tertiary impact. This influence takes place across the cycle. The primary, secondary and 
tertiary levels of influence are illustrated in Figure 7-3.
Interaction between the Firm and the legislator
By tertiary impact I refer to the firms’ contacts directly with the legislature, bypassing the routes 
described above. These could include firms’ intentions to pursue political strategies in order to 
obtain legislative benefits, or simply to increase politicians’ understanding of the firms’ position. 
By inviting politicians or other influential individuals to become members of the board, advisory 
board or any other key forum associated with the firm could be a means to create a direct 
communication link between the firm and the legislature, and possibly to emphasize the link to 
one of the parties in the legislature thus creating a channel bypassing the influence of the 
regulator.
The interaction between the firm and legislator is naturally a two way street. Besides the firm 
trying to influence the legislature, the legislature could try to influence the firms directly. The 
primary objective of a political party in government is to remain in government (Downs, 1957). 
Although officially there is very little discussion about parties being active in purchasing votes to 
help them stay in power, this is a possible scenario. Politicians could, in theory, trade with the 
firms, provide benefits and obtain votes from the influence sphere of the firm in return.
Figure 7-3 Complementing the cyclical model of co-evolutionary interaction under 
regulatory environmental variation by tertiary impact.
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Firms with a long monopoly history and mindset, often with structure and operational patterns 
that are a result of that history, are easily tempted to pursue political strategies (Bonardi, 2004; 
Lamberg et al., 2004) in order to impact the legislature, and subsequently the forthcoming 
actions of the regulator, and thereby trying to shape the future in their favor. Under a monopoly 
firms can have developed business activities that under competition would not have been 
considered as economically feasible. However, firms easily resist any change and regard the 
present state and structure of the company as justified and worth defending. Holburn and Vanden 
Bergh (2008) have shown the way in which the regulator has been nominated is reflected in 
firms’ political strategies. They found that regulated firms are more likely to try to influence the 
political sphere when the head of the regulator is appointed, and firms are more likely to 
approach political institutions when the environment is politically volatile.
The former static monopoly environment would have been an easier platform for the firms to 
implement changes, but in the absence of incentives to do so, they preferred to maintain the 
prevailing structure. It could be deemed understandable that firms with a long monopolistic 
history are tempted to defend their positions even under changed business environment, and thus 
implement political strategies to this end.
Bonardi (2004) proposes that former monopolies would be perfect examples of firms using 
defensive political strategies to their advantage. When the environment changes some firms 
could be tempted to try to alter their destiny by implementing political strategies. This is well in 
line with Stigler’s (1988) idea that regulation is acquired by the industry in order to benefit the 
industry. Bonardi (2004) names, as an example, EdF (Electricité de France) that has, due to years 
of daily contact with government officials, lobbied its home government to prevent the market 
opening of its domestic market to foreign entrants, while going on an acquisition “spree” around 
Europe. His main argument is that those former monopoly firms, which after deregulation want 
to implement an aggressive global strategy, have to maintain defensive aspects on the political 
“home front”. 
Bonardi et al. (2007) analyzed the non-market strategies of US utilities over a 13 year period, 
and state that performance is influenced by the characteristics of the firm’s regulatory and 
political environment; especially rivalry among the interest groups or politicians and by internal 
capabilities. A fruitful interaction between firm and government is presented by Sol (2002), who 
studied a Chilean utility. The findings suggest that the success of this utility was the result of 
government’s early mover policy vis-à-vis neighboring governments. This would imply that if a 
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utility would be given an early mover opportunity and the neighboring countries would follow 
the same path, the early mover would enjoy a beneficial position vis-à-vis the competition. This 
aspect would indicate that there would be a “deregulation market” where the governments are 
active, and by timing their actions they could provide perceived benefits for the firms. In cases 
where deregulation is carried out with a mutual understanding between the company and the 
legislator / regulator the result could be smooth and more easily digestible. This is, however, not 
often the case.
Implementing changes in firms can be carried out deliberately, proactively or as a reaction to 
make the company survive. Besides using its jurisdictional power to force the company to 
modify itself, a legislator / regulator could ease the transition by providing incentives to the 
company to change. Crafts (2006) believes that the most important impacts of regulation on 
productivity occur through changes in incentives to invest and innovate. Kamershcen and 
Reynolds (2000) believe that economic, political and social factors affect state regulation. The 
incentives to innovate and invest under regulation often follow the surcharge path. This could 
likewise apply to a regulated distribution function under competitive markets. Evidence of this 
can be found in Fortums and Vattenfall’s discussions with the politicians and any other attempt 
to exercise political strategies.
Interaction between the customers and regulator
The regulator is the agency for the promotion of competition in the energy markets. In those 
markets where this is the case, the regulator could find ways to promote competition by 
informing the public about the opportunities that competition could open. The regulator could 
arrange newspaper or TV ad-campaigns, arrange public meetings to advise about the 
opportunities that competition could provide the public.  Regulators could campaign for an 
increase in switching by preparing and updating an interactive list of service providers and their 
respective tariff structures vis-à-vis the industry, and through the customers contacting the 
regulator directly.
Examples of the regulator providing information directly to customers could be found from 
Finland, Sweden and Maryland in the US. In all these markets the regulator, 
(Energiamarkkinavirasto in Finland, Energimarknadsinspektionen in Sweden and the Office of 
People’s Counsel’s in Maryland) maintains a web site59 based service where individual 
59 www.sahkonhinta.fi.
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customers can find price information and make comparisons between various electricity 
suppliers and various electricity products. 
Here again, the influence is not unilateral. Customers do contact the regulators and file 
complaints about the firms’ behavior. This will subsequently initiate a process, of inspection of 
the activities of the firm, and whether such activities follow the set laws and regulations.
7.2.4 Adding the external influence to the cyclical model
The model discussed is not isolated from the rest of the world. So far only the interaction internal 
to the cycle has been discussed. To emphasize the external influences it is necessary to add 
elements describing how the external markets and industries ultimately influence the behavior of 
the actors in the model.
All the interaction cycles keep spinning and they receive momentum from outside influence. 
This influence is included in the regulatory interaction model and is presented in Figure 7-4
below, which concludes a picture of the interaction cycle.
Figure 7-4 The cyclical model of co-evolutionary interaction under regulatory environmental 
variation.
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In this model, the fuel that keeps the cycle spinning is not only derived from inside the cycle, the 
actors in the cycle, but also from outside. Firms carefully follow the development in the industry 
and market and other industries and markets. Likewise the factor markets impact firms’ 
decisions, because they need to satisfy the needs of the financial and other factor markets, and 
the developments in the minds of customers, of the basis for making purchasing decisions. 
Technical development in the industry and other relevant industries is reflected in the firms’ 
decision regarding the way to serve the customer base, and what customer base to serve.
Customers are influenced by the behavioral models common to other industries. External 
influences, i.e. attempts to change the beliefs and preferences of others through persuasion or 
strategic communication, have been discussed by Druckman and Lupia (2000). If customers are 
used to changing service provider in mobile communication, cable television, long distance 
telephoning, banking, and insurance or any other commodities’ market, they can easily also 
adopt this “shopping” pattern to an energy commodity. Any product markets where the customer 
is used to making a choice between service providers will contribute to the learning experience 
of customers adapting to the idea of being able to switch the supplier of the service. 
Often incumbents want to emphasize the difficulty of switching supplier, but sometimes even the 
direct actions of a regulator and legislator impair customers’ ability to benefit from the 
competitive markets. Most often price is the key factor that steers customers’ behavior, but even 
other issues such as convenience or reliability could be important. In electricity retail price is the 
most important, reliability is second, and “everything else is twenty-fifth”.
The ability of electricity suppliers’ to introduce new products for customers could contribute to 
the awakening of customer interest. Such new products that could invoke such interest in 
switching supplier could include environmentally designed products with a high share of 
renewables in the generation base. Such products could become interesting to consumers with a 
higher level of environmental consciousness. Other new options could be products where the 
price of the commodity could be complemented by price hedging, thus resulting in fixed price 
for month, quarter, year or other period. A model for such products could be derived from other 
industries where service providers have designed products to suit better customers’ needs. 
Hourly pricing, where the price changes on an hourly basis would need to be complemented by 
hourly metering to yield all its benefits.
Both legislators and regulators obtain influence from other industries and from the international 
arena. International arena in the case of the United States refers both to discussion with the 
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regulators of other states and with the Federal Regulator and the international arena, because it 
falls under the states’ jurisdiction to decide upon the regulatory model in each individual state. 
Likewise, legislators and regulators discuss with their colleagues from different industries and 
can thus adapt regulatory patterns, models and means from other industries. In this way 
legislators could use these international contacts as a learning experience, adopt new concepts 
and begin promoting this internationally sourced concept.
The impact from other industries should not be overlooked, either. Some lessons could be 
learned from processes from other industries although the structural and technical differences in 
how the business is organized between different industries have to be taken into consideration.
The firms active in an industry interact with firms from other industries; for example firms from 
the financing industry and suppliers and subcontractors. Technical development can open up new 
opportunities for managing the interface between customer and supplier. Such opportunities 
could emerge through the introduction of an automated meter-reading infrastructure, and demand 
response based on a price-derived load control.  
7.2.5 Propositions on firm - environment interaction
At market opening part of the regulatory barriers were lifted, thus changing the internal logic of
the business and opening new opportunities to firms. Customers no longer were obligated to 
purchase their energy from an incumbent supplier. Attracting new customers from old and new 
markets became an opportunity to grow, while retaining the old customers became a priority 
because regulatory restrictions no longer hindered competition from capturing market share. 
Stiroh and Strahan (2003) argue that in a deregulated banking environment, the better banks 
grow and the poorly performing banks shrink. The poorly performing banks will come under 
increased pressure, while well-run banks enter their previously shielded markets. They identified 
a merger wave appearing after deregulation, taking place within a decade of deregulation. Take-
over opportunities emerged, because previously such transactions would have been impossible or 
the regulator would have eliminated the benefits. 
After deregulation efficiency of operations became an issue because in a competitive situation 
the way a company is run, among others, impacts directly the value it can provide to customers, 
shareholders, employees and society as a whole. Smith and Grimm (1987), in their study on the 
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impact of deregulation into firm performance in the US railroad industry, state that strategy will 
likely be an important determinant of firm profitability in recently deregulated industries.
In the cyclical interaction model between the firm its customers, legislators and regulators 
presented in previous chapter, the introduction of competition primarily changes the interaction 
environment so that customers are provided with an opportunity to signal to the incumbent 
supplier his/her dissatisfaction by leaving the supplier or renegotiating the supply contract. The 
emergence of competitors attracting customers further forces a former incumbent to change 
market behavior, or stated simply, to start listening to the customers. A firm needs to consider 
carefully the needs and wishes of customers or to face losing market share. This subsequently 
could encourage the firm to change the behavior vis-à-vis regulators and legislators and 
encourage that firm to implement political strategies to shape the regulatory environment in its 
favor.
Individual customers can adopt new behavioral patterns from other fields of industry, such as 
telecommunication, banking, the insurance industry or any industry in which the customer is not 
tied to one monopoly supplier. Supplier switching becomes more commonplace as customers 
become aware of the opportunities that a competitive energy market opens. 
Opening markets for competition increases energy firms’ likelihood to consider behavioral 
patterns found outside the energy industry. Energy firms can adopt new behavioral patterns from 
other industries, such as financing. This is especially important in applying risk management 
practices because firms face the risks of the product market and of losing customers in quite 
different way.
Legislators and the regulators likewise change their behavior, because, besides the internal logic 
of the energy industry, new models can be adopted from other industries and other markets. This 
is especially the case in Europe where the creation of the common European energy market with 
27 individual national markets and characteristics requires substantial co-ordination between the 
markets and the Commission.
By reference to Assumptions 1 and 1b, Research Question 2, the assumptions and the discussion 
above, the following Propositions are developed:
Proposition 2a
Any government setting the regulatory framework for firms or individuals can be positioned 
along a regulatory continuum, whereby the degree of detail in the regulatory framework 
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increases while moving along the continuum. With an increase in the degree of detail in the 
regulatory framework, the freedom of movement for a firm decrease and visa versa.
Proposition 2b
 In the evolutionary interaction process each participant impacts the choice of action available 
to others and causes them to react elevating the level of interaction to a new level. This 
interaction shapes each participant’s role and restricts each participant’s future portfolio of 
available action options.
Proposition 2c
The stronger the market position of the firm prior to deregulation, the more tempted it is to try to 
impact through the use of political strategies and searching, new ways to influence the creation 
of a favorable environment for the firm after deregulation.
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Figure 7-5 Interaction between the regulator and the firm.
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7.3 HOW ENERGY FIRMS’ ACTION PORTFOLIOS HAVE CHANGED 
AT MARKET OPENING 
The third research question is discussed using several conceptualizations of success in order to 
demonstrate the concepts in a wider perspective. To illustrate success I have used a composite 
index, CTI (see Appendix B) consisting of multiple financial and operational factors 
(Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1985, 1986). The Corporate Turnaround Index, CTI is a 
comprehensive metric showing how the firms analyzed have managed to change the company. 
The objective of CTI is to incorporate financial performance with tangible actions that are 
intended to modify the company. 
The CTI for the firms analyzed is presented in Table 7-1. This represents the year of retail 
market opening for competition and two years after that date. In the changed environment the 
requirements to do business also changed, so firms that do change themselves comprehensively 
enable a continuous changing process of the firm and thus make it easier for the company to face 
continuous change. 
All the firms analyzed herein reacted to the environmental changes and modified their strategies 
substantially in order to accommodate the changed environment. Reflecting the changes in 
strategy (Quinn, 1995) and using the measurable impact of strategy changes (CTI) as a proxy for 
strategy changes, it is easy to note that it is common in all the firms studied that they took steps 
to benefit from the opportunities that market opening yielded. The changes in strategy, as 
illustrated in Table 7.7 could be regarded as substantial. All the firms analyzed show a 
substantially increased CTI two years from the beginning of the analysis period, i.e. at market 
opening. 
Constellation grew through mergers and developing their generation business in the wholesale 
market. In the Nordic market Vattenfall and Fortum expanded into each other’s former home 
markets through a wave of acquisitions. In the UK Centrica grew in the electricity retail market 
and by acquisitions in foreign markets.  This is compared to the prevailing situation prior to the 
market opening, when all the firms were static utility firms with low growth and strategy that 
was adjusted to the static environment demands.
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If the CTI is measured for a two-year period, immediately following the opening of the market 
for competition, the period 2000-2002, the firms experienced substantial changes. For Vattenfall 
and Fortum the market opening was concluded in 1997, but due to the availability of data the 
period 2000-2002 has been used as a proxy for the correct period. Here we can discuss whether 
the relatively slow changes in the Nordic power market are reflected in the firms’ slower 
reactions to market changes, and the reactions to the opening of the market for competition took 
place only with a delay. This two-year period is partially a matter of practicality and partially 
dictated by the data. To put the CTI changes into perspective and to illustrate the change in CTI 
as a function of a change in company, if we assume that a hypothetical company has grown 
revenues at the pace of inflation, i.e. 2 per cent pa, the change in CTI over a two year period 
would be negligible, Here the CTI change exceeds the rate of doubling in two years period, 
which means over 40 per cent growth pa (√2). Thus it is obvious that all the analyzed firms have 
seen substantial change.
Mill’s method. Temporal bracketing. Table 7-1 reveals that acquisitions were a common way to 
change the firm for all the firms analyzed. The second common feature is the fact that almost all 
made substantial changes in the management of the company. As most of the firms changed 
management, the obvious conclusion is that the new changed company needed a new 
management. This immediately leads to a discussion; was it the management that caused the 
change to happen or was it the change that caused the changes in management.
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Company Year of market 
opening and 
CTI
CTI two years 
after market 
opening
Three primary contributors to CTI 
increase
Centrica 1998  1 2000  2,2 Profitability, Acquisitions, Strategy/Growth
Constellation 2000  0.5 2002  3,6 Investment, Changes in Management, 
Acquisitions
Fortum60 2000  0.5 2002  3,7 Acquisitions, Investment, Changes in 
management
Vattenfall61 2000  0.5 2002  3,7 Acquisitions, Growth/Strategy, Changes in 
management
Table 7-1 CTI on analyzed firms on market opening and two years after with main 
contributors to growth in CTI.
All firms managed to survive after the opening of their respective home markets for competition; 
they have grown and delivered profit to the shareholders in the form of a dividend. If we define 
success by any accounting-based measures, return on capital employed, return on assets or return 
on equity, the image begins to blur, because this is influenced by the capital structure of the 
company and it is very difficult to compare the firms on an equal basis. A return on capital 
employed can sometimes be a function of the chosen strategy, characteristics of the business 
environment, or a function of the past of the company. Thus it does not give justice to firms to 
compare their ROCE figures without taking these differences into consideration. One potential 
fair way to compare the success of the firms would be to compare the stock price development. 
This analysis, however, has not been included in this research but could provide an initiative for 
further study.
A reasonable measure of success at an operational level would be to compare the various 
operational metrics between the firms. Such metrics would be, average cost to serve a customer, 
average sourcing cost of electricity, reduction in average sourcing cost, or any other yardstick. 
60 Market opening completed in mid 1990s, year 2000 / 2002 used as proxy due to non-availability of data.
61 Market opening in mid 1990s year 2000 / 2002 used as proxy due to non-availability of data.
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However, due to the non-availability of operational data, any comparison of success at the 
operative level is not possible within this research scope. This would, however, be an interesting 
subject for further research, and similar to using other measures of success, would probably 
reveal other contributors to success. These could also be a theme for further research.
By measuring the growth in sales against additions in capital employed in the business during the 
two first years after market opening for competition, we can produce another view of the firms’ 
success. We can easily see that the firms have grown, but by injecting new capital they have not 
managed to increase the revenue base proportionally. If we assume that the old businesses prior 
to the market opening, and the new businesses had an equal profitability and risk level, the 
injection of capital into the business should result in a corresponding increase in business volume 
and profit level. Thus, 30 per cent injection in the employed capital in the business could be 
expected to yield a 30 per cent increase in revenues. 
Vattenfall, however has managed to squeeze 80 per cent growth in revenues by increasing 30 per 
cent in the capital employed. However, the structure of Vattenfall at the time of completing the 
analyses was a result of major acquisitions that to some extent reflected the readiness of the 
company management to take risk positions. This in turn could reflect the shareholding of the 
company; i.e. the Swedish government holding the entire equity of the company. However 
Vattenfall had acquired major firms in Germany and had grown substantially, so the revenue 
impact was immediately visible. Had the government not had full control on the company, the 
financial markets could possibly not have accepted the risks taken.  
The other firms analyzed had been much more cautious in injecting capital into the business, 
thus resulting is slower growth in revenues. These firms can be divided into two categories; 
Constellation and Centrica had revenue growth above 10 per cent while Fortum had to be 
satisfied with much smaller figures. These firms did not invest so dramatically in acquisitions, 
and thus, due to the lead times of investments, the revenue impact cannot be seen immediately. 
During the period analyzed the asset base of Vattenfall doubled, and the increase in revenues 
increased even more dramatically. The correction of the impact of the different accounting 
practices applied in different jurisdictions could, however change this picture.
The Centrica development is easily explained by Centrica’s ability to create substantial new 
business volume without the need to inject substantial amounts of additional capital in the 
business of selling electricity to the existing gas customer base. Vattenfall however has pursued 
growth by acquisitions. The remaining firms primarily pursued organic growth.
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Centrica Constellation Fortum Vattenfall
Functioning retail market Yes No Yes Yes
Functioning wholesale market Yes Yes Yes Yes
Capital employed two years after 
BUSD
2,87 8,77 16,93 18,57
Growth in capital employed per cent 25,4 15,1 16,8 27,7
ROCE two years after, per cent 28,6 6,0 11,1 5,4
Growth in revenues (CAGR) per cent 15,2 15,1 2,5 78,5
CTI change ratio over 3 years 2,2 7,2 7,4 7,4
BDI 2004 0,52 0,28 0,71 0,72
Table 7-2 Case comparison, causality between market opening and success.
The financial figures do not appear to provide a clear correlation between the BDI, CTI and 
those financial figures. Employed capital appears to be more dependent on the company’s 
history and strategy than on the development at the time of market opening for competition. The 
same applies to the BDI, because it clearly results from the chosen strategy. Functioning 
wholesale markets are a prerequisite for functioning retail market, but not sufficient to guarantee 
the retail markets functioning alone.
With the exception of Vattenfall, growth in revenues appears to be related to the growth in 
capital employed. Another vague link could be identified as an inverted correlation between 
capital employed and ROCE.
Observing the case firms CTI from the time prior to market opening to the time subsequent to it 
we can clearly see that the firms modified themselves, altered their strategies and subsequently 
the resource configurations, in order to suit the changed operating environment. This clearly 
follows the pattern observed by Reger et al. (1992) and Ahmad and Chiasakul (2005). As Foss 
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(1999) regarded the treatment of the dispersed knowledge in the firm as a key element, the 
management (Stiroh and Strahan, 2003; Pettus, 2000) obviously has a key role in this. In an 
optimal case, strategy emerges (Quinn, 1985) as a function of a pattern of decisions (Andrews 
1980) and structure would follow the strategy (Chandle,r 1962), while resources should then be 
shaped accordingly (Wernerfelt, 1984, 1995). Based on the material provided herein, the changes 
in management were followed by changes in strategy and subsequently changes in resource 
configuration. Zajac, Kraatz and Bresser (2000) have demonstrated that the timing, direction and 
magnitude of strategic changes can be logically predicted based on differences in specific 
environmental forces and organizational resources. In the case firms, these changes obviously do 
not occur spontaneously but as a result of decisive determination of the management, 
complemented by a strong determination to make the changes happen. Cummins and Rubio-
Misas (2006) study found that the number of firms declined while the average size increased. In 
this research the firms increased in size through investments and acquisitions while the number 
of players clearly declined. Another result in the Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006) study 
indicated that inefficient firms disappeared through insolvency or liquidation. In the energy 
industry there has not been many cases of insolvency or liquidation, because most of the firms 
operate a local monopoly distribution network that yields a constant return on the employed 
capital. Such firms can become take-over targets, but somebody will always need to take care of 
the operating the distribution network.
Of the two options that Hull (1989) has defined to be available to the firm, the replicator and 
interactor, the replicator would copy external patterns and apply them to the company while the 
interactor would adjust the model to the firm’s and the environment’s needs so that the end result 
would be different from the original. The adaptation classification of Miles and Snow (2003) 
follows “a general physiology of organizational behavior”. As such, the firms, hovering on the 
edge between structure and surprise (Eisenhardt and Bhatia, 2002), will sometimes find it hard to 
adapt to changes in the environment because the competencies accumulated in the firm may not 
be easily transferred to serve new applications. 
The first steps firms take in a new environment are not necessarily sufficient to create a 
continuous development towards a set goal, so continuously observing what other firms are 
doing would appear to be a natural behavioral pattern. This clearly happened in the case firms’ 
environment. As the new operative mechanisms in the market were not known, firms were keen 
to learn these new mechanisms by observing the behavior of other firms and following the 
actions whenever they appeared to be successful.
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As CEO Rowe of Exelon stated during interview “This is an industry in transition and the 
balance of power could shift between the organized labor, customers and shareholders 
depending on the supply situation”, the world will not be ready after taking the first steps on the 
path towards competitive markets. 
Both the regulator, and the firms impacted by the regulatory framework, aim in the long run, at 
creating an environment where product could be supplied to the final user efficiently, keeping 
the quality of the operations high, and maintaining a favorable environment for the future 
development of the industry. To reach this goal all the parties involved should realize that 
although the short-term objectives could appear contradictory, by co-operation and frank 
discussion between the regulator and the regulated firm, a mutually beneficial environment could 
be produced. 
This Proposition was the case for firms active in the same market.  Both Fortum and Vattenfall 
engaged in establishing excessive marketing organizations as soon as the market was made 
competitive. Both firms believed that a strong involvement in marketing and customer service 
are the key to success in the market after it has been made competitive. Whether it was the 
business intelligence they conducted or the fact that they could have been using the same 
consultants to come to the same conclusions, remains unresolved, but will provide some ideas 
for firms facing market opening and thus the similar situation in the future. 
Both firms dismantled these excessive marketing organizations and concentrated on lowering the 
production cost of the services for customers. 
In the US, as the retail markets have not yet really been made competitive, this pattern cannot be 
verified. However, in most cities, the dominant utility company has pursued political strategies 
vis-à-vis the regulator in order to obtain lengthy transitional periods for the stranded cost 
recovery, which supports the Proposition.
In the UK, the incumbent utility firms relied on the prevailing price level in the market, and 
especially its sustainability, believing that nothing can change the market logic. 
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Figure 7-6 Interaction between the firm and the customer.
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Referring to the Assumptions 3a, 3b, 3c and research question 3 and the discussion above, the 
following Propositions could thus be presented:
Proposition 3a
Incumbents in similar conditions are tempted to follow each other and repeat each other’s logic 
rather than creating their own paths to the future.
Proposition 3b
When markets are opened for competition, the process used to open the markets and the actual 
and perceived actions of the other incumbents induces the firm to react.
Proposition 3c
When markets are opened for competition, due to the risk present in open markets firms active in 
such markets need to focus on risk management. When markets are opened for competition the 
process used to open the markets and the actual and perceived actions of the other incumbents 
induces the firm to react.
Figure 6-1 above illustrates the perceived attitude of the regulator towards the firm and the 
attitude of the firm towards the regulator. The attitude of the regulator towards the firm at the 
outset is naturally neutral, but the picture illustrates the perceived attitude, which in fact partially 
reflects the attitude of the firm towards the regulator and not the other way around. 
Political strategies (Bonardi, 2004; Lamberg et al., 2004) are common among firms that have a 
substantial position to guard. Under some jurisdictions the interaction between firms and 
government can be very friendly (Sol, 2002), while other governments could have a very 
stringent attitude towards the firm (Centrica). 
At the time immediately proceeding and following market opening for competition, the regulator 
often has a strong relationship with the former incumbent, because that regulator primarily 
focuses the new regulations towards the incumbent. As in the UK, Swedish and Finnish market, 
the incumbent dominated the market prior to the market opening, so opening the market for 
competition was primarily focused vis-à-vis that former incumbent. Depending on how the 
incumbent managed the business prior to market opening, primarily the extent it utilized the 
opportunities the closed market could provide, had an impact on how harsh the actions the 
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regulator would take against the incumbent at the market opening. The attitude of the incumbent 
towards the regulator impacted likewise the attitude of the regulator towards the incumbent, and 
the expected position of the incumbent after the market opening.  
Former monopoly firms must swallow their pride and begin to listen to the regulator, and the 
newly established regulator should listen to the industry to achieve common good for society as a 
whole. Should the incumbent pretend that the regulator does not have a role, and thus the 
regulations do not need to be followed, could dramatically impair that incumbents’ ability to
perform business transactions after market opening. The sooner the incumbent takes a more 
pragmatic attitude towards the regulator, the sooner it will be able to do “business as usual”.
Should the incumbent wish to impact the forthcoming new regulatory environment, the regulator 
could be prepared to listen to the wishes of the incumbent in case that incumbent wishes to have 
his voice heard. In cases in which the incumbent is not liked in the industry and among 
customers, the regulator could be tempted to prepare more harsh regulatory environment than 
otherwise would be necessary.
In the staged regulatory system, in use primarily in the US, where retail regulation is primarily 
under the jurisdiction of the states, the local regulator has been more tempted to listen to the 
wishes of the local champion. The local company, in many cases, has wished to obtain lengthy 
transitional periods to postpone the abolition of the monopoly for as long as possible into the 
future.   
As a general conclusion of the discussion above, we could state that predictability in the 
functional environment makes planning the future easier. Working in a predictable environment 
makes resource configuration easier, while the risks are reduced. However, it is very seldom 
possible to predict with accuracy the future development of the competition, although a 
predictable regulatory environment would be a benefit to the firm. Obviously, making decisions 
in a predictable environment is less risky that in a less predictable environment. In general, 
increased predictability and stability of the regulatory environment could encourage a firm to 
follow a longer-term policy.
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8 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I assess the contributions of this research in the light of the previous research and 
the literature addressing research in political economy and strategy, while evaluating the 
weaknesses of this study. I develop practical managerial implications both for the industry and 
the regulatory environment.  Theoretical contributions are addressed in sub-chapter 8.2, the 
managerial contribution in sub-chapter 8.4 while sub-chapter 8.4 discusses the limitations and 
suggests ideas for future research.
8.1 DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTION
Throughout this research work my intention has been to elevate the understanding of the 
interaction between the energy firms and their regulatory environment. Besides presenting 
theoretical contributions in this research, I intend to provide support for the strategic daily 
management of energy firms that are working under a perennial gale of competition and 
regulatory changes. Likewise wish to provide support to the legislators and regulators who, by 
shaping the overall regulatory framework for the firms’, impact the available alternative courses 
of action the firms can take.
To these ends I used the research setting reflecting the changes in the business environment of 
electricity retail firms at and after the time of opening of the retail market for competition both in 
the US and in Europe. My research sample is chosen to cover a sufficient number of market -
regulatory environment - firm performance permutations to enable me to travel the whole way 
from research initiative to theory generation. My focal point has been to study the companies at 
the time of opening the markets for competition and thus try to capture the changes in 
competitive dynamics and the co-evolutionary paths the firms and their respective business 
environment have taken when the markets were opened for competition.
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All the firms studied in this research have seen competition in some form beginning from the 
1990s, although each case is really individual regarding the characteristics of the processes of 
how competition was introduced. In the UK, Centrica had experienced gas competition prior to 
electric retail competition and could thus benefit from the accumulated experience. In the Nordic 
area, the paths the case companies traveled had similarities as competition was introduced first in 
wholesale markets by forming a common Nordic wholesale market. Subsequently the market 
opening was introduced in retail. In most of the US, the retail competition only works on paper. 
Although there are no case companies in this research representing the notorious California 
experiment of market opening, California firms could be an interesting case to analyze using the 
context described in this dissertation. In California the introduction of competition followed its 
own path and logic as the competition was first introduced and then later the process was 
reversed and competition in retail suspended. 
The electricity markets prior to opening for competition were either vertically integrated 
geographically monopoly markets, or monopoly markets where the entry was constrained by 
other means. The value chain from generation to retail sales was rigid. There was either a 
position I which one company was in charge of the entire value chain, or the wholesale 
oligopolies had exclusivity on the sales to local monopoly distribution / retail firms.  The 
transactions were monopolistic between buyer and the seller. In the US the state regulatory 
commissions regulated the rates and the rate of return for the utilities, while interstate 
transmission was regulated by the FERC. In Europe there was not a clear national regulator, but 
changes in the monopoly power prices often had to be approved ex ante through other 
governmental bodies.
In the US the early beginning of electricity industry was characterized by retail competition and 
in some cases even included competition in distribution. To restrict the influence of the firms, 
regulation was introduced in the US in the early 1900s. In Europe the first steps towards the 
retail competition were taken in the UK as a result of Prime Minister Thatcher’s policies, which 
subsequently spread to other jurisdictions in Europe and to the US. In this context the activities 
of the company Enron, as a promoter of competitive markets should be mentioned. Enron 
initiated a campaign to promote retail competition in Europe and multiple states in the US, which 
subsequently decided to open the regional markets for competition. However, due to transitional 
arrangements and other restrictions only a limited degree of competition was achieved. 
In most researched jurisdictions an oversupply of power prevailed at the time of the introduction 
of competition, which subsequently led to price cuts for some customers. This was, however, 
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only temporary, and when the supply situation became more stringent the prices obviously 
reacted to supply shortages. In all jurisdictions the distribution rates were regulated, but in the 
US the regulatory commissions had wishes to also control the retail prices.
The strategies the case firms selected were quite different though the strategic options the firms 
took can be seen to follow clear main paths. In all the analyzed cases the management succeeded 
in changing the company (illustrated as changes in the CTI) to be able to react better to the 
changed demands of the new business environment. The primary contributors to increase in the 
CTI for all companies were the active wave of acquisitions. Besides acquiring multiple target 
companies all of the firms analyzed changed parts of their executive management. For some 
firms the regulatory environment was stable and predictable but this was not the case for all.
However, all firms at the time of commencing the study were very different from the firms they 
had been 20 years previously. The CTI analysis reveals the configurations of actions the firms 
had followed and that the paths the different firms had chosen had been company identical. 
However, when the actions initiated by the company were plotted on a time scale against the 
time of market opening for competition, the company identical patterns became more noticeable. 
For some firms the internally and externally initiated actions proceeded parallel, and for some 
firms they followed in waves. 
The event structure analysis revealed a different view of the process. The focal point of activities 
shifted from being between the firm and the regulator / legislator to being between the firm and 
the customer. There was difference between the cases, but the fundamental shift seemed to 
follow the same basic pattern. For Constellation, the starting point was a long established two-
tier regulatory structure with the state and Federal Regulators both having a say on company 
actions. The legislator, likewise, introduced legislation on dual levels, which restricted the 
company’s freedom of movement. The external driving force was the influence of Enron both at 
a state and Federal level. The process ended, at least temporarily, in the key interaction taking 
place between the firm and the customer, with the regulator and legislator influence still being 
active. The regulative framework was not really designed for competitive markets but the 
existing structure had to be used to support another modification of the system.
For the European cases the energy regulator did not exist at the beginning, but was established 
during the market opening process as a part of that process. However, the regulatory task for the 
European firms could have been achieved through government ownership in the firms and the 
consequent control from within the firm. Thus the initial phases of the process took place 
Chapter 8 – Conclusions
196
between the firm and the legislator and gradually shifted towards being between the firm and the 
customers. For Centrica and Fortum these initial phases included changes in the ownership 
structure. The regulator’s role increased during the process and obviously the introduction of 
EU-level regulations further shaped the regulatory environment. As the regulator was not present 
in the early phases of the process, clearly the regulator could not have had a substantial role 
during the initial phases. However, the legislator assumed this role by passing legislation and 
thus forming the regulator. After the implementation of the third package in 2011 the role of 
regulators can be expected to increase further.
8.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION 
The development of the research approach used in this research was encouraged by multiple 
scholars. Firstly, Winter (2005) emphasized the industry as a population of heterogeneous firms 
differing in their ways of doing things, and also differing in size as a consequence of 
indigenously produced idiosyncrasies. Secondly, Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) proposed 
preparing theoretical and empirical work to provide understanding on why firms get to be good, 
why they stay that way, why they improve, and why they sometimes decline, pointed the way 
towards the approach used in this research. Furthermore Zajac, Kraatz and Bresser (2000) 
suggested that the timing, direction and magnitude of strategic changes could be logically 
predicted, based on differences in specific environmental forces and organizational resources. 
The role of regulatory changes was emphasized by Rhonda, Douhaime and Stimpert (1992) who 
regarded the relationship between regulation / deregulation, strategic choice, and firm 
performance, as pressing issues and suggested that the long-term effects of deregulation on 
strategic response and firm performance should be studied. Furthermore Reger et al. (1992) 
emphasized deregulation’s direct effects on firms’ strategic choices and both direct and indirect 
effects on risk and return. Further, Aldrich (1979) saw environmental variation, such as 
deregulation, as having a substantial external impact on the goal-setting of the organization, and 
as a good setting for research. 
As the past is more than a prologue (Daughety and Forsythe, 1987), firms may need a lengthy 
time to adapt into the new prevailing market situation after years of regulation, but the 
accumulated learning is, and remains, within the firm. When substantial regulatory changes are 
implemented there are no historical evolutionary models to follow and even the regulatory
institutions have little understanding of how deregulation will operate in the short run and evolve 
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in the future (Larsen and Bunn (1999). Similarly, Dyner and Larsen (2001) suggested that the 
planning systems the electric utilities used under monopoly times become less useful after 
deregulation and need to be replaced. This is well understandable as if the planning systems 
reflect the concepts of a simplex / static environment that has subsequently been replaced by a 
dynamic / complex environment (Duncan, 1972).
The view of classical economics in describing demand and supply and the balance function 
between these is static by nature and has subsequently been complemented by the dynamic 
market process view of the Austrian economists (von Mises, 1928, 1979; Hayek, 1973; Kirzner, 
1992; Foss and Christensen, 2001); thereby explaining how the actions of various actors’ cause 
an effect on the market balance function. The interaction between the firm and the customer (von
Mises, 1928, 1979; Coase, 1988; Kirzner, 1992; Hayek, 1973; Foss and Christensen, 2001; 
Mitzruchi and Yoo, 2002; Rao 2002; Bailey and William, 1988; Greene and Smiley, 1984; 
Joskow, 2006; Cho and Kim, 2007) has been widely researched and documented among all the 
component interactions researched herein. Regulatory theory has complemented the 
characteristics of classical economic theory and provided clarification on the laws of interaction 
between the regulator and the firm (Smith, 1776; Chydenius, 1765; Kahn, 1988; Aldrich, 1979; 
Schumpeter, 1964; Williamson, 1975; Coase, 1988; Kirzner, 1992; Hayek, 1979; Stigler, 1988; 
North, 1990, 1992; Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Kahn, 1988; North, 1990 and 1992, Viscusi et 
al., 2000; Lindblom, 1977).
Under regulatory change the political dimension obviously plays a key role. Thus the economic 
theory of interaction presented herein builds on and incorporates, besides theories discussed 
above, the interaction theories of political economy and influence between the voters and the 
legislature / government (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965; Downs, 1957; Olson, 1965; North, 1990 
Kessler, 2003; Downing, 2005; Degan, 2006). In the approach used herein, I complement the 
economics under regulatory change with aspects of political economy and the theory of 
democracy and individual action; i.e. I develop theory that unifies politics with economics as
encouraged by Downs (1957). The key element that combines the various research streams is the 
fact that under regulation the customers of the utility firms’, are at the same time, voters in 
elections and thus capable of casting their ballots in elections thereby impacting the forthcoming 
governmental policies regarding utility regulation. In an ideal world, once an organized society 
exists, the individual members of the state are integral parts of a larger more meaningful 
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organism (Buchanan and Tullock 1965).  Whether the decisions the government take favor any 
individual or a group is up to the individual or group to decide, and signal in the voting booth.  
The government, acting in a Russeauian fashion as a device of carrying out the will of the people 
(Downs, 1957), that is the state acting on behalf of the markets or replacing the markets 
(Lindblom, 1977), can be seen as an instrument to produce “public good” in the form of 
correcting a market failure (Buchanan, 1968), by using interventionist policies of the state 
correcting that failure (Keynes, 1936). Von Mises (1928, 1979) spoke strongly against 
interventionism, while promoting the idea of markets fixing themselves. Buchanan and Tullock 
(1965) acknowledged the supply and demand for public goods.  Krugman (2009) discussed 
widely the parallel between the great depression of the 1930s and the crisis of 2008 and the 
absence of the role of government in both crises. 
Obviously, using this complex and profound research framework capturing the elements of 
democracy, market economy and concerted action of the members of the society in pursuit of the 
perceived common good and complemented by the interaction between the parties active in it, 
would yield a theory that could explain some fundamental characteristics of the functioning of 
society. Energy, being one of the inescapable items of everyday life seen in a context of an 
economic – democratic evolutionary framework, and specifically at the time of making the long-
closed markets competitive, could reveal some fundamentals of how the society in which we all 
are members, works.
The Key contribution of the research comes from combining the co-evolution theory into a 
regulatory change in the electricity retail industry. The concept proposed by Murman (2003) and 
Lewin, A. Y. and C. P. Long (1999) have been used as a basis for preparing the theory.
The key theoretical contribution of this research is in the combination of multiple research 
streams that are merged into a cohesive whole. The presented theory builds on combining the 
interaction mechanisms presented by the referred scholars, but expands the approach by the 
inclusion of the mutuality of the interaction, the temporal element, and the external influence. 
The theory also introduces the co-evolutionary approach emphasizing the interaction between the 
firms, customers and the regulatory/legal framework. The presented theory is a simple and 
comprehensible model combining various levels of influence. 
This model, presented in Figure 7-4, illustrates the cyclical model of regulatory interaction 
between the firms and their respective environments. The opening of energy markets for 
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competition has often been seen as a one directional process that the legislator initiates while the 
ultimate beneficiary is the customer, and where the temporal dimension has not been present.
Another theoretical contribution produced during this research is the presentation of the degree 
of regulation of different governments on one regulatory continuum. The novelty of this 
approach is presenting the no-regulation and the “zero kelvin temperature of society” as the two 
extreme ends of this continuum, while all the real governments’ approaches fall in place on a 
point between these two extremes.
8.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this research the multiple choices I have made are justifiable in the context of the research. 
Many of the choices could have been made otherwise, and this could possibly have led to 
marginally differing interpretations. However, I have tried to justify all the choices thoroughly, 
although choosing other available options would sometimes have led to an easier and more 
manageable research process. I made the choices with the objective of ensuring the best possible 
quality in the outcome. 
The selection of cases used herein could be open to criticism. Collier and Mahoney (2004) were 
concerned that possible bias is caused by the selection of cases for research. Obviously the case 
selection could cause bias in the results and interpretations; for example, if the cases represent an 
extreme case and the researcher does not recognize the potential for bias that such case selection 
could cause. A way to control against this bias would be to inspect the full variance of the 
dependent variable.
The motivation for the selection of this particular sample has been thoroughly discussed above. 
However, whether the choice of cases could impact the conclusions has not been discussed so 
far. My interpretation is that selecting other case firms for this research could possibly have 
provided a slightly different tone to the conclusions, but presumably not substantially different 
results. Besides, finding other case firms could have proven to be challenging as the number of 
markets opened for competition has been limited and thus selecting case firms representing 
functioning competitive retail markets would be very difficult. However, selecting different 
cases representing other industries as the basis for further research could prove to be interesting. 
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The research setting chosen for this research could be criticized for being narrow and too rigid in 
that it focuses only on the US and Europe, and only on the electric utility industry. The 
environmental variation used in this research is limited to opening of the electricity retail 
markets for competition. Environmental variation as a concept stretches far beyond the selected 
geographical areas and industries, and could thus be understood much more widely than has been 
in this research. However, in a utility industry for a company that has been in full control of the 
business prior to changes, opening the market for competition brings such dramatic challenges 
that within the utility industry it is hard to find more substantial changes as a research setting. As 
such, by selecting other research settings could possibly reveal new features of the co-
evolutionary process, and would thus function as an initiative for the research setting in further 
research. 
The cyclical model of regulatory interaction between the firms and their respective environments 
presented herein can be regarded to be relatively general, and could be applied in businesses 
outside the electricity industry. Many of the conclusions presented herein are based on a pattern 
that could possibly be identifiable in other cases in other comparable industries. If this was the 
case it suggests that there are factors in the environment that could explain this feature. The key 
in the presented model is the fact that the customers of utility firms are, at the same time, voters 
who together have the capacity to elect politicians who in turn prepare the legislation impacting 
the regulatory environment.  In other industries the interaction cycle will probably have other
elements included, but a similar type of cyclical interaction could probably be identified in those 
regulated industries with such an important position in society. A subject for further research 
would be to rank the relative importance of the different components of the interaction cycles. 
Likewise, this analysis could be expanded to other industries.
The use of company issued press releases as a source of company event data could possibly bias 
the results due to the choices the firms have made regarding the issues that are included in a 
press release. It is in the nature of press releases that firms very seldom publish non-favorable 
material, except in the unavoidable case of publicizing annual financial results. Including 
information on all such non-favorable events the firms have selected not to publicize and have 
thus not been included, would have required access to the internal company files that are not 
generally open to the public, at least any time close to the events in question. For Constellation,
in order to be able to identify all the relevant events, and complement the press releases the 
filings in SEC and FERC were used, and complemented by using regulatory filing data. 
However, without the knowledge of what really has happened in the firm, it is only possible to 
Chapter 8 – Conclusions
201
use the data that was accessible. It is not possible to ask for data the existence of which one is not 
aware. For European cases, the firms’ annual reports and press releases provided sufficient 
information to enable the capture of the sequence of events. This was, however, complemented 
by the confirmatory interviews.  
Another source of bias is that resulting from the fact that different component markets use 
dissimilar methods and modes of opening markets for competition. The prevailing legislation, in 
conjunction with law enforcement and administrative traditions within and between markets, 
results in different ways and levels of permitting the conduct of communication between the 
firms and the regulators, and could thus contribute to distortions in the results. The features of 
the market opening process could be taken as a variable in the process, and used as a means to 
explain better the evolutionary process.
The methodology has been presented in this thesis.  It is recognized that there are possible 
sources of inaccuracies that originate from the choices relating to methods of analysis. When 
calculating the CTI, a special weighing system was considered in order to enhance the role of 
some of the components. The use of logarithmic scale when calculating the CTI, however, is 
intended to do the same. By using a logarithmic scale the significance of first actions will be 
emphasized as compared to the following actions. 
The dissimilarities in accounting practices and legislation between the markets and jurisdictions 
create a sea of problems. Here I have tried to overcome these obstacles by either defining the 
calculated ratios specifically for the purposes of this research, or by using very simple 
characteristic ratios instead of sophisticated accounting analysis tools. Increasing the level of 
sophistication would, however, require much more in-depth analysis of the accounting principles 
and would presumably have a secondary impact on the accuracy of the results, but 
simultaneously substantially increase the complexity of the model.
The results regarding dynamics of market opening for competition can only be regarded to 
reflect the chosen cases. As the market opening processes in markets not covered by this 
research are so substantially dissimilar to the procedures covered herein, some caution should be 
exercised when presenting the conclusions. This, however, is closely connected with the political 
strategies some firms exercise vis-à-vis the different market authorities, thus aiming at having
impact on the opening procedures, pace and timing. This is especially an area where there is 
much more to research.
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This research is limited by the geographical scope and by the low number of case firms. 
However, the results, with certain reservations, could be applicable to energy firms’ regulatory 
interactions in other geographical markets. Ideas for future research would be to test the concepts 
in different environments. These different environments could be new geographical 
environments or new business environments facing competition. Another idea would be to 
analyze whether similarities could be identified between the behavior of firms being forced to 
face competition, and firms that were born under competition. An interesting concept would be 
to see if similar behavioral patterns could be identified in different industries between firms that 
face a competitive environment. 
Additional research would be required to analyze the other forms of market distortions and their 
possible impact on the new entrants’ chances to successfully enter the market and prosper: i.e. to 
repeat what Centrica have done.
When trying to apply the results in other industries there is a cause for concern. The 
characteristics of the industry in question have to be taken into consideration; such as, the 
competitiveness of the market and the characteristics of the competition. However, the general 
observations regarding the mutual interaction cycle are probably applicable for other industries, 
provided that the special characteristics of the industry in question are considered. In this 
research I have not considered the applicability of the model outside of the energy industry, and 
thus the opportunities to apply the results in other industries are uncharted.
In order to be able to test how well a regression hyperbola combines the points in the diagram 
illustrating the dependence of ROCE on capital employed would require substantial statistical 
analysis. However, the higher capital employed seems to result in lower ROCE. Proving this 
kind of relationship would require additional research and thus I am unable to draw this kind of 
conclusion, because the amount of data used in this research does not justify such conclusions. 
However, the data could suggest that there was a negative relationship between capitalization 
and ROCE. 
The ideas for further research could thus be listed as follows: 
1) Analyzing whether there is a link between the development of dynamic 
capabilities and success in firms facing substantial changes in their respective
market environment. 
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2) Performing statistical analysis of the strategic choices the small utility firms have 
made, whether they intend to stay in retail business or to concentrate only on the 
wires business. 
3) Selecting other research settings; such as comparing cases from other industries, 
other geographical environments, and different regulatory frameworks as the 
basis for research. 
4) An analysis of whether further symmetrical behavioral patterns could be 
identified between industries in firms that are made to face competitive 
environment.
5) Analyze the relative importance of the different components in the interaction 
cycles with each other, and with the success of the firms. 
6) Analyze whether similarities could be identified between the behavioral patterns 
of firms in an industry being forced to face competition and firms that were born 
under competition at a given time. The analysis could be indexed to a major 
change in the competitiveness framework, such as the introduction of new 
technology.
7) Examine whether similar behavioral patterns could be identified in other 
industries between firms that were made to face competitive environment.  This 
would test the model presented in this research in other industries.
8) Analyze other forms of market distortions and their possible impact on the new 
entrants’ chances to successfully enter the market and prosper.
9) Analyze the consistency of the strategic moves between different firms at the time 
of market opening. This could be an especially interesting topic in the multi-
product and multi-SBU environment.
10) Analyze the impacts of political strategies of firms at the time of opening the 
markets for competition.
11) Test whether the regression hyperbola combines the points in the diagram 
illustrating the dependence of ROCE on capital employed. This would require 
substantial statistical analysis.
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8.4 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The results provided herein open up interesting perspectives for the management of energy firm, 
the regulatory authorities and the political actors preparing or initiating changes in the prevailing 
regulatory framework. All these actors should study carefully the results of this research, analyze 
the consequences that the cyclical model of regulatory interaction between the firms and their 
respective environments could have for them, and implement the concepts provided herein in 
their respective strategic thinking. No subject in the cyclical model of regulatory interaction can 
act independently without having to consider the consequences of his or her action. Neither can
anybody regard himself or herself as only an object without any role in taking the initiative in the 
spinning of the interaction cycle. 
The energy firms, with regard to how good and how efficient they are and how good they are in 
shaping the environment to their benefit, must base planning of their future course of action on 
the real processes taking place in their respective environments, and the interaction with their 
environment. They need to observe carefully the events taking place in the immediate functional 
environment of the firm, analyze those events, and determine the consequences that the events 
could have for the firm. They need to plan actions so that they are able to influence the events 
they are able to influence, and adapt and adjust according to the events they are unable to 
influence. The energy product they wish to sell to the customers always comes with a public 
service dimension, and with an intensive political dimension associated with it. 
Regulatory change is one of the key processes the firms have to take into consideration and use 
as a guide in shaping their strategy and their subsequent resource configuration. The firms might 
choose to try to impact the development of the regulatory framework by implementing political 
strategies. However, the outcome of attempts at political influence is always highly uncertain and 
despite the hard work this might turn unfavorable for the firm. Centrica’s development during 
the early phases of the competitive environment could function as an example of how things 
might not develop favorably when the firm overlooks the regulatory framework. 
The politicians designing any changes in the regulatory environment under which the firms are 
active should remember that that the business base is ultimately competitive, and thus making 
arbitrary changes to the business framework of the firms would change the competitive nature of 
the business. These changes could lead into undesired consequences. 
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The characteristics of the prevailing political and administrative traditions in the jurisdictional 
framework in which the firm is active can naturally set limits to what is acceptable and what is 
expected. It is important for firms to comprehend the position of the respective business 
environment along the regulatory continuum, and thus how much freedom of movement can be 
expected. Firms only can act within the framework that is determined by the legislative and 
regulatory framework. The degree of political influence that is accepted in various political 
regulatory frameworks varies between jurisdictions. To observe this becomes especially 
important if a firm intends to expand into new market areas, where the positioning along the 
regulatory continuum is different from that which the firm is used to. The firm must carefully 
investigate the characteristics of the new environment in order to be able to determine how it has 
to alter its behavior pattern and what is deemed as acceptable in the new environment. Naturally, 
this assessment has to be carried out before an expansion to new market areas is considered.
The cyclical interaction model provides a clear framework for the firm to navigate under 
regulatory changes. Sometimes the internal logic of the political action portfolio that impacts on 
the regulatory framework, and subsequently the firms, may appear vague. However, 
understanding that the basic logic caused by the legislature is primarily concerned with re-
election in forthcoming elections (Downs, 1957), can provide firms with an understanding of a 
sometimes short-sighted approach taken by politicians. By this I am not suggesting that the firms 
should have a strong role in financing the re-election of the incumbent, but that firms should 
merely understand the inherent logic in why politicians act the way they do. 
The firms active in political strategies should likewise acknowledge the logic and mechanisms of 
political action. Understanding the fundamental cause-effect interaction in the presented mutual 
interaction cycle can provide firms with insights about how and why the political level acts as it 
does. 
Similarly, understanding customers’ behavioral logic should be included when planning a 
product offering. Obviously, the firms active in modern business life have to stay alert of the 
changes in the preferences of the clientele, and the technical evolution in their respective 
business environment. Understanding the logic of why and how customers change supplier, and 
especially how the evolution in this logic is impacted by external influence will provide the firms 
active in energy business with significant insights. 
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For the politicians it is important to understand the role of the firms in trying to provide reliable 
supply of electricity to customers, while satisfying the needs of those that have invested their 
capital in the firm. The political regulatory framework should be such that it provides a planning 
framework for the firms’ activities on a medium-long run that the firms can rely upon – a 
framework that although evolves continuously, does not change constantly and unexpectedly. 
Politicians should likewise understand the logic of firm political action. They should understand 
that the primary mover for a firm in pursuing political strategies is to shape the business 
environment more favorably for the firm. Thus, firms could donate monies to the political actors 
and hope this method shapes the business environment to their favor. This could potentially 
include erecting entry barriers for potential new entrants, having more favorable treatment for 
the firms’ products or providing exemptions for the firm from the regulatory or legislative 
framework or postponing the implementation requirement. Successfully combining the firms’ 
political action agenda to the politicians’ pursuit of re-electability could provide a successful 
combination when applied skillfully. Listening only to the loudest voice will probably not yield 
the best results for the entire society – however this is defined.
The firms and the regulators should both appreciate that everybody involved with the 
development of the regulated energy business is trying to make the best out of the situation. Both 
parties should understand that the other party is honestly trying to improve the situation but 
could see the means and the priority order differently. 
Customers should observe the opportunities opening at the market place and react to the apparent 
price signals. This provides momentum for the markets that forces the firms to improve their 
service quality and product offering and ultimately keeps the cycle in motion.
Regulators should keep investing time and effort in finding ways to improve the competitiveness 
of the markets, improve the market awareness of the customers, and remove market entry 
barriers. Despite all this, regulators should not remove all regulatory oversights. Without any 
oversight the firms in a natural monopoly market would have the temptation to become 
predators. This could be damaging for the industry as a whole. 
A procedural cause for concern emerges from the California competitiveness experiment. Even if 
a firm observes all the details of the regulatory framework, it is not always possible to foresee 
what will happen with 100 per cent certainty. The regulatory risk, defined as the option of the 
regulators to make any unforeseen decisions that impact on the firm, will always be present and 
will have to be taken into consideration by the firm. In this sense the historical evolution of the 
Chapter 8 – Conclusions
207
regulatory framework in Europe has been somewhat more predictable, consistent and coherent 
when compared to their US counterpart.  The changes in who is in the position of power in the 
political sphere in Europe does not have such a substantial impact on the freedom of the firms to 
take action as it does in the US.
Finally the impact of influence from outside the industry cannot, and should not be overlooked. 
Evolutionary processes in other industries will subsequently be reflected in the energy industry, 
and the behavioral patterns observed in telecommunications, banking, or cable television, could 
be adopted by actors in the energy industry. 
There will always be national characteristics relating to how the industry is perceived, how 
strong an attitude the regulator has of the firm, and how the firm sees the role of the regulator. 
Through technological development the characteristics of the business change, the products and 
offerings are modified over time to match better the changed tastes of the customers, the 
structure of the regulatory framework changes, politics changes, and subsequently the firms have 
to change. The politicians who, through their position in the government are able to design a 
regulatory framework for the energy industry that leads into a well functioning competitive 
environment, in which economy flourishes through efficiencies and justifiable allocation of 
resources, will have a small advantage in the elections over the opposition.
There will always need to be someone to consume the product. Someone will have to make 
purchase decisions based on the perceived value of the product the firm tries to promote in the 
market. In a competitive market the firm that is best positioned to benefit from small changes in 
the regulatory environment, will have a marginal advantage over competitors.
In this concluding chapter I have assessed the overall contributions of this work, both on 
theoretical and managerial level. The theoretical contribution emerges primarily by combining 
the previous work of multiple scholars in multiple research streams into a new combined 
research stream. Based on the data obtained during this research process I have developed a 
model illustrating the cyclical interaction between the utility firms, their customers and the 
legislative regulatory environment, and included aspects of external influence. This model could 
help both firms and governments to understand the behavioral logic of the other party and thus, 
to help both parties to contribute to a stable, predictable development of a mutual regulatory 
and competitive framework. This in turn could contribute to creating an environment whereby 
Chapter 8 – Conclusions
208
the industry could develop so that the resources of society are deployed in an efficient fashion, 
and the prices of products and services would reflect the ability of the actors to sustainably 
develop the industry.
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APPENDIX A
REVIEW OF CASE STUDY LITERATURE
Bensabat et. al. Eisenhardt Glaser & Strauss Ragin & 
Becker
Yin
Approaches
Phases / 
components
Determining the unit of 
analysis, consideration 
whether to use single vs 
multiple cases, site 
selection and finally data 
collection followed by 
data analysis and 
exposition (page 374).
1. Getting started
2. Selecting cases
3. Crafting 
instruments and 
protocols
4. Entering the field
5. Analyzing within-
case data
6. Searching for cross 
case patterns
7. Shaping hypothesis
8. Enfolding literature
9. (reaching) Closure
1. Comparing 
incidents 
applicable to each 
category
2. Integrating 
categories and 
their properties
3. Delimiting the 
theory
4. Writing the 
theory
Ragin and 
Becker 
concentrate on 
defining the 
case and discuss 
the overall 
process. They 
do not provide 
detailed 
instructions how 
to carry out the 
research 
1. A study’s 
questions,
2. Its 
propositions, if 
any,
3. Its unique 
unit(s) of analysis
4. The logic 
linking the data to 
the propositions, 
and
5. The criteria for 
interpreting the 
findings.
Definition A case study examines a 
phenomenon in its 
natural setting, 
employing multiple 
methods or data 
collection to gather 
information from one or 
few entities. The 
boundaries of the 
phenomenon are not 
clearly evident at the 
outset of the research 
and no experimental 
control is used.
In case study researcher 
may have less a priori
knowledge of what 
variables of interest will 
The Case study is a 
research strategy, 
which focuses on 
understanding the 
dynamics present 
within single settings.
1. A case study is 
an empirical 
inquiry that:
* Investigates a 
contemporary 
phenomenon 
within its real-life 
context, 
especially when
* The boundaries 
between 
phenomenon and 
context are not 
clearly evident
2. The case study 
Appendix A
238
be and how they will be 
measured.  
inquiry
* Copes with 
technically 
distinctive 
situation in which 
there will be 
many more 
variable of 
interest than data 
points, and as one 
result
* Relies on 
multiple sources 
of evidence, with 
needing to 
converge in a 
triangulating 
fashion, and as 
another result
* Benefits from 
the prior 
development of 
theoretical
propositions to 
guide data 
collection and 
analysis
Theory 
generation
The analysis of case data 
depends heavily on the 
interrogative powers of 
the researcher. Using 
multiple methods of data 
collection offers the 
opportunity for 
triangulation and lends 
greater supports for 
researcher’s conclusions. 
Working with a research 
partner could provide 
assistance.
The research should 
move from objectives 
Should begin as close 
as possible to the ideal 
of no theory. 
The resultant theory is 
often novel, testable 
and empirically valid.
The process is 
intimately tied with 
empirical evidence.
Contradictory 
information could 
help generating. 
• Towards the end 
of the process, the 
researcher could 
become overly 
confident with the 
theory that 
emerged from the 
collected data
• When presenting 
the findings, 
substantial 
description of the 
field studied 
should be 
included in the 
The authors 
present the 
Mill’s method 
where the two 
cases are 
divided into 
components 
consisting of the 
dependent 
variable and a 
group of 
independent 
variable. 
Comparing 
these to each 
• Relying on
theoretical 
propositions. By 
this Yin means 
“following your 
instincts”, i.e. the 
original idea the 
whole research is 
based on.
• Thinking about 
rival 
explanations. Yin 
means that the 
researcher should 
be functioning 
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and questions to 
assumptions and design 
choices, to specific data 
uncovered and finally to 
results and conclusions. 
readers should be able to 
follow this path readily.
report so that even 
a layman is able 
to follow the 
presented logic
• The researcher 
should be 
concerned about 
the credibility of 
the presented 
material, and pay 
enough attention 
on comparing the 
findings with 
reference groups
• When presenting 
the theory, even 
more rigorous 
testing of the 
theory could be 
justifiable to 
satisfy even the 
most demanding 
readers’ appetite.
other provides 
insight on how 
the cases differ 
and what could 
be the decisive 
contributor to 
the different 
outcome.
This method 
suits the Small 
N case studies.
like “a devils’ 
advocate”, trying 
to elaborate 
rivalling theories. 
• Developing a 
case description. 
In this option Yin 
encourages to 
prepare a case 
description 
framework for 
organizing the 
case.  
• The case study 
must be 
significant. This 
primarily refers to 
not selecting an 
area of research 
that does not have 
any significance.
• The case study 
must be 
complete.  This 
means that the 
case being 
studied is one in 
which the 
boundaries of the 
case- that is 
distinction 
between the 
phenomenon 
being studied and 
its context – are 
given explicit 
attention
• The case must 
consider 
alternative 
perspectives. 
• The case study 
must display 
sufficient 
evidence. The 
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critical pieces of 
evidence must be 
contained within 
the case study 
report.
• The case study 
must be 
composed in an 
engaging manner.
Assessing 
the theory
Strength is that it is 
likely to generate a 
new theory
The emergent theory 
is likely to be testable 
with constructs that 
can be readily 
measured and 
hypothesis that can be 
proven false.
Theory is likely to be 
empirically valid. 
A good theory should 
be parsimonious, 
testable and logically 
coherent.
A strong theory 
should have a good, 
although not 
necessarily perfect fit 
with data.
1. Accurate 
Evidence:
On the factual 
level the evidence 
collected must be 
reflected versus 
comparative 
group to verify 
that a fact is a 
fact. This means 
that as the theory 
will be based on 
the data obtained 
from the 
case/cases in 
question.
2. Empirical 
generalization:
The 
generalization 
helps the 
researcher to 
delimit the 
grounded theory’s 
limits and helps to 
answer the 
question whether 
a fact derived 
from the research 
generally applies.
3. Specifying a 
Concept:
Another use of 
comparative data 
is to specify a unit 
of analysis for 
• Construct 
validity, 
establishing 
correct 
operational 
measures for the 
concepts being 
studied
• Internal validity 
(for explanatory 
or causal studies 
only, not for 
descriptive or 
exploratory 
studies), 
establishing a 
causal 
relationship, 
whereby certain 
conditions are 
shown to lead to 
other conditions, 
as distinguished 
from spurious 
relationships
• External 
validity, 
establishing the 
domain to which 
a study’s findings 
can be 
generalized,
• Reliability, 
demonstrating 
that the 
operations of a 
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one-case-study. 
This is done by 
specifying the 
dimensions of the 
concept 
designating unit.
4. Verifying the 
Theory:
Collected 
evidence can be 
used to verify the 
theory. The 
comparative data 
can be regarded as 
the best test for 
the applicability 
of the theory.
5. Generating 
Theory
The main goal for 
the researcher 
should be to use 
the collected data 
for purposeful 
systematically 
generating of new 
theories from the 
data.
study – such as 
the data 
collection 
procedures – can 
be repeated, with 
the same results
Criticism • In the published case 
study research--- the 
objective of the study 
was seldom clearly 
specified (page 378)
• They regard most of 
the analyzed studies as 
explanatory in nature, 
where “it is difficult to 
determine if the 
researchers were at the 
same time attempting to 
generate 
hypotheses”(page 378). 
They found, that the 
studies surveyed “did 
Intensive use of 
empirical evidence 
can yield a theory, 
which is overly 
complex.
May result in narrow 
and idiosyncratic 
theory.  
• Towards the end 
of the process, the 
researcher could 
become overly 
confident with the 
theory that 
emerged from the 
collected data
• When presenting 
the findings, 
substantial 
description of the 
field studied 
should be 
included in the 
report so that even 
This method 
requires very 
strong 
assumptions: a 
deterministic set 
of forces; the 
existence of 
only one cause; 
the absence of 
interaction 
effects; 
confidence that 
all possible 
causes are 
measured; the 
absence of 
• Construct 
validity, 
establishing 
correct 
operational 
measures for the 
concepts being 
studied
• Internal validity 
(for explanatory 
or causal studies 
only, not for 
descriptive or 
exploratory 
studies), 
establishing a 
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not provide clear 
descriptions of where 
their topics fit in the 
knowledge building 
process” (page 380)
• “Authors in our sample 
did not indicate if their 
case studies were part of 
systematic/programmatic 
research plans.” (page 
381)
• “The degree of detail 
about data collection 
methods was not very 
revealing, a substantial 
problem with most of the 
case studies observed” 
(page 382)
a layman is able 
to follow the 
presented logic
• The researcher 
should be 
concerned about 
the credibility of 
the presented 
material, and pay 
enough attention 
on comparing the 
findings with 
reference groups
• When presenting 
the theory, even 
more rigorous 
testing of the 
theory could be 
justifiable to 
satisfy even the 
most demanding 
readers appetite.
measurement 
errors; 
assumption that 
the same pattern 
would occur if 
data were 
obtained fro all 
cases in the 
universe of 
relevant cases.
causal 
relationship, 
whereby certain 
conditions are 
shown to lead to 
other conditions, 
as distinguished 
from spurious 
relationships
• External 
validity, 
establishing the 
domain to which 
a study’s findings 
can be 
generalized,
• Reliability, 
demonstrating 
that the 
operations of a 
study – such as 
the data 
collection 
procedures – can 
be repeated, with 
the same results
Applications 1. The phenomenon of 
interest can be studied in 
its natural setting and 
learn about the state of 
the art and generate 
theories from practice
2. The case method 
allows the researcher to 
answer how and why 
questions and to 
understand the nature 
and complexity of the 
process.
3. A case study is an 
appropriate way to 
research an area in 
which few previous 
studies have been carried 
out.
1. Can the phenomenon 
Situations when little 
is known of the 
phenomenon, current 
perspectives seem 
inadequate, because 
they have little
empirical 
substantiation or they 
conflict with each 
other or common 
sense. 
Case research is 
complementary to 
incremental theory 
building from normal 
science research. 
Small N case 
studies
* To explain the 
presumed causal 
links in real-life 
interventions that 
are too complex 
for the survey or 
experimental 
strategies
* To describe an 
intervention and 
the real-life 
context in which 
it occurred
* To illustrate 
certain topics 
within an 
evaluation in a 
descriptive mode
* To explore 
those situations in 
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of interest be studied 
outside its natural 
settings?
2. Must the study focus 
on contemporary events?
3. Is control or 
manipulation of subjects 
or events necessary?
4. Does the phenomenon 
of interest enjoy an 
established theoretical 
base?*
Case study is appropriate 
for certain types of 
problems: those in which 
research and theory are 
at their early, formative 
stages and sticky 
practice based problems 
where the experiences of 
the actors are important 
and the context of action 
is critical.
which the 
intervention 
being evaluated 
has not clear, 
single set of 
outcomes
* It may be a 
meta-evaluation, 
a study of an 
evaluation study.
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APPENDIX B
FORMULA FOR BUSINESS DIVERSITY AND 
CORPORATE TURNAROUND INDEX
Calculating the Business Diversity Index
The intention of the company Business Diversity Index is to illustrate how balanced the business 
portfolio of the firm is and how much the firm is a one business firm. The higher the value of the 
index, the more balanced is the business portfolio of the firm and to a lesser extent it is a one 
business firm The contrary is also true, i.e. the lower the value of the index, the lesser is the 
extent that the firm is diversified and more dominated by one business area. In case the three 
largest business areas have the same size, the value of BDI would be 2. In case the largest 
business area is double the volume of the two next business areas, the resulting value of BDI 
would be 0,5. The BDI is calculated as follows:
BDIn = Sum (Rev(B2n), Rev(B3 n) / Rev (B1 n), where
BDI
 n = Business diversity Index of firm n
Rev (B
 n)  = Revenue from Business n, where n illustrates the relative significance of a business 
within a firm, i.e. Rev (B1
 n) reflects the revenue from the biggest business unit, Rev(B2n) and 
Rev(B3
 n) subsequently reflect the revenues form the second and third largest business unit. 
Towards integrated measure of achievement, Corporate Turnaround index
In the literature, success is in most cases understood as financial or operational performance, and 
thus the operationalization of performance is based on accounting or operational performance 
indicators. For the purposes of this research it was deemed practical to develop a new index that 
would combine the accounting-based and operational measures with the actions of the firm in a 
form of a common index illustrating the achievement of the firm. This would serve the purposes 
of variance strategy in sense making (Langley 1999). The following thus incorporates the 
financial and operational performance indicators into indicators that illustrate the actions the firm 
is taking based on the selected strategic direction. 
The accounting-based indicators, though the differences in accounting standards and practices 
makes comparison between different regimes somewhat challenging, provide a clear image of 
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the financial performance measure of the firm within a regime context. The operational 
indicators, measured as market share, operational efficiency or other measures, in turn illustrate 
the operational performance. For the purposes of this research, the intention was to complement 
the accounting and operational measures by indicators that illustrate the effect of the strategy and 
the actions taken by the management. The strategic action indicators illustrate actions of the 
firm, like acquisitions, investments, changes in top management positions, realization of IPO etc 
and form an index illustrating the achievements, and incorporating thus the financial success 
with the actions by the management. The composite index is called the Corporate Turnaround 
Index. The composition of the CTI is presented below.
In the CTI the actions of the management and the result of these actions are both represented, 
and thus one can state that this leads to double accounting of cause and effect. However, in many 
cases to assess the change of a corporate only by the results of the actions will take time. Before 
the results of the actions will become visible, several years could pass so in order to assess the 
actions of the management to change the firm from inside within a short time frame, a measure 
that eliminates or speeds up the time factor will serve the purpose. The CTI together with its 
component indices will clearly illustrate the actions that will cause the change to take place 
within the context of the firm. 
The purpose of the CTI is to illustrate the pace at which company turnaround is carried out. 
Several aspects all contribute to the turnaround of the company, and thus the purpose of the CTI 
index is to include all the relevant yardsticks, each of which can be used to indicate the pace of 
which the company is transformed into something it has not been before. The intention is to 
collect all these aspect under one title and then use this yardstick to illustrate the success of 
corporate management efforts in altering the company to a desires direction.
The actions the firm is taking are illustrated in the CTI as an activity pattern. This pattern is then 
combined to the financial performance data to produce a Corporate Turnaround Index, CTI to 
demonstrate the dominant activity pattern of the firm. The CTI is presented in detail below.
The CTI will thus be a composite index, containing all the most significant aspect that can be 
used to measure the corporate turnaround.  It will contain accounting-based performance 
measures, operational performance measures, and basic indications of action the management of 
the company has taken to realize the corporate strategy.
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In the context of this research, the CTI was used as anchored to the time of market opening for 
competition. This was done in order to facilitate cross case comparison and reveal the impact of 
opening the market for competition.
The CTI is calculated as follows:
CTI(C)n =  ln(FStr(C,Strn) * FAcq(C,Acqn) * FCiM(C,CiMn) * FInv(C,Invn) * FPro(C,Pron) * 
FOwn(C,Ownn) * FOpe(C,Open)), where
CTI(C)n = Company Turnaround Index for company C on year n 
ln = Natural logarithm, where the base is e, an un-ending Decimal with a approximate 
value e=2.718281828… e is the unique number with the property that the area of the region 
bounded by the hyperbola y=1/x, the x-axis, and the vertical lines x = 1 and x = e is 1.
FStr(C,Strn)  = Strategy success index for company C on year n, where the value = 1 + the 
ratio of the change in net sales on year n over net sales on reference year, (year of deregulation)
FAcq(C,Acqn)= Acquisition Index for company C on year n, where the value =
1+Ln(N), where N equals the total number of acquisitions since reference year, (year of 
deregulation, the year of deregulation excluded and the year prior to the year N included)
FCiM(C,CiMn) = Management index for company C on year n, where the value   =
(1+ Ln(1+Ln(∑Qn-1)), where ∑Qn-1 equals the number of substantial management position 
nominations since reference year, (year of deregulation, the year of deregulation excluded and 
the year prior to the year n included)
FInv(C,Invn) =  Investment index for company C on year n, where the value= 1+Ln((∑In-1)),
where I equals number of major investments annually since reference year, (year of deregulation, 
the year of deregulation excluded and the year prior to the year n included))
FPro(C,Pron) = Profitability index for company C on year n, where the value = ROCE 
of year n over ROCE of the reference year, (year of deregulation)
FOwn(C,Ownn) = Ownership structure index for company C on year n 
FOpe(C,Open) = Operation cost index fro company C on year n 
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APPENDIX C
VARIABLES USED IN ESA FOR CONSTELLATION, 
FORTUM CORPORATION, VATTENFALL AND 
CENTRICA
CONSTELLATION
NEPA - In 1992 the US Congress passed the National Energy Policy Act. 
BGEREQ - requests by BGE to the Commission to permit it to set up a holding company that 
would allow it to enter competitive markets. 
HB 703, SB 300 – Passing of House Bill 703 and Senate Bill 300
ING1993 - in 1993 the commission initiated an investigation on the allocation of costs within the 
company between the regulated and unregulated business activities. 
MDBOU1993 - the regional boundaries for electric utilities service areas in the state of 
Maryland were established. 
ING1993 and ING1994 - the commission initiated an investigation on the promotional practices 
of BGE and the tariff structure. 
ING1995 - the Commission initiated an inquiry on the framework for gas business deregulation.
MKTr1995 - BGE applied for a transition to market-based rates in its gas business. 
GASORG - BGE organized the gas procurement to a subsidiary. 
CTAR1995 the Commission set targets for the generation business. 
CONST Constellation was founded in 1995. 
ENRON Throughout the 1990s Enron was the driving force trying to persuade both the Federal 
Government and the various states in trying to open the energy markets for competition62.
FERC888 - FERC order 888, issued on April 24, 1996 “Open Access Transmission Order”
which set the standard for rules regarding access to the network by for the generators and 
62 Multiple discussions at Maryland PSC.
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required transmission line owners to offer access to the grid at prices comparable to those they 
charge to themselves.
ING1996 - In 1996 (the Commission initiated an inquiry into the provision and regulation of 
electric service. In December 1996). 
INGa1996 - the Commission initiated an inquiry of the company’s practices under certain tariffs 
regarding customer enrolment practices. This was followed in 1997.
ING1997 - the Commission initiated an inquiry on the standards of conduct. 
FIL1997 - In April 1997 the company finally filed the application to merge. This merger was 
then put into reality in 1999 through a share exchange.
SB 851 - Passing in April 1997 of Senate Bill 851 
CO8738 - In 1997 Maryland PSC issued an Order 8738 establishing a framework for the 
restructuring of the electric power industry. 
The Commission had a role as an advisor to the governor, the state senate and house. The 
Commission being politically nominated by the governor kept continuous contact with the 
governor and the state parliament, especially during the legislative sessions in the beginning of 
each calendar year. 
CPERF1998 - In 1998 the Commission set performance targets for the BGE generation activity 
BGESTRC - BGE application to recover stranded cost. 
OPC1998 - In 1998 the Office of People’s Counsel as an advocate of the consumer groups 
requested the reduction in retail rates. 
SETL1998 - In the 1998 Settlement agreement, the Maryland utilities (including BGE) OPC and 
the Commission agreed on two phase market opening incorporating all the actions into one 
package.
HB 3 and SB 65 - In 1999 House Bill 3 and Senate Bill 65 allowed BGE to form a holding 
company. 
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HB 703 and SB 300 - In 1999 the House Bill 703 and Senate Bill 300 “Maryland Customer 
Choice and Competition Act,” enacted restructuring legislation in Maryland. 
RESTRPLAN - BGE submitted its new restructuring proposals in July 1999 to the PSC. 
FERC2000 - In, 1999 FERC issued Order 2000 on regional transmission organizations (RTOs). 
GENTRANS - In March 2000 the generation assets of BGE were transferred to Constellation 
on book value.
COMPSWITCH - Throughout the observation period the share of residential customers 
switching supplier was negligible. However, it has to be pointed out, that this was the case only 
among residential customers while the larger industrial customers typically did use the 
opportunity to switch supplier63. The primarily commercial and industrial customer switching is 
indicated as.
IPO - In the year 2000 the IPO of Constellation, 
SEPAR - October 2000 the merchant energy business were separated from retail services 
business.
UWDON - Donations, specifically to United Way were constantly on the agenda.
FINPR - The financial problems of 2001 resulting from continued investments in different 
competitive power generation projects. 
CEO - The 2001 nomination of Mayo A. Shattuck as the president and. CEO. 
NEWSTRAT, NEWORG - The new CEO quickly changed the strategy and the organizational 
shape of the firm.
FINIMP - in 2002 the improvement of the financial situation of the company. 
NOM - The 2002 wave of nominations. 
SB 285 - In 2004 the Maryland Senate passed Senate Bill 285 that required electric firms in 
Maryland to conduct a study tracking shifts in generation and emissions as a result of 
restructuring the electric industry.
63 Monthly customer switching statistics provided by Maryland PSC.
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BGEFERC - In 2005, BGE and other transmission owners filed a joint application at FERC to 
have network transmission rates established through a formula that tracks costs instead of 
through fixed rates in accordance with FERC guidelines. 
EPA2005 - Introduction of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
Expected price increases - The major hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the fall of 2005 caused a
rapid rise in natural gas prices, followed by a rapid rise in the power market prices. As the rate 
freeze was determined to expire in July 2006, there was general anticipation of a substantial 
price shock in the retail prices of electricity.  The expected rate increases caused an intense 
political debate which resulted in an arrangement de-facto postponing the rate increases by a 
year.
ELECT06 -In 2006 the gubernatorial elections in Maryland.
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FORTUM CORPORATION 
IVOSTR - Imatran Voima (IVO) sought growth opportunities pursuing an internationalization 
strategy.
IVOI - The establishment of IVO International.
IVOGES - Establishment of IVO generation services. 
Telivo - Establishment of a subsidiary for providing national long distance telecom services was
established.
90/547/EEC - Introducing directive for the transit of electricity through transmission grids.
90/377/EEC - Community procedure to improve the transparency of gas and electricity prices 
charged to industrial end-users
EMA95 - The government’s proposal on law opening power markets for competition, electricity 
market act was given in August 1994 to the parliament (HE 138/94) and later passed as law 
386/1995
LEXCOM - The transmission network operators and all key players in the power market 
provided an opinion on the proposed EMA legislation.
REG - Law proposal on the establishment of an electricity regulator was then subsequently 
given to the parliament as government proposal HE 202/1994. 
TECOMPL99 - Complaints about the distribution rates of Tuusulanjärven Energia (later Fortum 
Distribution) regarding the rates of the company.
EMA01 - The energy market Authority ruled in 2001 that for 1999 the rates would need to be 
corrected retroactively.
IVONSTR - As a reaction to the simultaneous introduction of competition in Finland and 
Sweden, in 1996 IVO had started implementing a new strategy. 
ACQGS - buying shares of Gulspång. 
ACQSEV - Gulspång acquired Skandinaviska Elverk (SEV). 
Appendix C
252
ESTB - establishment of Birka, a joint venture with the City of Stockholm.
1stPackage - The Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
December 1996 set out the framework for common rules for the internal market in electricity. 
2ndPackage - This first package has the subsequently been complemented by the second package 
(2003/54/EC).
FG - Merging the transmission networks of Imatran Voima and Teollisuuden Voimansiirto to 
form Fingrid. 
FORTUM - Merger of Neste Oy and Imatran Voima Oy. 
1stCEO - The CEO of IVO, Heikki Marttinen was nominated as the CEO of Fortum. 
FINISTR - The initial strategy of Fortum.
PR1 - The media blaming the company’s two-headed management structure for causing a lack 
of direction and profile in the company. 
CEONOM - Mikael Lilius nomination as a CEO of Fortum. 
FORSTR - The new strategy of Fortum. 
ACQSE - Acquisition of Stora Enso’s power assets in the Nordic region.
ACQWE - Acquisition of Wesertal in northern Germany.  
ACQLV - Acquisition of Länsivoima Oyj .
ACQBIR - Purchase of outstanding shares of Birka Energi. 
FOR01 - A response to the EMA ruling Fortum applied to supreme administrative. 
DIV02 - Divestmenet of the shares of Fortum Energie GmbH in Germany () (Wesertal. 
KHO02 - The supreme administrative court ruled in December that the EMA ruling of 2001, 
2002 (3349, Dnro 1244/2/01) was correct. 
DISMER - Fortum merged the distribution businesses. 
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OL3APR - The parliament approved the construction of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant..
OL3FOR - Fortum decided to participate in the new nuclear generation project in Olkiluoto. 
DEMER - Oil businesses were separated from Fortum. 
ACQEON - Fortum acquired E.On Finland. 
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VATTENFALL  
NUCREF - Referendum on the fate of nuclear power in the country. 
ALTEN - Development on alternative energy sources. 
NGINT85 - Natural gas was introduced in Sweden.
BCLO99 - Barsebäck I was shut down in fall of 1999. 
BCLO05 - Barsebäck's second reactor shut down was scheduled for. 
VINC92 - Vattenfall was incorporated as a public limited company. 
SKDEM - The national power transmission network, Svenska Kraftnät was unbundled. 
POLENT92 - Vattenfall entering the Polish energy market.
INTSALE95 - Selling power to Enso-Gutzeit and mining group Outokumpu in 1995. 
INTSTRAT - International growth strategy for Vattenfall. 
DEREG96 - The electricity market was opened for competition. 
EI96 - A regulator, Energimarknadsinspektionen was established. 
NP93 - Nord Pool was founded
SWPN96 - 1996 Sweden joined the power exchange. 
VFOY94 - Setting up a subsidiary in Finland Vattenfall Oy, in 1994.
FINACQ95 - Purchase of two regional electricity producers in Finland. 
FINDER95 - Finnish market opening for competition the company also began selling electricity 
directly to customers in Finland.
VFN95 - Vattenfall entered Norway.
VFD95 - Vattenfall entered Denmark. 
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GER96 - Vattenfall took its first steps into the German market, setting up a joint venture, Vesa 
Energy. 
HS96 - Acquisition of a distribution company in Finland, Hämeen Sähkö in 1996. 
GERDEG98 - German electricity market was deregulated in 1998.
HEW99 - Vattenfall acquired 25.1 per cent in Hamburgische Elekrizitätz - Werke AG. 
VFEUR00) - Vattenfall Europe was formed 
POLACQ00 - In 2000 Vattenfall acquired a 55 per cent holding in Electrocieplownie 
Warszawiskie (EW).
VEAG01 - Acquisition of generation and transmission network company Veag Vereinigte 
Energiewerke AG and the fuel supplier Lausitzer Braunkohle. 
BEWAG01 - Acquisition of Bewag. 
GRWTH - The company effectively doubled its revenue base, not to mention the impact for 
assets.
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CENTRICA
GA48 - The 1948 gas act. 
NGDISC - Gas discovery in the North Sea.
GASCONV - Decision to convert Britain to natural gas. 
GA72 - The 1972 gas act.
EGA82 - The 1982 oil and gas (enterprise) act. 
TPA82 - Third party access.
PRIV86 - Privatization of the company.
OFGAS - The establishment of the regulator, Ofgas.
MKTSRED - A request to reduce its market. 
NEWCOMP - New competitors entering the market. 
MMC93 - Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) inquiry. 
DOMCOMP - Opening of domestic gas market to competition. 
BGRSTR97 - BG restructuring. 
DEMER- BG demerger.
POWSAL97 - Introduction of electricity sales. 
CUSTSWITCH - Customers switching to BG.
HUMACQ01 - Acquisition of Humber Power Limited. 
ENACQ01 - Acquisition of Enron’s former energy customer business.
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APPENDIX D
INTERVIEWS
Glenn Schleede
Paul Dragoumis
Jorma Väkiparta
John Murach and David Sikora, BGE
Alan Wyatt, Paul Hallas, Centrica 
Tom Brady, Larry McDonald and Pentti Aro, Constellation
Branko Berzic, Deloitte
Paterson Brown, DoC
Jeff Skeer, DoE
John Clarkson Robert Paislee, Tarja Kunnas, Bob Byrd Embassy of the United States in Helsinki
Kenneth Hänninen, Energiateollisuus 
John W Rowe, Exelon
David Mead, Udi Helman, Sebastian Tiger, FERC
Tapio Kuula, Fortum
Roger Gale, GF Energy
Juho Lipponen, Eurelectric
Lars-Olof Hollner, EU Representation in Washington DC, Kalervo Rötsä, Augustin van 
Hasteren, Philippe Chauve, William Webster, European Commission
Dr Michael Canes, LMI Research Institute
Bob Linden and Ed Kee, PA Consulting Group
John Derrick Jr, PEPCO
Phillip G Harris, PJM
Roy Granroth,Akke Kuusela, Porvoon Energia
Debra Reed, Sempra
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Gunnar Lundberg, Vattenfall
Mikko Kara, Olli Ernvall, VTT
Multiple discussionas at EMV
Multiple discussionas at MDPSC
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